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IN 1927 BY 
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Christian Beltef in God 


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Published on the foundation established 


in memory of James Wesley Cooper of 
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Christian Belief in God. 


A German Criticism of German 
Materialistic Philosophy by 
Georg Wobbermin, Ph.D. 
Professor of Dogmatics in the 
University of Heidelberg. 
Translated from the third German edition by 


Daniel Sommer Robinson, Ph.D. 
Acting Chaplain, U.S.N. 





New Haven, 
Yale University Press. 
Mdcccexviit. 


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OPYRIGHT, 10918, ctbakan, 
ete YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 


_ First published, September, 1918. 


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THE JAMES WESLEY COOPER 
MEMORIAL PUBLICATION FUND 


HE present volume is the first work published 
by the Yale University Press on the James Wesley 
Cooper Memorial Publication Fund. This Founda- 
tion was established March 30th, 1918, by a gift to 
Yale University from Mrs. Ellen H. Cooper in memory 
of her husband, Rev. James Wesley Cooper, D. D., 
who was born in New Haven, Connecticut, October 6, 
1842, and died in New York City, March 16, 1916. 
Dr. Cooper was a member of the Class of 1865, Yale 
College, and for twenty-five years pastor of the South 
Congregational Church of New Britain, Connecticut. 
For thirty years he was a corporate member of the 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mis- 
sions and from 1885 until the time of his death was a 
Fellow of Yale University, serving on the Corporation 
as one of the Successors of the Original Trustees. 


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Publishers’ Foreword 


HE original work of Dr. Wobbermin was first 

published in Germany in 1900, being re- 
printed in 1907 and again in 1911. It was suggested 
that a translation should be brought out in this 
country by the Yale University Press, and the 
proposal was in December, 1914, brought formally 
before the Council’s Committee on Publications 
of Yale University for its sanction. With the ap- 
proval of the Committee arrangements were there- 
after entered into with Dr. Daniel S. Robinson 
now Acting Chaplain, U.S. N., for the preparation 
of an American edition. The publication just at 
this time of his translation of Dr. Wobbermin’s 
work seems especially significant since it presents 
to our people a careful analysis and incisive criti- 
cism by a German of that modernized form of 
German materialism and evolutionism expounded 
by such writers as Nietzsche and Haeckel. It has 
been felt by the publishers that it was desirable to 
make available this criticism by a German of Ger- 
man materialistic philosophy for the benefit of 
English-speaking people who seek to acquaint 
themselves with, even if they find it impossible to 
understand, the dominant thought of modern 
Germany. 


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Translator’s Preface 


N such a calamitous time as this, when the 

question is quite generally being asked “Can 
any good thing come out of Germany?” it is with 
considerable trepidation that I venture to offer to 
the public a translation of a German book on the 
philosophy of religion. I am convinced, however, 
that any reader who may pick up this book with 
this sceptical attitude, will lay it down—if he will 
but carefully and thoughtfully read it through— 
with the consciousness that he has been guided 
through a most interesting mass of facts and the- 
ories by a thinker of the first rank. 

Dr. Wobbermin needs no introduction to stu- 
dents of systematic theology and the philosophy of 
religion. It is generally known in theological circles 
that he delivered, in 1907, the Nathaniel William 
Taylor lectures at Yale University, and that one 
of these lectures was published shortly afterward 
in the Yale “ Divinity Quarterly.” That is all that 
has hitherto appeared in English from his pen. 
But in Germany he is known as the author of many 
important contributions to the history, as well as 
to the psychology and the philosophy of religion. 
His influence in German theology has grown until 
he stands today second to none among systematic 
theologians. It may be of interest to some to learn 


xiii 


Christian Belief in God 


that it was Dr. Wobbermin who translated into 
German William James’ “Varieties of Religious 
Experience,” and that he has been considerably 
influenced by James, although much more by 
Schleiermacher and Ritschl in theology, and by 
Kant in epistemology. He was recently transferred 
from the University of Breslau to that of Heidel- 
berg. 

I trust that readers of this translation may be 
induced to read other of Dr. Wobbermin’s writings. 
His ‘‘Theologie und Metaphysik,”’ “‘Systematische 
Theologie,”’ (of which only one volume has so far 
appeared) and his ‘‘ Monismus und Monotheismus”’ 
are especially valuable. I have appended to the 
notes at the end of the book a list of the books by 
Dr. Wobbermin published by J. C. Hinrichs and 
Company, of Leipzig, in appreciation of their hav- 
ing given me the English rights on this book. How- 
ever, this is not a complete bibliography of Dr. 
Wobbermin’s writings, since some of his books 
have been published by other firms. 

This translation was completed and was accepted 
for publication several months ago. In fact, the 
work was practically completed at the outbreak 
of the world-war. Quite recently, however, the 
text has been carefully revised. In making this 
revision I was fortunate in securing the valuable 
assistance of Dr. Franz J. Déhmen, of Cambridge, 
Mass., who made a minute comparison of my 
translation with the original, and provided me with 
an alternative rendering. The translation as it now 


XIV 


Translator’s Preface 


stands embodies most of his changes. His thor- 
ough familiarity with both languages made it pos- 
sible for him to correct many errors into which I 
had been led, and I am greatly indebted to him for 
making it possible for me to offer a much more 
accurate rendition than I could have done had I 
published my original translation. However, I 
have been guided throughout by the desire to make 
the book read like English rather than by the de- 
sire to be slavishly true to the original. 

I am also indebted to Professor Douglas Clyde 
Macintosh for valuable assistance and encourage- 
ment, and to Dr. Wobbermin for having read my 
manuscript and for giving many helpful suggestions. 


Do Se R. 
Newport, N. H., 
March 9, 1918. 


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i 


Preface to the Third German 
Edition 


HIS little book seems to have met the modest 

purpose for which it was intended. The text 
remains unaltered in this third edition, but the 
notes and references have been revised and 
made more complete. In doing this I have kept 
strictly to my original intention that this booklet 
should serve simply as an orientation and as a 
guide to further study. 

For a fuller discussion of the thoughts expressed 
in this book, I refer to my recently published 
“Monismus and Monotheismus, Vortrage und 
Abhandlungen zum Kampf um die monistische 
Weltanschauung,” Tubingen, 1911. 


GEORG WOBBERMIN. 
Breslau, July, 1911. 


XVii 


Table of Contents 


PAGE 
PDAS ROEE FORAGING 5855.2. 62508. 59s 5 Skiers 5 GE xi 
DT CMMOONCOPE ROTO OSL. os Le als we wate gee ae xiii 
Preface to Third German Edition.................44. XVii 
Chapter One. 
The chief tendencies of present-day philosophy, 
and its relation to modern natural science ....... I 
Chapter Two. 
Epistemology and the Christian belief in God... 31 
Chapter Three. 
Cosmology and the Christian belief in God...... 52 
Chapter Four. 
Biology and the Christian belief in God........ 79 
A. Teleology in organic nature..... ....... 79 
B. Propagation and Evolution as the cul- 
mination of organic teleology .......... go 
C. Interpretation and delimitation of the con- 
ODT OF CVOMILION Gi 5 shidisinedicns sa cass 102 
Chapter Five. 
Psychology and the Christian belief in God...... 117 
RU REE MERTEN PCOS ig te ERG eG indie be dae ae 153 


xix 


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Chapter One 


The Chief Tendencies of Present-Day 
Philosophy and Its Relation ‘te Modera. 


Natural Science 


e 
aA 


RIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Be ‘aioe Ra OI 


philosopher of our day, has somewhere said 
that all systematizers should be distrusted and 
shunned, inasmuch as the will to systematize in- 
dicates a lack of integrity.* 

Nietzsche’s own works, with their brillant epi- 
grams, aphoristic in form and too often mutually 
contradictory, are indeed a model of absolute lack 
of system. Now it must be frankly conceded, so 
it seems to me, that the systems of human opinions 
and world-views, from the most ancient down to 
the most modern, and the purely philosophical 
no less than the theological, give this great scoffer 
sufficient occasion for this epigram. For they 
often resemble the work of the spider, who spins 
his ingenious web entirely from himself. But on 
the other hand, systematic completeness. belongs 
necessarily to every genuine philosophy in the 
sense that such a philosophy must proceed from a 
permanent, well-founded position, and from that 


* Gétzendimmerung, WW., VIII, p. 61. 
I 


Christian Belief in God 


seek to win a unified, harmonious view of things 
and of life. 

Both are, however, completely lacking in 
Nietzsche. Hence, in the proper meaning of the 
word he cannot even be considered a philosopher, 
to say nothing of his being taken as a representa- 
tive of current philosophy. To be sure Nietzsche 
_ represents mocernness in a certain sense; modern 
life, the stirrings and moods of the modern mind— 
its unrest, its disjomtedness, and its distraction. 
But precisely the most important characteristics 
of modern philosophy as modern are lacking in 
his works, the most important because they relate 
to the starting point and to the method of philoso- 
phizing. These characteristics are, to mention 
them here at the outset, empirical knowledge as 
the starting point, and critical thought as the 
method. Indeed with Nietzsche the lack of founda- 
tion and of system is so great that, taken as a 
whole, his doctrines and his world-view are equally 
as fanciful and capricious as cob-web systems. 

This is especially and quite manifestly true of 
his doctrine of the eternal recurrence of all things,* 
one of the two ideas really and steadily maintained 
by Nietzsche from their first conception. This 
theory, at least in the application which he makes 
of it and for which it is of consequence to him, is 


* This conception is found for the first time in the “‘Frohliche 
Wissenschaft,” which appeared in 1882. The same idea dominates 
the Zarathustra Schriften, and plays an important part in the 
posthumous works. 


2 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


the purest mythology. The supposition that 
everyone must live over again the life he is now 
living, and that this is to happen a countless num- 
ber of times—this new and unfruitful form of 
belief in immortality which Nietzsche sets over 
against the Christian belief, is, as I said, for present- 
day thought, the purest mythology; for it has 
neither a theoretical nor a practical basis, nor is 
one led to it either by theoretical or by practical 
motives. Among the Babylonians, the Pytha- 
goreans and the Stoics this belief at least had a 
proper meaning, but no such connotation belongs 
to it to-day. 

Nor is it very different with the other underlying 
and basic thought of Nietzsche, his cardinal and 
most unique underlying conception, namely, that 
of the necessity of a re-evaluation of all values, the 
necessity of substituting for the stupifying slave 
morality of sympathy the master morality which 
alone promotes culture, a morality of reckless self- 
assertion and self-indulgence. Here he has at 
least attempted to give a real demonstration, 
which is to be found in the “‘ Genealogy of Morals,”’ 
the only one of his so-called philosophical writings 
which might lay any claim to being scientific and 
philosophic. Nevertheless this attempt to give a 
historical or historico-philosophical basis to the 
doctrine of “double morality” fails completely. 
Instead of being historical it is in the highest degree 
unhistorical—a poetical, fanciful conception, or bet- 
ter, construction. The real historical development 


3 


Christian Belief in God 


of moral ideas, that is to say, of moral norms and 
values, cannot be fitted into the scheme of master 
and slave morality. Moreover, Christian morality, 
however much it desires to be and is universally 
humane, is not a slave morality in Nietzsche’s 
sense of demanding that all men be treated and 
valued as absolutely equal. Beyond doubt the 
kernel of truth in Nietzsche’s thought lies in his 
emphasis upon independence and the intrinsic 
value of the strong-willed personality. But on 
the other hand, unless we would drive this prin- 
ciple at once to extremes, we must not use it as 
an argument against Christian morality itself, but 
only to correct a pietistic limitation of Christian 
morality. Even so proud an utterance as that of 
Zarathustra: ‘‘And verily there came to me many 
a chance imperiously, but even more imperiously 
my will spake to it, and forthwith it lay upon its 
knees imploring mercy,” are so little in contradic- 
tion with the Gospel that, apart from the ambiguity 
of the word ‘“‘chance,’’ it expresses one and only 
one of the fundamental moods of the Bible. Think, 
for example, of the story of the temptation. 

In discussing these two fundamental conceptions 
I have already criticised the doctrine of the super- 
man which Nietzsche builds upon these two pillars. 
He is the superman who exalts himself above the 
crowd, who exalts himself, indeed, above the limita- 
tions of humanity itself. Therefore the morality 
of mankind is not applicable to him, but only that 
exceptional morality which Nietzsche designates 


4 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


master morality. Only the superman can endure 
the thought of an eternal recurrence. Hence it is 
precisely this belief in the eternal recurrence which 
overcomes humanity and breeds the superman. 
Consequently this idea of the superman is a fic- 
tion which entirely disregards experience. Indeed 
its supposition of the possibility of a breeding 
of the superman even directly contradicts ex- 
perience. 

Nietzsche intends this belief in the superman to 
supplant belief in God. ‘Dead are all the Gods: 
now do we desire the superman to live. Let this 
be our final will at the great noontide! Thus spake 
Zarathustra.” ‘‘Before God we are all equal, (so 
the populace blink). Before God!—Now, however, 
this God hath died. Ye higher men, this God was 
your greatest danger. Only since he lay in the grave 
have ye again risen. Now only cometh the great 
noon-tide. Now only doth the higher man be- 
come—master! God hath died, now do we desire 
the superman to live.’’ * 

As a matter of fact this conception of the super- 
man is even with Nietzsche manifoldly iridescent 
and often reshaped. Indeed he himself did not 
maintain it to the end. Hence what has been said 
may suffice to justify passing on over Nietzsche 
and his steadily growing animosity to the Christian 
belief in God, which in his later works already 
presages insanity. This belief he finally character- 
ized as the one great spiritual perversity, the one 

* WW. VI, pp. 115, 417. 


5 


Christian Belief in God 


ineffaceable blemish of humanity.* To be sure, 
disciples have gathered around the name of 
Nietzsche. Yes, a Nietzsche cult has sprung into 
existence! But the movement seems to be ebbing 
away even now, and there can be no doubt but 
that the waters will soon subside entirely of them- 
selves. A serious and thorough argument with 
Nietzsche over belief in God is neither possible nor 
necessary. His own words are valid against him- 
self: “‘This thinker needs no one to refute him 
because he does that sufficiently himself.”” A de- 
bate with his so-called disciples is even less neces- 
sary, since, almost without exception, they either 
fail to understand their master at all, or else they 
do not rightly interpret him. 

This does not mean, however, that the work of 
Nietzsche is entirely fruitless and valueless for 
religious thought and belief in God. On the con- 
trary it is possible for it to become exceptionally 
productive for such a purpose. For upon close 
examination it will be found that motives of a reli- 
gious nature are by no means lacking in Nietz- 
sche’s own thinking. But these genuine religious 
motives are, as a rule, either subsequently violently 
and artificially distorted, or else they lose their 
proper meaning. For example I need only to refer 
to the well-known verse in the famous ‘“‘ Midnight 
Song,” which friends and admirers have had 
chiseled upon the memorial stone on the shore of 
Lake Silser, in the Upper Engadine: 

* WW. VIL., p. 186 (Antichrist). 
6 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


“OQ man! Take heed! 

What saith deep midnight’s voice indeed? 
‘I slept my sleep— 

‘From deepest dream I’ve woke and plead :— 
‘The world is deep, 

‘And deeper than the day could read. 
‘Deep is its woe— 

‘Joy—deeper still than grief can be: 
‘Woe saith: Hence! -Go! 

‘But joys all want eternity— 

‘Want deep profound eternity!’” * 


Anyone having anything like a fine appreciation 
of the religious life will at once recognize the point 
of relation between the feeling expressed in this 
verse and belief in God. Nor is it merely a relation 
of remote analogy, indeed it is exactly the most 
significant psychological fundamental motives and 
fountain heads of religion which are involved. 


“The world is deep, 
And deeper than the day could read.” 


This implies that the meaning and import of the 
world which surrounds us, and in which we live, 


*T have taken this from the English translation of the works of 
Nietzsche. Vol. II, p. 279. Here is the original (WW. VI, 
P- 332): 

O Mensch! Gib acht! 

Was spricht die tiefe Mitternacht? 
Ich schlief, ich schlief—, 

Aus tiefem Traum bin ich erwacht :— 
Die Welt ist tief, 

Und tiefer als der Tag gedacht. 
Tief ist ihr Weh—, 

Lust—tiefer noch als Herzeleid: 
Weh spricht: Vergeh, 

Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit! 
Will tiefe, tiefe Ewigkeit! Tr. 


7 


Christian Belief in God 


is not to be fathomed by superficial reflection. And 
that means, in the first place, that the world has a 
meaning. It is not meaningless, purposeless and 
aimless. Consequently, realizing or at least divin- 
ing this, we may neither look upon nor conduct our 
life aimlessly and as though it were meaningless. 
And, in the second place, it means that only he who 
bores into the depths will be able to comprehend 
this meaning, for, as a matter of fact, it does not 
lie in that which presents itself immediately and 
passively to the senses. It is upon this conviction 
that religion bases its faith in a world or sphere of 
life of the ‘‘beyond,” a world which is designated 
or conceived as ‘‘beyond,”’ first, because, as is as- 
serted, in its nature and import it extends beyond 
the whole world of sense and phenomena (because 
it is deeper, or, to use a word which expresses the 
same thing under a different figure, higher than 
this); and second, because the phenomenal world 
receives meaning only by being brought into re- 
lation to the world of the ‘‘ beyond.” 
And again: 
‘‘Joy—deeper still than grief can be: 
Woe saith: Hence! Go! 


But joys all want eternity— 
Want deep profound eternity!” 


Such an ardent longing for eternity, for the values 
and realities of eternity over against the transitori- 
ness of all manifestations and achievements of the 
world of sense is another fundamental motive of re- 
ligion. And this is in closest accord with the dis- 


8 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


cussion above. The same thought is expressed in 
the hymn: 


O Ewigkeit, du schéne, 
Mein Herz an dich gewéhne, 
Mein Heim ist nicht in dieser Zeit. (Tersteegen.)* 


From this the desire is born in religion to subor- 
dinate everything of ‘‘this world” to the ‘world 
beyond.” To use the language of Schleiermacher, 
it is the desire “‘to become one with the infinite 
while still in the finite and eternal at once.” Of 
course the meaning of the words eternal and eter- 
nity in religious usage, especially in that of the 
Christian religion, is altogether different from that 
ordinarily connected with the words. Indeed, the 
quotation just given from the Christian author 
shows that very clearly. As interpreted by the 
Christian belief in God eternity does not mean 
simply the endlessness of time, and not, therefore, 
the passing of time. Indeed, if we seek an under- 
standing of the word eternity from the psychological 
approach, it stands in contrast with the temporal 
as such and means the surmounting of everything 
temporal and ephemeral—of all changing finite 
existence. And Nietzsche’s “Midnight Song” 
shows that he comprehended, at least in a measure, 
this turn and interpretation of the word. His more 
specific characterizations of eternity testify to 
this—“‘deep, profound eternity,” for it must be 
noted that the word deep here is manifestly in- 


*O Eternity, Thou beautiful, my heart lives in thee, my home 
is not in time. 


9 


Christian Belief in God 


tended to connect with and to recall the thought 
expressed in the preceding sentence—‘‘the world 
is deep.” But it is precisely this connection which 
is significant and conclusive for the religious con- 
sciousness. For eternity, in the sense in which the 
word is used in the Christian religion, signifies pre- 
cisely the eternal and profound substance of cosmic 
and of human history—its eternal foundation in 
God and its eternal relationship to God. 

Finally, therefore, these lines of Nietzsche lead 
to genuine religious optimism; not a powerless 
optimism which dreams itself away unaffected by 
the tribulations and contradictions of life, but a 
higher, courageous, strong-willed optimism which 
abides in spite of all adversity and suffering in its 
“nevertheless ”’ 


‘‘Joy—deeper still than grief can be.” 


For the ultimate and deepest meaning of the world 
does not lie in sorrow but only in joy; not in the 
depreciation and negation of life, but in its affirma- 
tion, enrichment and elevation. [Imbued with 
such optimism the Apostle Paul said: “‘ For our light 
affliction which is for the moment, worketh for us 
more and more exceedingly an eternal weight of 
glory, while we look not at the things which are 
seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the 
things which are seen are temporal, but the things 
which are not seen are eternal.”’ II Cor. 4, 17f. 
All of these thoughts, which spring from the 
depths of the human spirit, and which are from 


Io 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


their very conception intrinsically related with one 
another, are in the Christian belief in God con- 
sistently welded in the conviction that the phe- 
nomenal world, presenting itself to us to begin 
with, and our own life in it, are not ultimate, not 
an end and goal in themselves, but rather, that 
they have the ground and purpose for their exist- 
ence in a deeper or higher world—the world of 
God; and that it is only through reference to his 
eternal being and to the eternal essence of his 
Kingdom that God gives meaning and purpose to 
this phenomenal world of ours, supporting and 
actively permeating it. Thus the destiny and goal 
of human life is to grow beyond itself, and into 
fellowship with God. 

When once these feeling and thought motives so 
strongly attested by Nietzsche are recognized as 
valid and as pointing in the right direction, they 
can be united with the Christian belief in God and 
its ideal of fellowship with God. For this would 
be incomparably more natural and satisfactory than 
the interpretation of these motives of Nietzsche 
to favor the theories of the superman and the eter- 
nal recurrence of all things. For critically consid- 
ered these theories contradict and annul one an- 
other. For when the doctrine of the eternal and 
inevitable recurrence of all things (alles Werdens 
_ und Geschehens) is taken seriously there can be no 
final goal. Moreover, strictly speaking, the super- 
man cannot be the goal of evolution, for even the 
very idea of a development toward an end must 


It 


Christian Belief in God 


be unconditionally rejected. Indeed Nietzsche 
himself occasionally demanded this.* Yet this 
idea is the real motive of the whole doctrine of the 
superman! * 

But if Nietzsche cannot be considered a repre- 
sentative of present-day philosophy who can be 
so considered? Another name might be mentioned, 
and certainly with greater justification than that 
of Nietzsche—the name of Richard Avenarius 
(died 1896). He was the founder of what he called 
the empirio-critical philosophy or the philosophy 
of pure experience, and he was at one with Nietzsche 
in radical warfare against all forms of belief in God. 
But the philosophy of Avenarius is a polar opposite 
to that of Nietzsche. For he emphasizes empiri- 
cism—the actual reality—as the starting point of 
philosophizing, and demands just as emphatically 
the critical method (which is the real scientific 
method) for this philosophizing. Hence it is pos- 
sible to examine the philosophy of Avenarius criti- 
cally and in detail. Consequently it is not sur- 
prising that he has found adherents in considerable 
numbers among the younger generation of philos- 
ophers. In the “Vierteljahrsschrift fiir wissen- 
schaftliche Philosophie” this school possesses its 
own organ which is thoroughly modern. And in 
the discussion of philosophical problems this school 
has undertaken the extremely important task of 
bringing about a union and free interplay of ideas 
between philosophy and the exact sciences. Never- 

* WW. XII, pp. 51 ff. 
12 


Chapter I—Tendencies 
theless I can briefly dispose of this philosophy of 
pure experience. For while it may in fact be called 
the most characteristic phase of present-day scien- 
tific philosophy, yet it does not represent that 
philosophy with which we are concerned, be it 
as a dangerous opponent or as a welcome ally of the 
Christian belief in God. For the present this philos- 
ophy will not exercise a wide-spread influence, at 
least not in the form in which it has thus far been 
expounded. Neither the chief work of Avenarius 
himself—his voluminous ‘‘ Kritik der reinen Erfah- 
rung,” intentionally so entitled to pattern after 
Kant’s ‘‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’”—nor the 
works written by his pupils, among whom Willy 
and Petzoldt are the most representative, will be 
very influential. The highly complex terminology 
with which these works are set forth, and which 
requires study in itself, will prevent that. If 
Nietzsche attaches so much value to the linguistic 
terms, to the style and literary form, that the real 
philosophic interest stands in the background, the 
opposite extreme is found in the empirio-critical 
philosophy. Here there is a neglect of the art of 
expression that greatly impedes the understanding. 
The basic thesis of this philosophy, from which 
radical warfare against belief in God in any form 
at once follows, is the systematic rejection of the 
distinction between inner and outer experience. 
According to Avenarius this distinction, and the 
consequent assertion of a special inner experience 
along side of the outer, has heretofore been the 


13 


Christian Belief in God 


great and fundamental falsehood and self-deception 
of all methods of thought. He thinks that this 
distinction is entirely uncritical, and that it is 
directly connected with the naive, animistic con- 
ceptions which we find in children and uncivilized 
peoples, who transfer their psychical experiences 
to all objects perceived by them, thinking all of 
them animated, and thus finally set up a re- 
duplication of the whole conception of the world. 
Just as the doll or flying dragon is to the child not 
merely the particular thing of this or that kind, but 
at the same time the home and abode of some sort 
of special capabilities and powers, so every distinc- 
tion between inner and outer experience is claimed 
to rest upon a similar unwarranted reduplication 
of the given facts. Thus, then, belief in God would 
be proved a pure illusion, being rooted, and indeed 
admittedly so, in the inner experience pure and 
simple, even though the attempt be perhaps sub- 
sequently made of establishing it from outer ex- 
perience. 

This argument, however, undoubtedly rests upon 
serious epistemological and psychological errors. 
The distinction between inner and outer experience 
is warranted, indeed it is necessary, for it follows 
naturally and imperatively from the nature of the 
human psychical life. Our mind, or to put it dif- 
ferently, the content of our consciousness, and 
that is the only thing which is direct and immediate 
for us, is essentially of a dual nature. On the one 
hand, it consists of sense-mediated representations 


14 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


which point to material things external to us, and 
which present themselves with the claim of being 
images of these material things. But on the other 
hand, this content of consciousness is made up of 
a great variety of will-tensions (Willensspannun- 
gen) and impulses of feeling. The latter are dis- 
tinguished from the former just in this, that they 
do not, at least not directly and primarily, refer 
to things in the outer world, but that, on the con- 
trary, they merely express our own inner life. Sub- 
sequently, to be sure, these will-tensions and feeling 
impulses often give the mind occasion for assuming 
objects (still other objects than those mediated by 
the senses) as really existing in the outer world. 
Avenarius suppresses entirely the latter part of 
this duality, namely, the fact of will-tensions and 
feeling impulses. At any rate he suppresses it in 
his first formulation, but that is just where it would 
be of decisive significance. Later he gives this fact 
some consideration, but not until he has reached a 
point where it can no longer injure his theory—an 
artifice that is much favored and often used by 
systematizers. Only in this way are Avenarius and 
his disciples able to establish the fundamental 
thesis of their philosophy, a thesis which, from the 
outset, takes away the very basis of faith in God. 
The faultiness of this thesis is merely concealed by 
the mass of difficult and complex discussion of 
details. But the fundamental distinction between 
inner and outer experience remains valid, no mat- 
ter how their relation to one another may be de- 


IS 


Christian Belief in God 


fined, for this may certainly be done in various 
ways. 

Here, therefore, I shall not enter into a more 
detailed discussion of the philosophy of pure ex- 
perience. In reference to it I shall only mention 
what seems to me the point really worthy of at- 
tention, namely, that here the attempt is made to 
make higher mathematics and biology fruitful for 
philosophic reflection. This attempt has been 
made by quite a number of other philosophers of 
our day, but nowhere with the same vigor, and in 
the same methodical and systematic: manner as 
here.?, Indeed I consider this to be a real service. 
For it seems to me that the methods and results of 
both of these disciplines must play an important 
role in all future attempts at systematizing, be 
they theological or purely philosophical. Within 
the scope of these lectures my further rseriesrmie 
will substantiate this opinion. 

So then, neither Nietzsche nor Avenarius can be 
considered representatives of present-day philos- 
ophy. But then there seem to remain a vast throng 
of heterogeneous thinkers whom we must now 
consider. For the saying “‘ there are as many philos- 
ophies as philosophers,’ which might be thought 
true with reference to philosophy in general, holds 
with special force at the present time. Indeed this 
is not merely a semblance. Just at present all 
matters in philosophy are actually in a state of 
flux. The fields of epistemology and psychology of 
the senses show a certain exception, but even of 


' 16 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


them this is true only with important restrictions. 
And, while these disciplines are undoubtedly the 
foundations proper of present-day philosophy, yet 
they only interest us here indirectly. But when 
we inquire for the complete philosophical world- 
view, with whose bearing on the Christian belief in 
God we are concerned, we find a motley col- 
lection. 

When examined more closely, however, the 
seemingly inextricable thicket clears to a certain 
extent before the more penetrating investigation. 
Certain perspectives and lines of procedure are 
disclosed which do not, to be sure, point to a 
uniquely determined conclusion, but which do, 
nevertheless, indicate a goal lying within definite 
limits. 

Two such general lines of development appear 
to me to be especially characteristic and determin- 
ing for present-day philosophy. One is the return 
to Kant, especially to his epistemology; and the 
other is the concept of evolution, or, more generally 
expressed, evolutionary thought. 

Indeed it might be held that both of these 
movements are reducible to one, namely, the first, 
because as a matter of fact the concept of evolu- 
tion is itself both directly and indirectly dependent 
upon Kant. It is dependent upon him directly in 
so far as the present doctrine of evolution, that is 
to say, the doctrine of the gradual origin of life 
and of the gradual development of living organisms, 
can consistently be expanded into a general theory 


I7 


Christian Belief in God 


of cosmic evolution. For the latter was first scien- 
tifically established in the Kant-Laplacian nebular 
theory. This theory deduces the origin and motions 
of the various heavenly bodies from the rotation 
of a general and chaotic primordial nebula.* In- 
deed on various occasions Kant developed almost 
a complete program of the doctrine of evolution. 
This is to be found especially in paragraph eighty 
of his “‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’”’ *—a paragraph 
often neglected. Moreover, for his ultimate world- 
view as a whole, transcending all particularities of 
his system, Kant gave a far reaching importance 
to the principle of evolution directed teleologically, 
that is, to the idea of a general ascending develop- 
ment toward anend. This has often been entirely 
overlooked, or, at least under-valued in its signifi- 
cance to Kant’s work as a whole. For this he him- 
self was partly responsible in that he did not ex- 
plicitly emphasize this line of thought, but rather 
introduced it incidentally and took it as a matter 
of course. But nevertheless it is there, and it is 
by no means merely incidental to the whole of 


* Kant developed this theory in a work which appeared in 1755 
entitled ‘‘Allgemeine-Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Him- 
mels,”’ to which he gave the sub-title: ‘‘An essay on the constitu- 
tion and mechanical origin of the whole cosmic system, based 
upon Newtonian principles.” Essentially the same thoughts 
were soon after put forth by the French mathematician, Laplace. 
It was especially the English astronomer, Herschel, who brought 
this theory to the widest acceptance. Today the theory by no 
means passes uncontested, indeed it is open to many objections 
in its details, but its underlying principle—the conception of 
a cosmic evolution—is generally accepted. 


18 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


his system—to the final collected result of his re- 
flections. The ethico-theological and the historico- 
philosophical views of Kant are united with his 
teleological conception of nature in the hypothesis 
of a consistent evolution of the world, comprising 
all being and all phenomena, the physical and the 
ethical alike.* And this leads to the indirect de- 
pendence of the concept of evolution upon Kant to 
which attention must be called. For the modern 
conception of evolution is indirectly dependent 
upon Kant in so far as the idealistic speculative 
philosophy, which took up Kant’s ideas, but which, 
to be sure, afterwards completely abandoned his 
critical position in very important and decisive 
points, has, through the very fact of taking up, 
developing, and completing Kant’s ideas of evolu- 
tion, helped to bring about the dominance of the 
modern conception of evolution. 

While this must not be overlooked, it is neverthe- 
less true that the conception of evolution gained 
the general acceptance and fundamental impor- 
tance which attach to it today only through modern 
natural science. We must therefore admit that 
these two lines of development are independent 
and parallel. According as to whether one or the 
other predominates, and according to the measure 
of the predominance of the one over the other, we 
get different groups of philosophers and of philo- 
sophical world-views. 

It suits my purpose best to distinguish three such 
groups, which may be considered chief groups. 


rg 


Christian Belief in God 
I. = The Positivistic Philosophy. 
II. = The Materialistic-Naturalistic Philosophy. 

III. = The Idealistic Philosophy. 

Each of these groups contains a variety of shades 
and gradations which must be differentiated under 
varying points of view, and must be brought into 
relation with one another. But these three ten- 
dencies and groups are nevertheless the most essen- 
tial ones for my purpose, which is concerned with 
the relation of present-day philosophy to religion— 
in particular to the Christian belief in God. 

They are comprehensible in their heterogeneity 
through the historical development of philosophy 
in the last half century. 

Before the rigorous, systematic development 
of the exact sciences, (for which the eighteenth 
century prepared the way, but which has only been 
systematically carried out since the middle of the 
last century), philosophy had been considered the 
fundamental science and the mother of all the 
sciences. The exact sciences were in a relation of 
complete dependence upon it. They permitted it 
to prescribe the ends to be attained by their work, 
in most cases even to give them their results in 
advance—at least just the decisive and final results. 
Although Kant’s epistemology should have put a 
stop to this procedure and attitude, philosophy 
nevertheless once more put forth its utmost exer- 
tions in this direction in the very years after Kant. 
Leaving all experience out of the question, philos- 
ophy attempted, purely from the reason, from 


20 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


certain so-called highest rational ideas, arbitrarily 
to construct the whole of reality. All contrary 
empirical knowledge and the results of investigation 
were either ignored or forced into the system. 
Never before had this been attempted in such a 
comprehensive manner and on such broad lines as 
in the systems of the speculative philosophers of 
the first half of the nineteenth century, namely, 
those of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. But philos- 
ophy had gone too far in its demands and had over- 
estimated its powers. An Icharus-flight to the sun 
had been attempted and the headlong plunge to 
earth was inevitable. In fact, even before the 
middle of the century a reaction set in against the 
esteem in which philosophy had been held such as 
history had never before known. Though it had 
only yesterday reigned supreme over all human 
knowledge and thinking philosophy now suddenly 
became valueless. It was thought for a time that 
philosophy, which had come to be regarded as mere 
abstract speculation, had been demonstrated to be 
mere pseudo-science. It was thought that only 
experimental science should be considered real 
science, and that seriously minded men should no 
longer have anything to do with philosophy. 

Of course this was to throw away the wheat with 
the chaff. In the first place it had been overlooked 
that the exact or experimental sciences work with 
definite hypotheses, habits and methods of thought 
without being able to test their justification or 
validity. For example take the hypothesis of 


21 


Christian Belief in God 


causality. Generally speaking is it valid at all? 
If so, why, how and how far is it valid? And if 
we find that certain habits of thought appear as 
norms of thought which are the basis of all think- 
ing and knowing, does it not follow that these norms 
help to determine the whole of our knowledge, and 
that knowledge is by no means grounded in mere 
experience? Kant’s epistemology had already set 
in just at this point. Hence a return to Kant, and 
therewith to a certain measure of philosophic re- 
flection, was soon seen to be necessary. The funda- 
mental principles and rules common to all scientific 
thinking, and inherent in empirical knowledge, 
cannot be sufficiently analysed and criticised by 
any single empirical or experimental science. That 
can only, and must of necessity, be done by philos- 
ophy, reflecting upon the sum total of empirical 
knowledge as well as upon all human thinking and 
knowing. In other words, in the form of logic, 
epistemology and methodology philosophy is in any 
case indispensable, and as such it is necessary for 
the pursuit of the exact sciences. 

This field of work was, in fact, the first to be 
won back for philosophy. But, quite naturally, it 
was frequently demanded that philosophy be un- 
conditionally limited to this task as a matter of 
principle. At most, it would be conceded, the 
field of ethics, like logic itself, might be treated 
according to purely logical principles. As for the 
rest, philosophy was to confine itself strictly to 
the analysis of positive knowledge. This-is the 


22 


Chapter I—Tendencies 

positivistic school of modern philosophy. It gets 
its name from a work written by the French philos- 
opher, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), entitled “‘Cours 
de philosophie positive.”’ This school has found 
eminent and acute exponents in Germany among 
the so-called Neo-Kantians. These men have 
rendered the great service of having again paved 
the way for philosophic reflection. They have 
also had a significant part in reviving the study of 
Kant. 

Cohen and Natorp belong to this school, the 
former being well known because of his penetrating 
studies in the philosophy of Kant, the latter es- 
pecially by his pedagogical publications.® Ernst 
Mach of Vienna, originally physicist, later philos- 
opher, also belongs here; though he is not affected 
by a strong Kantian influence. But there are 
many points of contact between Mach and the 
school of the so-called immanence philosophy, rep- 
resented by Schuppe, Rehmke, and others.’ The 
empirio-critical philosophy, which was discussed 
above, tried to push to its logical conclusion the 
view represented by Mach on the one hand and 
on the other hand by the immanence philosophy. 

Liebmann of Jena (died 1911) and Alois Riehl 
of Berlin are usually classed with the Neo-Kantians 
and therefore as positivistic philosophers. But 
although they started from strict positivism they 
have gradually left that position and are more 
properly classed with the third group.’ 

Now arises the further question as to whether 


23 


Christian Belief in God 


another line of problems does not properly fall 
within the domain of philosophy. Since the exact 
sciences often lead to results with bearings beyond 
their scope (even when looked upon as infinite 
processes), results which make it imperative to 
establish a connection between them and the prob- 
lems and results of other sciences, it is obvious that 
no one of these branches of science can, with pros- 
pect of success, undertake this comprehensive 
task, which includes the whole of human knowledge 
and thought. Here too, on the contrary, progress 
can be made only through general philosophic 
reflection. Philosophy must supply the super- 
structure as well as the foundation for the various 
fields of knowledge and investigation. 

Still other more important considerations point 
in the same direction. For if norms of thought 
have the great significance for human knowledge 
which we have claimed for them above, they will 
point the way to final, absolute truth. This is at 
least true if it is not merely a question of norms 
of thought for particular, single individuals, but 
on the contrary such as are valid, so far as we may 
be able to judge, for all normal human thinking— 
not merely for the particular individual’s con- 
sciousness but, so to speak, for the race conscious- 
ness of humanity. And again, further than this, 
what is valid of these norms of thought will also be 
valid of the other spiritual and mental potential- 
ities of mankind—the religious, the ethical, and 
the esthetical potentialities—in so far as they 


24 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


are shown to be necessary presuppositions for a 
normal participation in the sphere of life which 
is in question. 

Thus philosophic reflection finds the greatest 
variety of opportunities for striving to go beyond 
the separate spheres of the exact sciences, and to 
approach final truth without running the risk of 
becoming mere speculation and arbitrary con- 
struction. © 

Among recent philosophers those who felt that 
they could not be satisfied with the strictly pos- 
itivistic point of view as final have defined their 
task in this sense. But they are distinguished from 
the purely speculative thinkers of the Schelling- 
Hegel type by two fundamental characteristics. 
First, they do not ignore or disregard the exact 
sciences and empirical knowledge, but on the con- 
trary they presuppose this empirical knowledge as a 
necessary basis. Second, in accordance with this, 
they do not claim absolute validity for what they 
assert, but hold it subject to the unceasing check 
and criticism of wider experience. 

Fechner (died 1887) and Friedrich Paulsen (died 
1908) so defined the task and working methods of 
modern metaphysics—for thus this second field 
of philosophy is designated. But metaphysics as 
here defined is not absolutistic and deductive, but 
inductive and conscious of its limitations and its 
provisional character. 

But on the basis of such principles the problem 
may still be dealt with in two very different ways, 


25 


Christian Belief in God 


according to whether the phenomena of nature and 
their interpretations are taken exclusively or at 
least preferably, as the starting point and basis 
for philosophic reflection, or whether the spiritual 
life and its history are also taken into account. 
In the first case we get a materialistic-naturalistic 
and in the second an idealistic philosophy. 

From this it follows at once that the idealistic 
philosophy will be the only one capable of taking 
into account not merely positive knowledge and the 
results of investigation, but also those inner guides 
which are to be found in the religious, the ethical 
and the esthetical consciousness, as well as in 
thought. But idealistic philosophy in its turn will 
exhibit highly significant differences according to 
the manner in which and the extent to which these 
inner guides are brought into play. 

Ernst Haeckel, the zodlogist of Jena, is today the 
chief representative of a matertalistic-naturalistic 
philosophy and world-view. He is often mentioned 
of late on account of his ‘‘ Riddle of the Universe,” 
a book which has a distinct bias, and which, in the 
historical part, is filled with mistakes and mis- 
understandings of the worst sort. However Haeckel 
undeniably deserves credit for his work in applying 
the doctrine of evolution to the organic world, 
which he carried out with a certain intuitive orig- 
inality. But even within the domain of his own 
specific science he is not free from diverse exaggera- 
tions and premature conclusions, and hence he is 
to blame for the fact that very recently some nat- 


26 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


ural scientists have, in contrast with him, returned 
to a one-sided and radical rejection of the whole 
doctrine of evolution.°® 

Next to Haeckel I place Wilhelm Roux, founder 
of the so-called theory of mechanical evolution. 
He has had a great influence among physicians 
and natural scientists in the dissemination of a 
mechanical world-view. Compared with Haeckel’s 
his work is thoroughly scientific and reliable.° I 
also mention here some other natural scientists 
because they have worked on the doctrine of evolu- 
tion and its application, although they have not 
definitely stated their position on the really phil- 
osophical questions, namely: 

Weismann, biologist of Freiburg, who has devel- 
oped the Darwinian theory most consequentially,™ 
Nageli, formerly botanist in Munich,” and De 
Vries, botanist, important on account of his so- 
called theory of mutation, a significant modifica- 
tion of and supplement to the theory of Darwin." 

In contrast to these there are some contem- 
porary natural scientists who have taken a de- 
cided interest in philosophical problems, namely: 
Ostwald of Leipzig, the most zealous advocate at 
present of a philosophy based on natural science, 
and editor of the ‘“‘Annalen der Naturphiloso- 
phie,” '* Driesch, of Heidelberg, the champion of 
the so-called neo-vitalism,!® and Reinke, botanist 
in Kiel, who in recent years has expressed himself 
on several occasions very emphatically to the 
effect that it is unjustifiable to draw materialistic- 


27 


Christian Belief in God 


atheistic conclusions from the achievements of 
modern natural science.® . 

The representatives of idealistic philosophy, 
especially important from our point of view, are 
the following: 

Von Hartmann. He is well known as the phil- 
osopher of the unconscious. Among his followers 
Arthur Drews, of Karlsruhe, is especially prom- 
inent by reason of his acumen and scholarship. 
He has attempted to harmonize the philosophy of 
von Hartmann with recent scientific and philosoph- 
ical principles and results, and he has directed his 
attention especially to the problem of the relation 
of the philosophical to the theological world-view." 

Baumann, of Gottingen, has attempted to estab- 
lish ethical and religious ideas on the basis of the 
exact sciences.'® 

Héffding, of Copenhagen, well known for his 
ethical and psychological works.’® 

Wundt, the well-known psychologist and founder 
of the “Psychological Institute” at Leipzig, in ad- 
dition to his exact psychological investigations has 
never ceased to be interested in the fundamental 
problems of all the philosophical disciplines. Among 
his numerous pupils Oswald Kilpe must be espe- 
cially mentioned.” 

Paulsen (see above), apart from his philosophical 
works, is especially important for us because of his 
having brought out clearly and emphatically the 
connection between Kant’s philosophical mode of 
thinking and the spirit of Protestantism.” 


28 


Chapter I—Tendencies 


William James.2 Not only are Wundt and 
Paulsen closely related to one another but they are 
both similar to James, the three being the chief 
representatives of voluntarism—the philosophy of 
will. Wundt and Paulsen are also closely related 
on the other hand to Fechner, the founder of 
psycho-physics.”? 

Eucken, of Jena, has laid great stress on the duty 
of philosophy to take a definite stand in the fight 
for religion.”* 

Wilhelm Dilthey (died 1911), must be credited 
with having set forth most convincingly the dis- 
tinctive character and the independence of the 
mental and moral sciences in contrast with the 
natural sciences, and with having brought about 
the general acceptance of this contrast. At the 
same time, he has taught us to take into account 
the facts of the religious life, and has thrown light 
upon its problems. We are indebted to him for 
the best work on Schleiermacher. Finally he 
advocates the “‘Idealism of Freedom,” as exhibited 
in the Christian religion and the philosophy of 
Kant, as one of the possible world-views. 

Besides Dilthey, especially Windelband of Hei- 
delberg (died 1916) and Rickert of Freiberg are 
striving to establish a philosophy of history and 
culture.”° 

Herbert Spencer (died 1903), the most important 
English philosopher of the nineteenth century, 
endeavored to bring together the three principal 
trends of modern philosophy mentioned above.”® 


29 


Christian Belief in God 
For our purposes these are the most important 
‘ representatives of the philosophy which, in the 
narrowest sense of the word, may be designated 
modern philosophy. But the Hegelian philosophy 
still has its advocates. They have rendered a most 
valuable service in keeping before the present gen- 
eration the tenable features of that earlier epoch. 
Because of his acumen and breadth of insight, 
Adolph Lasson, of Berlin, ranks first among these 
Hegelians. 

It is of course impossible for me to expound 
singly here the positions of these various thinkers 
toward the Christian belief in God. I shall, there- 
fore, select only such of them as are important in 
any particular connection, considering them in 
larger or smaller groups according to circumstances, 
or, when necessary, referring to a particular one of 


them. 


30 


Chapter Two 


Epistemology and the Christian Belief in 
God 


OW how does the Christian belief in God meet 
the general view and position of modern phil- 
osophy just outlined? 

Undoubtedly this belief aims to be something 
entirely different from a merely intellectual insight 
and a merely intellectually established world-view. 
Its deepest roots do not lie in rational understand- 
ing and thinking. On the contrary, it is grounded 
in those basic potentialities of the human soul which 
are specifically religious. While these religious 
potencies are closely connected with the esthetical, 
and especially with the ethical aspects of mind, and 
are correlated with them in a great variety of ways 
(especially with the latter), yet they are not 
identical with them, but possess a peculiar and 
independent significance. 

But does not the realization of this fact itself 
suffice for the modern man to condemn faith in 
God? For will he not be compelled to point out, 
and indeed rightly so, that the emotions are, to be 
sure, a “very aimable, but at the same time a 
highly dangerous brain function,” and that they 
have absolutely nothing to do with knowing the 


31 


Christian Belief in God 


truth. Haeckel, at least, thinks that this disposes 
of the whole question.* But do such views really 
prove him to be a modern man, if this expression is 
to be used in a just and proper sense, or do they 
not rather prove him to have lagged behind con- 
temporary thought? Does not such a verdict 
characterize that attitude of mind which can only 
appreciate the intellectual side of man? The 
further fact that Haeckel without further ado 
converts the psychical into a brain function, not 
claiming simply a definite connection between 
them or a definite relation of each to the other, but 
holding them to be identical, shall here be left out 
of consideration. But is not such exclusive atten- 
tion to and appreciation of the intellectual powers 
taken in the narrower sense, a onesidedness which is 
especially out of place in the modern man, who 
should take into account the whole of reality in its 
widest scope? If the modern man boasts of his 
‘‘sense of reality”? as an attainment left for him to 
achieve, then he should also feel himself logically 
bound to follow this “‘sense of reality” without 
prejudice, and he should not call it to a sudden 
halt the moment it begins energetically to protest 
against his preconceived opinion. The fact is that 
there are other psychic forces, phenomena and 
activities besides the purely intellectual which 
belong to the full reality of the human soul! To 
be sure all hasty misinterpretations of this fact 


* Cf. “Riddle of the Universe,” Ch. II. “Wonders of Life,” 
Ch. V. 


32 


Chapter [I—Epistemology 

must be definitely rejected. But from the very 
outset the fact itself must be taken into account 
and fully appreciated. And that means that the 
unique function and importance of these other 
psychic forces and activities must be recognized. 

The attitude of onesidedly excluding and re- 
jecting, as a matter of principle, the phenomena of 
the religious psychical life was possible for purely 
intellectualistic rationalism, but, if it is not wan- 
tonly to set aside its own principles, the ‘‘sense of 
reality” of modern thinking must not take such an 
attitude. 

From the same point of view a protest must be 
raised against those who only consider the religious 
life in its relation to moral conduct, and accordingly 
completely subordinate religion and faith in God to 
ethics. This, too, is a onesidedness which fails to 
give full play to the sense of reality, even though the 
connection between the religious and the ethical 
forces is in fact close and important. To be sure, 
the thinkers in question are somewhat justified in 
referring to Kant for this way of viewing and deal- 
ing with the matter. But just at this point we are 
confronted with a narrowness in Kant’s philosophy 
which is clearly based upon a limitation of his 
whole nature and personality. For, with all the 
loftiness and energy of his moral will, he was after 
all dry and pedantic, and this is one of his pecu- 
liarities which the “modern”? man should not 
imitate. In his article on Kant’s personality, 
Bauch justly writes: “‘When all man’s acts are 


33 


Christian Belief in God 
subjected to reflection the purely emotional side 
of his life is necessarily restrained and hampered. 
Kant did not escape this experience in his own life. 
Though it was not a necessary consequence of his 
ethics, the imperative of the practical reason, owing 
to Kant’s personal bent toward an extreme inter- 
pretation, was exaggerated until it was made into 
what we commonly call a rational, in the sense of 
intellectual, principle. Hence Kant himself pre- 
vented the purely emotional side of his nature from 
attaining complete expression and development, 
and this very fact made it impossible for him to 
understand the universal significance of this phase 
of human life.” * What Bauch here says of Kant’s 
inner life as a whole is especially true of its religious 
side. Moreover, Kant himself did not, as a matter 
of fact, consistently carry through the subordina- 
tion of religion to morality. However little culti- 
vated and developed, his own religious conscious- 
ness protests against a consistent development of 
his exclusively ethical theory of religion, and, at 
least between the lines, religious faith is permitted 
to speak for itself. Over and over again his char- 
acterization of our moral disposition has a strictly 
religious coloring. Thus, for example, he writes: 
“There is, however, one thing in our soul which, 
when we take a right view of it, we cannot cease to 
regard with the highest astonishment, and in regard 
to which admiration is right or even elevating, and 
that is the original moral capacity in us generally.” 

* Kantstudien, IX, 1904, p. 205, 


34 


Chapter II—Epistemology 

And a little further on he adds: ‘‘And even the 
incomprehensibility of this capacity, a capacity 
which proclaims a Divine origin, must rouse man’s 
spirit to enthusiasm, and strengthen it for any 
sacrifices which respect for this duty may impose 
upon him.” * This clearly implies that ethical 
matters fall under and are subordinate to the 
domain of religion, and not the reverse! For here 
the moral will is given depth and impetus by being 
brought into relation with the ‘“incomprehensi- 
ble,” into relation, that is to say, with the to us 
mysterious world of the ‘‘beyond.” And this is a 
relation that is decisive for the trend and tendency 
of the religious consciousness. 

Considering the question on its own merits, there 
can be no doubt whatever but that every attempt 
to exhaust the meaning of religion by subordinating 
it to ethics does violence to the full reality of the 
life of the human soul as it really is. We need only 
to recall the characteristic features of the religious 
life already mentioned. The consciousness of the 
meaning and depth of = world, the soul’s longing 
for eternity while i orld ) nporal and 
passing phenomena, it#ptimism persisting through 
any misfortune or disappointm all of these 
facts of actual human experiencé reallly become 
meaningless when considered solel the point 










* Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 2nd ed., 
p. 57 and p. 59. The words emphasized by Dr. Wobbermin show 
the special aspects of the religious mood. The English is taken 
from Abbott’s translation of Kant’s ethical writings. Tr. 


35 


Christian Belief in God 


of view of ethics. They are given various inter- 
pretations but their proper import as facts of 
experience is never admitted. Now after all, if it is 
a fact of the greatest importance that Kant taught 
us to take into account these moral forces of the 
will which man feels in his inmost soul, as con- 
trasted with the one-sided attention to the activity 
of the intellect and to rational knowledge, and if he 
laid the most emphatic stress upon the independ- 
ence and the intrinsic importance of this moral will 
(even the most highly developed intellect con- 
ceivable cannot, according to Kant, vouchsafe even 
the slightest degree of ethical consciousness), we 
shall merely be drawing a necessary conclusion 
from his own position if we demand a similar recog- 
nition for the manifestations of religious feelings.”’ 
And modern philosophy must all the more admit 
the justice of this demand since, in going back to 
Kant, it insists upon an unprejudiced recognition 
of the whole reality of experience. 

But do. not most serious considerations against 
the atte npt. ace for the Christian 
x0d. wi thought arise from 
io efact fromthe most decisive and 
int, in the Kantian philosophy? If 
Kant’s critical philosophy seriously 
must we not either wholly renounce faith in God, 
or, in any case, relegate it to the domain of pure 
imagination, where all the standards of reflective 
thought and rational deliberation are entirely 
lacking? Both of these positions have been and are 


36 













Chapter II—Epistemology 
still being maintained, but critical thinking in the 
sense of Kant certainly does not lead to either. 

It is true that Kant’s philosophy intends to be 
critical philosophy, and all thinking—at least all 
scientific thinking—should and must be critical 
thinking today. It must not be allowed to relapse 
to the low level of pre-critical and uncritical think- 
ing. From a protestant point of view there can 
be no serious difference of opinion, even among 
theologians, on this point. But the philosophy of 
Kant, as well as all other thinking, gets its critical 
character by going back to, and by a deliberate 
examination of, the fundamental conditions of knowl- 
edge. In order to reach the first and fundamental 
decision as to the value and validity of human 
thinking, Kant directed attention away from the 
object of knowledge to the subject of knowledge, 
and he thereby became the great reformer, or, as he 
himself expressed it, the Copernicus of modern 
thinking. For there had dawned upon him the 
momentous idea, which, after all, is quite simple 
and almost obvious, that objective knowledge pre- 
supposes not merely objects but also the under- 
standing itself, as the cognitive function of the 
human mind or of human consciousness. 

It then follows, however, that the results attained 
through the understanding must be dependent, 
not merely upon the material furnished to the 
understanding, but upon thinking itself—upon the 
constitution, so to speak, of the faculty of thinking. 
Let me use a very crude illustration to make this 


37 


Christian Belief in God 


clear. The nature of machine-made products, for 
instance knit goods or cloth, depends not merely 
upon the raw material fed into the machines, but 
also upon these machines themselves—upon the 
way in which they distribute the raw material and 
arrange and combine its various elements. Quite 
similar conditions must prevail for the human 
understanding. Indeed, a knowledge of the nature 
of the machine is the primary and indispensable 
basis for any opinion as to the merits of the product 
which it turns out. The same raw material may 
yield products differing widely in quality and value 
when different manufacturing processes are applied 
to it, inasmuch as the distribution of this raw mate- 
rial, the reassembling and composition of its various 
elements may be carried out in very different ways. 
Only a knowledge of the machines themselves will 
enable one to understand this difference in quality 
and value, for only such knowledge will show how 
it is possible to turn out the various products. And 
again it is the same with the human understanding. 
If we would discuss the meaning and value of 
human knowledge, we must first of all get a clear 
idea concerning those fundamental conditions of 
knowledge inherent in the human mind itself. 
Kant called them the @ priori moments of knowl- 
edge. Thus he directed attention away from the 
objects of knowledge to the subject of knowledge, 
and to the conditions of knowledge inherent in the 
latter, or, to put it more exactly, to the conditions 
of the possibility of knowledge inherent in the sub- 


38 


Chapter [I—Epistemology 


ject. In doing this Kant brought about a revolu- 
tion in thought, for he attacked the problem from 
a fundamentally new position, reversing the réles of 
object and subject, just as Copernicus had reversed 
the relation between the earth and sun of the naive 
Ptolemaic cosmology * (which, to be sure, does not 
deny that the sun itself may move). 

Now this fundamental principle of the Kantian 
epistemology presents a case altogether like that of 
the egg of Columbus. When once it has been 
grasped, and its fundamental meaning compre- 
hended, it becomes the most obvious platitude. 
But really to comprehend it fully and in its final 
meaning is indeed a matter of no little difficulty. 
In fact, those naive habits of thought, which, be- 
fore any attempt is made to think “critically,” 
have become flesh and blood of every human being, 
must be completely overcome. How difficult this 
may prove, even for highly educated men engaged 
in scientific research, is shown by Haeckel’s ab- 
solute inability to surmount these naive habits of 
thought. In his “‘Wonders of Life,” published in 
1904 to supplement his ‘‘ Riddle of the Universe,” 
he attempted again and again to refute the objec- 
tion raised against him from many sides that his 
philosophy, as set forth in the “‘Riddle of the 
Universe,” lacked an epistemological basis. Never- 
theless he persists, throughout and from the very 
outset, in the decisive error of dealing with knowl- 


* See the “Critique of Pure Reason.” Preface to the 2d ed., 
p. 16. 


39 


Christian Belief in God 


edge solely from the objective side. Claiming the 
authority of Kant and referring to the latter’s 
bringing of experience and thinking into relation 
with one another, he writes, for example: ‘‘The 
external world is the object that acts on man’s 
organs of sense, and in the internal sense-centers 
of the cortex of the brain these impressions are 
subjectively transformed into presentations. The 
thought-centers or association-centers of the cortex 
(whether or not one distinguished them from the 
sense-centers) are the real organs of the mind that 
unite these presentations into conclusions. The 
two methods of forming these conclusions—induc- 
tion and deduction, the formation of arguments 
and concepts, thought and consciousness—make 
up together the cerebral function we call reason.”’ * 
Haeckel then emphatically claims that the recogni- 
tion of these propositions is the ‘indispensable 
prerequisite to the solution of the riddle of the 
universe.’’ As such, he points out, he had been 
recommending these ‘‘fundamental truths” (!) for 
thirty-eight years, but that, unfortunately, they 
were still far from finding such recognition. As a 
matter of fact this summary of so-called ‘‘fun- 
damental truths”’ is a veritable maze of distortions, 
unestablished sophisms and fallacious deductions. 
To mention only the main point: considered from 
the point of view of epistemology as a critique of 
the understanding, the cognitive centers or associa- 
tion areas of the cerebral cortex are, of course, 
* “Wonders of Life,”’ p. 4. 


40 


Chapter [I—Epistemology 


quite as objective as all other objects of the ex- 
ternal world. For as parts of the cerebrum they 
are certainly not acts of the understanding but in 
fact objects of it. 

Haeckel blinds himself to this truth by making 
a distinction between ‘‘monistic”’ and “dualistic”’ 
epistemology, claiming that he alone advocates 
the correct, that is to say, the monistic epistemol- 
ogy, and that his opponents represent the false 
dualistic theory. Thus he fails to recognize the 
fact that the theory of knowledge or critical 
epistemology can and ought to be neither dualistic 
nor monistic, but that it must be critical epistemol- 
ogy and nothing else, that is to say, a critique of 
the understanding as such. For otherwise it would 
not enter upon its task without prejudice, but 
would presuppose the result as a dogmatic pos- 
tulate. In fact, the whole of Haeckel’s so-called 
monistic theory of knowledge or critical epistemol- 
ogy is neither theory of knowledge nor critical 
epistemology at all, but pure dogmatism (of a 
naturalistic kind, however, whereas traditional 
dogmatism is supernaturalistic). At the beginning 
this dogmatism contains potentially the whole 
metaphysics of naturalism, and it takes for its start- 
ing point and as the basis of operations what, in 
any case, could only be the conclusion. 

Reference to the genesis of the cognitive faculty 
of the human mind serves Haeckel as a final means 
of defense. He asserts that the great mistake of 
Kant was that he failed to take this genesis into 


41 


Christian Belief in God 


consideration. ‘‘Kant had no suspicion of the ev- 
olution of man’s soul from that of the nearest re- 
lated. mammals. The curious predisposition to 
a priort knowledge is really the effect of the in- 
heritance of certain structures of the brain, which 
have been formed in man’s vertebrate ancestors 
slowly and gradually, by adaptation to an associa- 
tion of experiences, and therefore from a posteriori 
knowledge.” * Here Haeckel fails completely to 
appreciate what is really involved, and substitutes 
for the problem of epistemology an entirely dif- 
ferent one, having simply nothing to do with that 
problem. Moreover, his statement that Kant did 
not think of this possibility of a gradual evolution 
of the mental capacities is absolutely false. But 
Kant saw that the epistemological problem, at 
least in its decisive and essential points, cannot be 
solved by starting from that basis. For the epis- 
temological problem concerns human thinking as 
distinguished from all other forms of consciousness 
known to us. The characteristic features of this 
thinking or understanding must be investigated and 
criticised. But as to what process this capacity 
for understanding has come into existence—that 
is a question belonging to an entirely different 
field of investigation, a question whose study may 
indeed indirectly further the study of the epis- 
temological problem, but whose solution in one 
way or another neither gives nor can give a direct 
solution to this epistemological problem. Let me 
* Op: cit., pi 11. 


42 


Chapter II—Epistemology 
refer again to the machine illustration. In passing 
judgment on the products it makes no difference 
whatever how the machines in question came to be 
devised—whether this came about by a lucky 
chance, or through an ingenious intuition, or by 
utilizing devices already known, or by concen- 
trated reflection directed toward constructing 
machines for the purposes to be attained. In spite 
of very different ways in which machines may be 
produced their construction may in all cases be 
the same, so that products of the same kind and 
value are turned out. But it is also possible that 
the machine discovered entirely by chance may 
turn out better products than all other machines, 
and of course the reverse may be true In short, 
every imaginable case between these extremes is 
possible, and many examples could actually be 
cited from practical life As a matter of fact, the 
origin and history of the machine are of no con- 
sequence in passing judgment upon what it makes. 
The main point is to know the principles upon 
which it is based and the details of its construction. 
And in dealing with the human faculty of under- 
standing we have a closely analogous situation be- 
fore us. However it may have come into existence, 
it is in existence, and it must first of all be under- 
stood and be dealt with on the basis of its own in- 
herent properties. 

Thus, from every point of view, Haeckel’s own 
so-called monistic theory of knowledge, and his 
opposition to the Kantian theory of knowledge 


43 


Christian Belief in God 


proves to be untenable, non-critical and dogmatic. 
And this is the basis upon which he would prove 
that the Christian belief in God is out of date and 
inconsistent with modern thought! His charge 
reverts upon him with redoubled force. 

Let us return, then, to the critical position of 
Kant. To the short sketch already given we must 
first of all add, as an immediate consequence of 
this position, that scientific knowledge must be 
strictly limited to the domain of possible expe- 
rience. Human understanding does not extend 
beyond the limits of such experience since it con- 
sists in nothing but a working over of material 
furnished by experience. And, in the second place, 
it must be added that Kant’s efforts are directed 
toward ascertaining the inner structure of the 
human understanding which forms the basis of all 
normal human knowledge. For him the main 
point is not to investigate the conditions of knowl- 
edge as they exist more or less accidentally for 
certain isolated individuals, but to study those 
which hold for human consciousness quite gen- 
erally. Hence everything pertaining merely to 
individual cases in an accidental way must be 
deliberately excluded. Kant assumes that the 
characteristic and distinctive features of the faculty 
of the understanding, which remain after such an 
exclusion, are of a super-empirical nature, grounded 
in the universal reason of things, and that, on their 
part too, therefore, they direct attention to this 
reason. Thus, in his opinion, they are connected 


44 


Chapter II—Epistemology 


with the final and highest truth—with that primor- 
dial reality which is the fons et origo and ultimate 
goal of all that is and of all that comes to pass. 

And in this, too, we shall have to agree with 
Kant, at least to a certain extent. For if the world 
and human life mean anything at all, if we human 
beings are not born merely to live in error, and the 
world in which we live is not simply a great and 
empty delusion, we must assume that those fun- 
damental characteristics of the faculty of under- 
standing or reason exercised by man, which really 
prove to be universally valid conditions of normal 
human understanding, can in fact claim a super- 
empirical validity precisely to the extent that they 
prove to be such universally valid conditions of 
normal human understanding, and that they direct 
us to final and absolute truth. To be sure this is a 
circular argument But as human beings we can- 
not avoid this circle. Strictly considered we re- 
main subject to it even though the particular in- 
dividual can disregard it for himself. Nor can we 
compel that man who denies, as a matter of prin- 
ciple, that there is any possibility whatever for 
man to approach the truth to admit the conclusion 
that we draw from the opposite conviction. 

But although we can agree with Kant thus far, 
we must, nevertheless, raise strong objections to 
the further development of his basic thought, and 
we must insist that a revision of it is indispensable. 

First of all, this even applies to Kant’s attempt 
to establish once for all by an abstract logical 


45 


Christian Belief in God 


process those a priori characteristics of the human 
understanding. Such an attempt conflicts with 
the whole unbiased sense of reality since this sense 
of reality must not, once for all and from the very 
outset, be closed to any possible new experiences. 
To be sure, logic, conceived as a closed system of 
human norms of thinking, is consistent and valid 
beyond a quibble, but the logical thinking of the 
race, bound as it is to experience, is, like all human 
life itself, subject to historical development. A 
propos to a detailed development of the basic idea 
of Kant’s critical philosophy, we must, therefore, 
insist upon the two points above asserted to apply 
quite generally, namely: unflagging regard to the 
material furnished by experience, as it is given to 
us by history and psychology, and accordingly, 
repudiation of the absolutistic attitude. 

This leads to another matter. In discussing 
Kant’s critical philosophy or A priorism we have 
thus far always considered only the faculty of 
understanding of the human mind, cognition and 
its exercise. We did this, first, in order to be as 
clear as possible, and secondly, because Kant him- 
self started from here and always had a special 
interest in this side of the problem. But all of 
what was said above holds by no means only of 
cognition or of the intellectual activity of the mind 
of man, but it holds of his whole mental life and his 
whole mental activity. The ethical will, the estheti- 
cal feelings and the religious consciousness must all 
be given the same consideration. But even in this 


46 


Chapter [I—Epistemology 


respect Kant was led to a somewhat narrow view. 
Religious matters he usually put decidedly into the 
background, and esthetic matters were not always 
given the consideration which their importance 
deserves. Thus there remained for him, as the 
main subjects to be considered, only cognition and 
ethical volition—the theoretical and the practical 
reason, as he expressed it. After isolating these for 
purposes of comparison he exaggerated the contrast 
between them. He brought out clearly the charac- 
teristic differences between these two modes of 
activity of the human mind, but he did not suffi- 
ciently elucidate either the fact that, after all, they 
belong together, or the fact of the correlations be- 
tween them. To be sure, he classifies both under 
the common concept of reason—theoretical and 
practical reason, thus making it very clear that, 
even from the point of view of critical philosophy, 
the final aim is not to tear them asunder, but to 
establish more firmly the fact that they belong to- 
gether (only on the basis, of course, of the preceding 
critical distinction between them). Nevertheless, 
with Kant the view that these two spheres are 
entirely different and have nothing to do with one 
another often preponderates. And since he simply 
subordinates the religious consciousness to the 
moral will, this contrast is considerably intensified 
when a determination of the relation between 
knowledge and religious faith is sought. 
Consequently it may seem to be a necessary 
result of critical philosophy simply to put belief 


47 


Christian Belief in God 


in God outside the province of thinking reflection, 
and to relegate it to a sphere in which rational 
thinking has absolutely nothing, either negatively 
or affirmatively, to say. As a matter of fact this 
was not Kant’s own position, and least of all was 
it so in his later years when he sought to sum up the 
results attained by critical philosophy.” But 
owing to the one-sided limitations of his position 
already pointed out, he certainly did furnish ground 
for such a view. These limitations we must, there- 
fore, deliberately seek to overcome, and we must 
do this by developing the fundamental idea of 
critical philosophy in all its aspects. 

Hence we must indeed distinguish between 
specifically scientific reasoning and inner convic- 
tions together with interpretations of nature and 
history, dependent upon and not entirely separable 
from these inner convictions. But even though 
such interpretations differ from scientific conclu- 
sions and demonstrations, nevertheless they can 
and must themselves be made the subject of sci- 
entific reflection, and the positive value of such 
interpretations may be shown to vary greatly. 
By scientific reflection it is possible to set up a 
descending or ascending scale of groups of such 
interpretations and convictions, varying in impor- 
tance and scope. 

It will not do, then, to try to solve the chief 
problem of theology—the relation between faith 
and knowledge, between belief in God and philos- 
ophy—by means of a mere delimitation of bound- 


48 


Chapter [I—Epistemology 

aries, simply by drawing a line and saying: “‘ Here 
we cannot cross over, but-neither may you cross 
over to us.” To begin with, our opponents will 
not submit to this. And we must grant that this 
attitude is not altogether wrong. To be sure, in 
dealing with these problems it is highly important 
and necessary to take into consideration the limits 
of human thinking and knowledge, to proceed in 
fact, with epistemological objectivity. But all of 
those questions and problems, in respect to which 
knowledge and faith in God seemingly or in reality 
come into conflict, must be considered, and the 
position held on the part of faith in God must be 
justified. This is necessary, too, because, in the 
last analysis, epistemology itself is not independent 
of the sum total of human thought and knowledge. 
In every instance, indeed, it must stand above the 
whole of knowledge, but it cannot do this except by 
taking this very knowledge as a basis, and hence it 
remains bound to the latter after all. 

The conclusion of all this seems to me to be that 
beside the watchword: ‘“‘Back to Kant” we must 
also put: “On from Kant!” Only in conjunction 
with the second is the first really justified. But, to 
be sure, we must start from Kant and not otherwise. 
After all, therefore, first: ‘‘Back to Kant!”’ 

In the light of experience it is not probable that 
all the mistakes of the Schelling-Hegel speculative 
philosophy would be avoided as an immediate 
consequence of proceeding from the motto: ‘‘On 
from Kant!” We shall be able to point out many 


49 


Christian Belief in God 


instances of similar mistakes in present-day philos- 
ophy. I am sure that such are to be found in my 
own writings. But the mistakes will be less serious, 
and, since, therefore, the deviations from the path 
leading to all scientific progress will become less, it 
will be possible on the whole to make a little head- 
way toward the goal. 

In seeking to uphold the Christian belief in God 
in a systematic and philosophical way, it is not 
admissible to use the general philosophy of Kant as 
a basis. For Kant opposed the traditional at- 
tempts of this sort in detail, and, at least according 
to the opinion prevalent among theologians today, 
he disposed of them conclusively. These traditional 
attempts consist in the so-called proofs for the 
existence of God, and these proofs have almost 
entirely lost standing in theology of the present 
day. But to be frank, I cannot bring myself to 
accept this unfavorable verdict completely and 
without further comment. The motives and ten- 
dencies, upon which the principal forms of these 
proofs are founded, contain, it seems to me, sig- 
nificant elements of truth which are of permanent 
value. Indeed it is my firm conviction that we 
can today, by reason of the present stage of our 
knowledge and understanding attach to these mo- 
tives and tendencies a far greater demonstrative 
force than was possible for the theologians and 
philosophers of the past. 

But in the nature of things two groups of these 
arguments must be distinguished. One group is 


50 


Chapter [I—Epistemology 


based upon the study of nature and the natural . 
sciences, while the other has to do with the mental 
life and the mental sciences. Now if my aim were 
to establish the Christian belief in God on positive 
philosophical grounds (in the sense explained in 
detail above), I should, at least in my opinion, 
have to put the emphasis entirely upon the second 
group, and I should have to proceed from the re- 
flections which are based upon inner experience as 
the starting point. But my task is rather to discuss 
the positions held and the results attained by cur- 
rent philosophy. And from this point of view I 
must begin with the first group, since only with 
respect to this group can current philosophy be 
said to have anything like consistent positions, or 
to have attained consistent results. 

Of course, all these proofs are untenable in their 
traditional classical form. For in this form Kant’s 
criticism demolished them. 


51 


Chapter Three 


Cosmology and the Christian Belief in 
God 


HE classical form of the cosmological argument 

operates. with various nuances of the thought 
that from the world as the effect God as cause is a 
necessary conclusion. Since for every effect a cause 
must be presupposed, by rising higher and higher 
from cause to cause, a highest and last cause—God, 
must finally be reached. Hence the decisive prin- 
ciple of proof here is the law of causality. It is 
conceived as a supreme and absolutely valid cosmic 
law to which the universe must conform. I have 
mentioned this classical form of the argument just 
because the principle of causality, upon which it is 
founded, directs attention to that problem which 
is of the greatest importance for the whole question. 
For all the more specific laws of nature fall, as 
special cases, under the law of causality, but in the 
cosmological argument we have to do with a world 
constituted according to these laws. 

Let us first consider the law of causality purely 
on its own merits. That hypothesis is false which 
says that this law possesses a validity in and of itself, 
and that it is an absolute and supreme universal law, 
to which the whole universe must necessarily con- 


52 


Chapter I1I—Cosmology 


‘form. Hence the conclusion that there is a highest 
cause is untenable. The law of causality compels 
us to seek a cause for every effect, and does not 
permit us to stop anywhere in this process. Thus 
in using this law of causality we do not reach a 
highest and first or original cause, but are involved 
in an infinite series—a regressus in infinitum. I 
have stated that the other conception of the law of 
causality, set forth above, is false. We may say 
that today it is no longer held in science or philos- 
ophy, although we shall see that it is still brought 
into play to a certain extent. Apart from these 
exceptions, which I shall presently mention, I may 
refer to all the philosophers cited in Chapter I for 
the following discussion. 

The principle of causality maintained by sci- 
entific philosophy today is a different one. As its 
starting point it takes the fact that we can only 
note, by direct observation of nature, a succession 
of two or more events, and never a real causation 
in the sense of an active influence from one event to 
another. As a result of our inability to observe the 
actual connection, some philosophers have actually 
sought to reduce causality to the unfailing succes- 
sion in time of one event upon another. Hume led 
the way in holding this view, and so-called pos- 
itivism has often taken up this thesis of Hume. 
But it, too, is false because it is one-sided and in- 
sufficient. For we only speak of causality when we 
look upon the occurrence of the consequent event 
in question as necessary. This characteristic of 


53 


Christian Belief in God 


necessity forms an inseparable and an essential 
part of what we consider to be causal connection. 
We assume a causal relation between an increase of 
temperature and the rising of the mercury in the 
thermometer, because we have a preconceived idea 
that this rising necessarily follows from the in- 
creasing temperature. This is the concept of 
causality of present-day philosophy. It asserts 
a necessary connection between two successive 
events. In order to prevent confusing it with the 
mistaken interpretation mentioned above, philos- 
ophers prefer to express this modern concept of 
causality in terms of the mathematical concept of 
function. Modern mathematics designates as a 
functional relation any relation between two quan- 
tities such that a change in the value of one neces- 
sarily involves a change in the value of the other, 
or, to put it differently, that of two variable 
quantities one represents the independent variable, 
and the other the variable dependent upon the 
independent variable, or simply the dependent 
variable. Accordingly the modern concept of 
causality can be expressed by the formula: e = 
f (c), which means that the effect stands in a func- 
tional relation to the cause—in the relation of a 
necessarily dependent variable. 

This consideration, and especially the reference 
to the mathematical analogy, proves that the law of 
causality contains a subjective element. For this 
characteristic of necessity cannot come from expe- 
rience. Experience knows only particular occur- 


54 


Chapter [1 I—Cosmology 


rences and events—particular facts, but no neces- 
sity. When, in spite of this, we mean by a causal 
relation the relation of necessary connection be- 
tween two events, this necessity must be intro- 
duced or assumed by us. From this point of view, 
therefore, the law of causality is nothing but the 
fundamental hypothesis made by us for the sci- 
entific study of natural phenomena. And for this 
reason the classical cosmological argument is un- 
tenable. But this insight immediately leads further. 
I have already pointed out that all special laws of 
nature can be regarded as special cases of the causal 
law, since the latter is the most general law of 
nature under which all others are subsumed, and 
to which they are subordinate. Consequently all 
natural laws must be treated like the causal law. 
None of them can claim an absolute objective 
validity because all contain a subjective element. 
Now this is of prime importance in dealing with 
those representatives of a materialistic philosophy 
who use these very laws of nature in arguing against 
faith in God. Haeckel is the chief of these. There 
are no absolutely binding laws of nature in the 
sense of expressing norms of the objective world- 
order which are valid in themselves and unal- 
terably fixed. Haeckel holds a position which must 
today be considered unscientific when he brings 
up this conception of the laws of nature, with the 
corresponding conception of the law of causality in 
particular, against faith in God. Not only philos- 
ophers, but also the more discerning natural 


55 


Christian Belief in God 
scientists, have ceased to hold this view which 
Haeckel advocates. Among the latter, Ostwald, 
in his lectures on natural philosophy, has recently 
laid special stress upon the fact that laws of nature 
must not be looked upon as decrees but merely as 
reports. They do not decree what shall come to 
pass, but merely give an account of what we can 
observe and bring under a comprehensive concep- 
tion. And, in fact, this is the only conception of 
laws of nature which is scientifically useful and 
adequate. 

After all, however, this does not dispose of the 
question as to what the laws of nature are. As we 
saw, they contain a subjective factor, yet, on the 
other hand, they are by no means purely subjective. 
Let us again consider causality. To be sure, the 
necessity which we attach to whatever takes place 
in accordance with the causal law depends upon 
our way of looking at things. But the causal con- 
nection itself is not put or interpreted into nature 
solely by us. On the contrary, it must somehow 
be in nature objectively, or, to formulate the mat- 
ter more carefully, there must be in nature itself 
an objective basis for our considering the causal 
law to hold. For, as far as we are concerned, with- 
out this assumption the whole course of the world 
would at every moment be reduced to mere chance. 
It is indeed a most astonishing fact that the stone 
thrown into the air for a million or even a billion 
times falls back again, but we could not, simply 
from this, deduce the least probability that this 


56 


Chapter I[I—Cosmology 


would be the result of the billion and first or any 
other new instance, unless, at least in a broad 
general way, we presuppose the existence of a 
fixed order of things, so that from the greater or less 
number of cases we might conclude, with a greater 
or less degree of probability, that there is such an 
order in this particular respect. Nor, unless we 
assume the objective existence of a fixed order of 
things, could we with any degree of probability, 
assume for the next moment of time that with an 
increase of temperature the mercury would again, 
as always in the past, rise in the thermometer. 
Only upon the basis of the hypothesis of an objec- 
tive existence of a fixed natural order is there any 
probability for this assumption, just as in math- 
ematics we speak of probability only when a lim- 
ited number of variables is given. The probability 
of drawing a definite one from an infinity of chances 
is one to infinity (co), that is, there is no proba- 
bility.* Thus, for every subsequent moment of 
time, the probability that the stone thrown into the 
air would again fall to earth, that with an increase 
in temperature the mercury would again rise in the 
thermometer, that the earth would again turn on 
its axis and revolve about the sun and would con- 
tinue with the sun to move through space—in these 
and in all similar cases the probability would be 


* oo is the mathematical symbol for infinity. For readers who 
are entirely unfamiliar with the principles of the theory of prob- 
ability, we may note, that the probability of drawing a particular 
one of six chances is one to six (+), since six chances are possible 
and only one of them will give the desired result. 


57 


Christian Belief in God 


one to infinity or nothing, if we did not assume a 
fixed order of nature. 

These considerations make it possible for us to 
make a final estimate of the laws of nature as a 
whole, so far as such an estimate is important in 
the present connection. These laws are based upon 
a process of abstraction on our part, for we arrive 
at them by contemplating reality under certain 
definite points of view and from specific angles, 
while intentionally leaving other points of view 
out of consideration. In this sense the laws of 
nature contain a subjective element. Moreover, 
these laws of nature do not possess an absolute 
validity—a necessary validity in and of them- 
selves, for they hold only for the present world— 
the world as we know it. However, with respect 
to this world the laws of nature indeed point to 
rules actually holding for the course of nature it- 
self, and particular ones of them can be brought 
to a greater or less degree of probability. In fact, 
some of them, as for instance the law of falling 
bodies, the law of gravitation, and others, have 
already attained a force of the highest degree of 
probability. 

Let us now return to the cosmological argument. 
We have found that seeking to deduce a highest 
cause by means of the law of causality, is founded 
on a misconception. On the other hand, when we 
do not base the cosmological argument on detached 
natural phenomena and on the course of nature in 
particular instances, but subject the whole course 


58 


Chapter I1I1—Cosmology 


of nature to thoughtful reflection, do not the 
actual actions and reactions as well as the correla- 
tions of finite individual beings and events compel 
us to assume a transcendent being, standing above 
this whole complex of actions and reactions, and 
making their harmonious interplay comprehen- 
sible? Before answering this question let us recall, 
by means of a few examples, what we know today 
concerning the objective logic of the course of 
nature. | | 

Above us arch the starry heavens. Since the 
days of Galileo modern astronomy has increased 
the number of known heavenly bodies beyond all 
bounds. Ranging from the first to the tenth magni- 
tude more than a hundred thousand fixed stars are 
known today, and many of these are probably 
surrounded by a greater or less number of planets. 
The milky-way, the equatorial belt of our system 
of fixed stars, has been resolved into millions of 
suns, and beyond these appear other systems of 
world-nebule and of milky-ways. We no longer 
imagine the vast multitude of fixed stars to be 
firmly attached to a great hollow sphere, because 
we know that all of them move through space with 
enormous velocity. And we know, too, that the 
same constellations which we see today were seen 
by the Babylonians and the Egyptians, or by the 
author of the ninth verse of the ninth chapter of 
Job. How astounding is the order and regularity 
exhibited by the movements of these heavenly 
bodies! Especially when we remember that the 


59 


Christian Belief in God 


heavens, as they greet our eyes at a given moment 
of a star-lit night, represent many different epochs 
of the history of the universe. For while, as is 
well known, the rays of light coming to us from the 
sun tell us of its existence eight minutes previously, 
those coming from the north star, for example, 
tell us of its existence thirty-five years previously. 
We know the laws in accordance with which the 
planets revolve about the sun, and the satelites 
around the planets, so that by calculation we can 
determine eclipses of the sun and moon very accu- 
rately for centuries past and for centuries to come. 
Our knowledge of these laws is such that the exist- 
ence of a planet heretofore unknown, Neptune, 
could be established a@ priori. We know the laws 
of light in the universe, towit, that the intensity of 
light diminishes inversely as the square of the dis- 
tance increases, and we know that the velocity of 
the transmission of light varies with the density of 
the medium but remains constant for the same 
medium, and we know the various velocities. We 
know that the intensity of an electric current is 
directly proportional to the electro-motive force, 
and inversely proportional to the resistance of the 
conductor. By the law of degradation or conserva- 
tion of energy, discovered simultaneously but in- 
dependently by Robert Mayer and Helmholz, we 
know that all agencies of the material universe— 
mechanical motion, heat, light, chemical and elec- 
trical processes—constitute a great and connected 
system of nature, in which forces or energies of one 


60 


Chapter [1I—Cosmology 


kind are continually transformed into absolutely 
equivalent forces or energies of another kind. 
Obviously, then, an objective mathematical logic 
prevails in the world, even though our calculations 
and conceptions represent merely a system of 
symbols pointing to an actuality whose real essence 
is absolutely inaccessible to us. Taking up an 
idea due to Laplace, Dubois-Reymond, in his well- 
known lecture “Uber die Grenzen des Welter- 
kennens,” says that a stage of our knowledge of 
nature is conceivable in which the whole process of 
nature would be represented by a single mathemat- 
ical formula, by a single infinite system of differen- 
tial equations, from which the position, the direc- 
tion of motion and the velocity of every atom in 
the universe would be deducible at any moment 
of time. This statement, however, goes beyond the 
limitations of our knowledge of nature inasmuch 
as it creates the impression at least, that we are 
here concerned with an absolutely established order 
of the universe as such. We have clearly seen that 
this is out of the question. However, when the 
statement is limited as indicated it holds true. 
Now what follows from all this? The existence of 
a personal God? By no means. Or at least the 
reasonableness of belief in a personal God? This, 
too, is not immediately necessary. But less pre- 
tentious. results are not valueless. Expressed in 
the most general terms, and hence with universal 
validity, it follows that every complete and com- 
prehensive philosophical view must assume or 


61 


Christian Belief in God 


accept a consistent prime cause of the universe. 
This makes materialistic atheism philosophically 
meaningless, if we interpret the word atheism in 
the strict sense so that it is opposed to every form 
of pantheism as well as to theism. This is the first 
result at which we here arrive: strict atheism is 
philosophically meaningless and untenable. Today 
the great majority of philosophers admit this. 
Mach’s contrary view is based upon his epistemol- 
ogy, an epistemology which is closely related to 
that of the empirio-critical philosophy. On this 
basis he acknowledges only a mere economic value 
of the so-called laws of nature. Just as every dis- 
tinction between subjective and objective is un- 
watranted, according to Mach, because we. are 
absolutely and forever confined to the sphere of 
our ideas, so also the laws of nature are conse- 
quently purely subjective modes of ours and for 
our purposes of looking upon nature. We have 
seen that this conception is erroneous. But not 
only the representatives of philosophy proper, but 
also all the more discerning among natural scien- 
tists, acknowledge that this first result is warranted. 
And those natural scientists who do not acknowl- 
edge it (Haeckel may again be cited as the most 
important present-day representative of this class), 
are involved, as a consequence, in the most as- 
tounding self-contradictions and the most extrav- 
agant theories. For in order to explain how this 
ordered cosmos originated from the random play 
of eternal atoms Haeckel is finally compelled to 


62 


Chapter III—Cosmology 


endow these atoms themselves with feeling and 
volitional impulses. But this is a view which is, 
in the first place, entirely uncritical, since we simply 
have no knowledge of animate atoms, the concept 
atom being, on the contrary, only an aid for our 
conception, interpretation and calculation of the 
course of nature. On the other hand, if consistently 
thought out this view would lead to Leibnitz’s 
theory of monads, and hence to some form of pan- 
theism or theism. 

But is this exclusion of rigorous atheism all that 
can be attained by using the cosmological argu- 
ment? It is the only definite and unequivocal re- 
sult which follows. However, speculations of 
probability lead beyond this. That we must con- 
ceive this consistent prime cause of the universe 
rather as of the nature of a mathematical logical 
intelligence may undoubtedly be considered the 
most obvious position to take, after what we have 
said. We may, therefore, brand as ill-founded 
conceptions like that of Hartmann-Drews of the 
unconscious absolute, or like that of Herbert 
Spencer of one universal immanent living energy, 
which, as he says, may not be determined more 
definitely, either materially or spiritually. Indeed 
this is even true, although in less measure, of 
Wundt’s conception of an absolute basis of the 
universe regarded as an absolute world-will, of 
which it is impossible to form a specific idea even 
in the shape of an ideal.*! 

On the basis of the cosmological argument we 


63 


Christian Belief in God 


cannot go further than this. In order to gain a 
fuller appreciation of the philosophical conceptions 
last mentioned we must turn to teleological reason- 
ing, and ask how far it will serve to supplement and 
to extend the cosmological reasoning. 


* * * * * *k * * 


However, before going into this question, I 
shall, under the point of view of the above discus- 
sion, treat another and different problem—the 
problem of miracle. Although it is not really of 
great consequence for Christian faith itself, it is 
so for its history. At the same time the question 
just implied will have to find an answer, the ques- 
tion, namely, whether and in what respect Christian 
faith has an abiding interest in the problem of 
miracle. 

To begin exactly with that formulation of this 
question which is common among the wider public, 
it may be precisely expressed as follows: Are mir- 
acles necessarily a component part of the Christian 
religion? 

Now if an answer to this question is to be given 
from the standpoint of the Christian religion, the 
Christian to whom it is put finds himself in a some- 
what awkward position. He can answer “‘yes”’ and 
‘“‘no”’ with equal justice, and this not, as it were, to 
qualify and to confuse the problem, but from the 
depth of his Christian religious convictions. 

‘“‘No,” for what have such external and extrinsic 
things as accounts of miracles and miraculous 


64 


Chapter [1I—Cosmology 


events to do with the most concentrated inward- 
ness of the spiritual and ethical personal life which 
the Christian religious conviction represents? 
Though “miracles” may be an indispensable 
factor in religions of a lower order, the religion of 
spirit and power stands superior to them, as is ex- 
pressed indirectly, but yet very plainly, in the 
words of Jesus: a iecept ye see aioe and wonders, 
ye will not believe.”’ 

But still, on the other hand, “‘yes,” miracles 
necessarily belong to religion, also and especially 
to the Christian religion. Indeed, taken in its 
entirety, the Christian religion itself is a miracle, 
whether considered from an objective-historical 
or a subjective-psychological point of view. And 
all the leading ideas in which it finds expression 
are designations of miracles—conversion, regenera- 
tion, redemption, atonement, peace with God, 
life in God! Above all, however, the basic fact of 
the religious life, which has attained full realiza- 
tion in Christianity and which the ideas just men- 
tioned then aim to define more closely from dif- 
ferent points of view, means, indeed, the miracle 
of miracles—the absolute miracle. For it means 
that, in spite of his finitude and although involved 
altogether in finite relations, man is given in his 
faith the power and the possibility of rising above 
the whole realm of temporal finite existence, and 
into that higher world transcending all mundane 
affairs—the world of God, of becoming, in a com- 
mon life, one with God himself! . 


65 


Christian Belief.in God 


Thus we have two entirely different and even 
contradictory answers! But from our discussion 
it must already be clear that the contradiction in 
these answers is due to the fact that the word 
miracle by no means represents a simple, but on 
the contrary, a very complex concept. Hence the 
first and fundamental point is what we mean by 
miracle. Two questions are, therefore, of decisive 
importance: Im what sense are miracles an integral 
part of the Christian religion? What does the 
belief in miracles mean for the Christian religion? 

Let us begin with the latter. According to the 
view prevailing at the present time, miracles are 
such events as lie outside of the usual course of 
things, that is to say, outside of the course of 
events under the sway of the laws of nature, and 
they, therefore, involve a setting aside of these 
laws. For we of today look upon the ‘‘usual course 
of things”’ as subject to the laws of nature. 

Now, to begin with, if we compare with this the 
attitude of faith, that of the Bible in particular, 
we find two important differences. In the first 
place, the conception of an order according to the 
laws of nature, at any rate in the exact modern 
sense of the word, is not found in the Bible. Hence, 
for it “‘the course of events as ordinarily known” 
is not at once and necessarily a course subject to 
laws of nature in our sense. In fact, this has quite 
frequently and properly been pointed out. 

But the second difference is of still greater con- 
sequence. ‘The scriptural belief in miracles does 


— 66 


Chapter II I—Cosmology 


not even greatly emphasize this lying outside of 
the known order of things. Emphasis is rather 
laid upon attributing the so-called miracles to God, 
because the hand of God is seen in them. They 
are, therefore, looked upon as acts of the universal 
sovereignity of God. 

Consequently, it is the belief in providence which 
finds expression in the idea of miracle. It is from 
this point of view that the miracle stories of the 
Bible must primarily be considered, if their reli- 
gious essence is to find due appreciation. In short, 
belief in providence is the psychological motive of 
belief in miracles. ‘The details of the outward form 
in which miracles are clothed are immaterial and 
they are, of course, in accordance with the state of 
learning and knowledge of that time. 

When we consider the Christian religion as a 
whole, that is to say, in its historical development, 
what has just been said about the psychological 
motive of the idea of miracle becomes still clearer. 
Especially do the legends of saints of the Roman 
Catholic Church offer a great store of material to 
support the thesis that the real religious basis of 
“miracles” is the belief in providence. These 
miracle stories are, so to speak, the symbolization 
and the materialization of the belief in providence. It 
goes without saying that this belief itself may be 
endangered by such a materialization. Even down 
to our own day history furnishes us many examples 
of this. We need only think of Lourdes, above all, 
but also of many an excess in the religious life 


67 


Christian Belief in God 


exhibited in our own (Lutheran) church, especially 
when there is a pietistic tendency. 

This does not alter the fact, however, that the 
element of religious value in the idea of miracle is 
to be found in the belief in providence. 

The real problem for the modern man, therefore, 
is: (1) Does the Christian belief in providence, if 
it is to be effectual, require an occasional setting 
aside of the laws of nature? (2) Is this belief in 
providence at all compatible with our present 
state of scientific knowledge, in particular, with 
our knowledge of the laws of nature? 

At the very outset, then, we put these questions 
solely with reference to the Christian belief in 
providence. For while many analogies, rudiments 
and preliminaries of the belief in providence are to 
be found in other religions, this belief receives in 
Christianity a form entirely and quite peculiar to 
this religion. Here this belief comes into play toa 
far greater extent and goes much deeper than in 
any other religion or world-view. 

For the Christian belief in providence is the con- 
viction that everything that exists and all that 
happens has its origin in God, and hence, that 
nothing whatever, be it what it may, has ever 
happened or will ever happen apart from the will 
of God. Applying this to the individual, the fur- 
ther conviction follows that whatever may come 
to his lot is in accordance with the will of God and 
therefore redounds to his good, at any rate, that 
it may and is intended to serve this purpose, inas- 


68 


Chapter I1I—Cosmology 


much as it is designed to be the means of his attain- 
ing eternal life. 

This conviction is directly implied in and is in- 
separable from the Christian belief in God. In- 
deed, to be precise, it is not something put into the 
Christian belief in God, but 7¢ zs itself this belief in 
God, exhibited from a definite angle and under a 
definite point of view. The belief in providence 
constitutes, as it were, the world-view of the 
Christian religion. 

The justification of this belief in providence in 
any particular case cannot, therefore, be estab- 
lished on purely objective grounds. If it could be 
so established, it would cease to be religious faith. 
Personal voluntary acceptance of this belief is 
rather the indispensable prerequisite of its meeting 
the test in a concrete case. This is a matter of 
course, inherent in the subject. For if the belief 
in providence is convinced that whatever falls to 
the lot of an individual is ordained for him by God 
as a means for his attaining eternal life, then what- 
ever falls to his lot can only come into full play 
as a real means for attaining eternal life, when it is 
made possible for it to come into play to this end, 
that is to say, when it is made part of the belief in 
God’s providential dispensation. In any other case 
there is no inner disposition to permit these things 
that fall to the lot of the individual to become what, 
according to the conviction of the belief in prov- 
idence, they must become. 

Thus, by making belief in providence its world- 


69 


Christian Belief in God | 


view the Christian religion consciously attaches the 
highest importance to the personal voluntary 
decision, the decision, moreover, of every individual 
believer. Hence, although it makes absolutely 
all things dependent upon God, this belief in prov- 
idence is in no respect fatalistic. On the contrary, 
it always includes the personal decision of the will, 
not merely admitting but demanding it and in- 
cluding it with other fundamental assumptions. 
According to Christian faith the personal voluntary 
decision of man is a part of that reality which, as an 
entirety, is dependent upon God, and it is equally 

a part of the divine purpose and régime of the 
- universe. 

Indeed, it is for this very reason that the justifica- 
tion of belief in providence cannot be established, 
in any particular case, in a strictly objective and 
purely theoretical way. It can only be confirmed 
from practical life. Quite generally speaking, 
however, similar conditions hold for every world- 
view. A world-view is never a matter of mere 
theoretical reasoning and mere intellectual reflec- 
tion. It is at the same time always a matter of 
the practical conduct of life and of the position 
taken in and toward the world in practical life. 
If this was frequently overlooked in the age of in- 
tellectualistic and speculative philosophy, hardly 
any of the philosophers of an idealistic bent se- 
riously question it today. Indeed many of them, 
especially James, Wundt, Paulsen, Eucken, Dil- 
they, Rickert and Windelband, unconditionally 


7O 


Chapter I1I—Cosmology . 


admit it. The belief in providence, as the world- 
view of the Christian religion, thus consciously 
emphasizes in this respect a phase which, whether 
it be explicitly recognized or not, belongs after all 
to the psychological character of every world- 
view. 
From this brief sketch of the nature of the 
Christian belief in providence the answer to the 
two questions stated above is almost obvious. 
Does a complete development of the Christian 
belief in providence require an occasional setting 
aside of the laws of nature? Absolutely no. If this 
belief in providence carries with it the conviction 
that absolutely all that happens has its origin in 
God, and accordingly, if it sees in the ordered 
course of the universe, so far as we are able to know 
and to determine such a course, an image of the 
universal sovereignty of God, then this belief in 
and of itself has no concern whatever to desire 
that it be possible occasionally to set aside this 
ordered course of nature. Quite to the contrary, 
since such a setting aside of this ordered course of 
nature would encourage the view that God inter- 
vened in the universal course of nature only by 
extraordinary acts and only occasionally. Thus 
the relation of God to the world would be con- 
ceived as far less essential and real than the Chris- 
tian belief in God holds it to be. Indeed, for this 
belief the relation of God to the world is absolutely 
real and constant, and without any exception: 
“Without the will of God no sparrow falleth to the 


71 


Christian Belief in God 


earth and no hair from our head. He maketh his 
sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth 
rain on the just and the unjust.” 

The idea of a world ordered by the laws of 
nature would only be in contradiction with the 
Christian belief in providence, and hence with the 
Christian belief in God, if the course of nature were 
thought of as interposed, with absolute conformity 
to its own laws, between God and the happening 
of particular events, if, in other words, it were 
interposed in such a way between God and the 
happening of particular events, that it would be 
looked upon as entirely independent of God. And 
this would mean that it would be a positive ab- 
solute. But then the laws of nature which con- 
stitute the course of nature would have to claim 
an independent validity on their own merits, and, 
as we saw above, this is something which they can- 
not justly claim. 

From a psychological point of view, just here 
lies the real motive and the kernel of truth in the 
exception which faith often takes to an order of 
things under the laws of nature. By reason of tts 
religious consciousness it protests, with this objection, 
against the sway of such an order of things according 
to laws of nature as being of itself and in itself an 
absolute and ultimate reality. ‘Therefore, by main- 
taining certain exceptions in particular cases, it is 
inclined to establish, to its own satisfaction, the 
justice of this protest, and the injustice of the 
opposite view, whether that view be consciously 


72 


Chapter [1I—Cosmology 


formed or merely unconsciously favored. Hence 
miracle is the favorite child of faith. 

Turning, now, to the second question: Is the 
Christian belief in providence at all compatible 
with our present-day scientific knowledge, with 
that of the laws of nature in particular? Again the 
answer is implicit in what has been said. The 
Christian belief in providence and the scientific 
or causal conception of the universe are not mu- 
tually exclusive, no, not even when both are fol- 
lowed out with all possible rigor and completeness. 
In fact, they are entirely diverse points of view, 
and instead of being mutually exclusive they are 
rather mutually supplementary. 

The causal idea always possesses a twofold 
aspect, and hence can always be considered and 
developed in two ways. In the first place, in every 
more or less closed system of phenomena, we may 
investigate the dependence of every definite com- 
plex of phenomena of a particular kind on the re- 
maining complexes in the same system. But we 
may also investigate the dependence of every 
particular event on the controlling powers of nature 
assumed to be constant. So long as one has in 
mind only partial systems of the phenomenal 
world both conceptions are still within the realm 
of scientific reflection. But if one turns his atten- 
tion to the phenomenal world as a whole, that is, to 
the complete system of finite existence and of finite 
events, only the first conception remains open to 
scientific consideration, namely: that which seeks 


73 


‘Christian Belief in God 


to understand the dependence of all the various 
single phenomena upon one another. To be sure, 
even here scientific reflection must admit the pos- 
sibility of the second causal conception, which now 
seeks the absolutely final cause of every single 
event. But the latter no longer belongs to the 
domain of scientific reflection, since it leads beyond 
the sphere of the phenomenal world. 

It is precisely with this last consideration and 
attitude, and only with it, that faith has to do. 
It makes the whole phenomenal world and every- 
thing that occurs in it dependent upon God as the 
highest and absolute reality. But under this point 
of view everything that is and occurs in the world 
can be interpreted as a ‘‘miracle.” For the world 
itself as a whole, the fact that it is at all, and that 
it is as it is, is entirely beyond the comprehension 
of man, and hence, taken from a purely objective 
point of view, it is a miracle, indeed, an absolute 
miracle. The subjective reference to the relation 
of the individual to God comes into play as a fur- 
ther element for the religious attitude toward the 
matter, and consequently faith designates as ‘‘mir- 
acle”’ only what in particular instances seems to 
it to point with special clearness beyond the world 
of phenomena and directly to God. What in a 
given case constitutes this depends solely on sub- 
jective personal conditions and preconceptions. 
Objectively considered, however, the position 
must be maintained that in the last analysis every- 
thing may become “miracle” for the individual— 


74 


Chapter I1I—Cosmology 

the least as well as the greatest, the commonplace 
no less than the unusual—and that it shall at 
the proper time become miracle. For the whole 
world is God’s, and even the least and most insig- 
nificant thing can give a glimpse of the world 
beyond. 

But when it has once grasped the meaning and 
import of this inquiry faith, especially belief in 
providence, has no interest whatever in really ex- 
traordinary phenomena in the sense that they set 
aside the laws of nature. Faith can leave it en- 
tirely to purely academic discussion to deal with 
this matter. Such discussion will lead to an epis- 
temological delimitation of the concept of the 
“laws of nature,’’ such as we have already set 
forth above. 

Finally, to bring this discussion of the concept 
of and the belief in miracle to a close, one thing 
more must be added. It makes a difference, and 
indeed a momentous and significant difference, 
whether we have in mind the sphere of the mate- 
rial course of nature or that of the inner psychic 
life and its relations to the organism. So far as we 
can see, the causal law holds sway in the former 
in the form of a strict equivalence of cause and ef- 
fect, that is to say, according to the formula, causa 
@quat effectum—cause and effect are quantita- 
tively equal and can be quantitatively balanced 
_ against one another. 

But the law of causality must not in this form 
be extended to the domain of the inner life, least 


75 


Christian Belief in God 


of all to that of the higher mental life. Quantita- 
tive considerations play an altogether unessential 
role in the inner life. Here, on the contrary, the 
qualitative content is the crucial thing. Hence it 
is impossible to set up for this inner life, and its 
relations to the organism, anything at all like such 
fixed rules as for the material course of nature. 
At any rate this is entirely beyond our power at 
present. As far as we are able to apprehend any- 
thing about the laws of the psychic life, these run 
in an exactly opposite direction to those of phys- 
ical and material causality. What might here come 
_ Into question is not a law of quantitative equal- 
ity, but far more a law of “spiritual growth’— 
a law of an increased growth of the products of the 
mind. I thus adopt the terminology advocated 
by Wundt because, as the senior in exact psycho- 
physiological investigation, he is entitled to special 
consideration in this matter, but futhermore, be- 
cause his formulation shows very plainly what 
care must here be exercised in using the concept 
“law.”’ 

As to the matter itself, there can certainly no 
longer be any serious difference of opinion with re- 
spect to the crucial point. The soul is not a mere 
causal mechanism. This is admitted today by 
practically all philosophers. And not only philos- 
ophers admit it, but also natural scientists in in- 
creasing numbers are admitting it, and among 
them, above all, the representatives of that science 
which is here primarily concerned, namely: psy- 


76 


Chapter [I1I—Cosmology 


chiatry. They realize that it is to the interest of 
psychiatry to recognize that lawfulness peculiar to 
the psychical as psychical. Thus, for example, 
W. Hellpach, who has already on other occasions 
proven that he is an investigator of psychological 
training, writes: “‘Psycho-pathology has to deal 
with phenomena of consciousness, and that means 
with contents of consciousness. The abnormality 
must be manifested in these, if we wish to speak 
of psychic abnormality at all. But we know prac- 
tically nothing about the relation of the contents 
of consciousness to the processes of the brain. The 
effect of this lack of knowledge has become very 
evident in psychology. Scarcely a psychologist ever 
even thinks now of classifying psychic contents ac- 
cording to their corresponding physical processes, 
much less of attempting to investigate these con- 
tents and processes with reference to any causal 
connections. Is it a matter of only slight impor- 
tance for the psycho-pathologist to understand the 
qualitative and hence absolutely distinctive nature 
of the psychic? Hardly, for he too must familiar- 
ize himself with the idea that the content alone of 
a psychic phenomenon is decisive in determining 
whether it is abnormal or not. For plain everyday 
experience proves this necessity.”’ * 

The psychic life, then, is the true sphere of reli- 
gious “‘miracle.”” But here, too, it is unnecessary 


* Grundgedanken zur Wissenschaftslehre der Psychopathologie, 
Leipzig, 1906, pp. 82 f. See also his Die Grenzwissenschaften 
der Psychologie, 1902. 


77 


Christian Belief in God 


to think of a “‘setting aside” of the laws of nature, 
however little the religious disposition itself—its 
development and unfolding—rests upon such a 
“setting aside.” 

And now let us turn to the teleological argument. 


78 


Chapter Four 


Biology and the Christian Belief in God 


S there any such thing as teleology, or, at any 

rate, a teleology that is scientifically tenable 
and convincing? Is it really possible to establish 
other than causal relations in nature? He who 
holds that it is will consider, exclusively or at 
least primarily, as the field in which such other re- 
lations can be established, the field of organic na- 
ture, that of living things, that is to say, the field 
of biology. 


A. TELEOLOGY IN ORGANIC NATURE 


The point at issue, however, is just whether this 
field occupies a unique position in this respect. © 
From the writings of Haeckel, if from no other 
' sources, it is well known that wide circles of mod- 
ern natural scientists, and especially such as dis- 
play a general philosophical interest, take a decid- 
edly negative attitude in the matter. Repeatedly 
and with untiring zeal Haeckel impresses upon his 
readers that all phenomena and facts even of the 
organic world are without exception explicable and 
intelligible under a purely mechanical causal view. 
Mechanical causes alone, he urges, determine those 
peculiar motor phenomena by which organisms 


79 


Christian Belief in God 


are distinguished from inorganic things, and which 
we call life in the narrower sense. Not only in his 
‘Riddle of the Universe” but also in his most im- 
portant scientific writings, Haeckel has maintained 
this point of view, and quite recently he has again 
given it special emphasis in his ‘‘ Wonders of Life.”’ 
But he by no means stands alone in holding this 
view. On the contrary it is the attitude of a large 
number of modern natural scientists. In Roux and 
his numerous disciples this conception has found 
protagonists of greater scientific rigor than Haeckel. 
In the mechanics of evolution, as he calls it, Roux 
sees the real science of the future. He defines it 
more closely as the causal science of organisms, and 
he explains this to mean that it is, or must certainly 
become, the science of the real formative causes, the 
vere cause, to which the organic kingdom as a 
whole, as well as every individual representative, 
owes its origin. 

In its beginnings this view and mode of thought 
goes back to the middle of the last century, to the 
time of the violent opposition against the theory 
of vitalism. Natural philosophy, as well as philos- 
ophy in general, used to explain the distinctive and 
peculiar character of organic life by the hypothesis 
of a special vital power, effective only in organisms 
and constituting their special divine endowment. 
The real characteristic of living creatures, as dis- 
tinguished from inorganic nature, was seen in this 
purposive active vital power, which was looked 
upon as different from all physical and chemical 


80 


Chapter I1V—Biology 

forces. Now there can be no doubt that this con- 
cept and this theory of vital power have often been 
misapplied in order to obscure certain problems or 
to dismiss them without much ado. It was cus- 
tomary to stop the discussion of all questions and 
perplexities to which biological investigation led, 
by referring to the vital power of divine origin as a 
sufficient explanation of the phenomenon under 
consideration. Hence it cannot be denied that the 
opposition to vitalism was justified. In fact, this 
theory is an impediment to scientific investigation 
and that is a sufficient reason for giving it up al- 
together, since its sole object is to explain certain 
scientific problems. The well-known philosopher, 
Lotze,*” was chiefly instrumental in opposing and 
overcoming it. But, and here we come to the heart 
of the matter, the way in which vitalism has often 
been and is being combated in recent natural 
science and natural philosophy, quite contrary to 
Lotze’s intentions, amounts at the same time to a 
definite and positive conception of the nature of the 
phenomena of life and of their relation to inorganic 
nature. Implied in the theory of vitalism was the 
idea that living phenomena cannot be fully ex- 
plained and understood under a causal mechanical 
view. But those representatives of modern natural 
science who oppose vitalism, in fact, take the posi- 
tion that they can be so explained. In the whole 
domain of nature they recognize only causal rela- 
tions, and hence they maintain that causality 
reigns supreme in this domain. Now we have 


81 


Christian Belief in God 


already made it clear that absolute validity can 
not be claimed for causality. The law of causality 
does not govern the course of nature with absolute 
necessity by virtue of its own comprehensive force, 
but on the contrary it merely represents that order 
which we meet with everywhere in nature as we 
know it—as it comes to our understanding. On 
this account it must be conceded that the law of 
causality holds generally. But does it follow from 
this general validity that we are justified in pro- 
claiming causality alone to hold, and hence in 
denying and contesting all other relations than the 
mechanical and causal in the whole domain of 
nature, including the phenomena of life? On 
purely logical grounds, by no means. Taken in 
the abstract, a system of facts constituting a 
mechanical causal complex may at the same time 
be a part of a purposive complex, or it may even 
constitute the whole of such a complex. Indeed, 
we see this in all machines and parts of machines, 
for although they serve the definite purpose for 
which they are constructed by human ingenuity, 
their operation is, as a matter of fact, mechanical 
and causal. Hence the only question arising is 
this: What conclusion does the existing state of 
facts demand or at least favor? And, precisely 
by reason of recent biological research and dis- 
covery, it seems to me that to this question we 
may give the answer: The assertion of the exclusive 
validity of causality is not only unjustifiable but 
directly untenable. 


82 


Chapter 1V—Biology | 

To prove that this answer is correct, at least for 
some of the most important cases in question, I shall 
again take up the illustration of the machine. The 
comparison of the living organism to a machine 
comes to our mind almost as a matter of course, 
and it has, in fact, frequently been made. But 
since De la Mettrie coined the well-known phrase 
““Phomme machine,” it has often been used in sup- 
port of precisely this purely mechanical causal 
view, which is satisfied with chemical and physical 
processes as a complete explanation of the nature 
of living organisms. But the more discerning of 
the natural philosophers of today admit that such 
a comparison is really adverse, indeed fatal, to 
this view. Reinke especially has strongly em- 
phasized this fact, and in so doing he is in full 
accord with philosophers proper, such as Lieb- 
mann, Paulsen and Wundt. But even natural 
scientists, not at all or only slightly interested in 
philosophy, have recently expressed themselves to 
the same effect. I refer the reader especially to 
Oskar Hertwig, anatomist and biologist of Berlin, 
particularly to his ‘“Zeit- und Streitfragen der 
Biologie.” ** 

For although I may be thoroughly familiar with 
the various chemical and physical processes in- 
volved in the operation of a machine, this is not 
sufficient to give me any knowledge of its real 
nature. For this it is necessary that the engineer 
explain to me the plan of construction and the 
definite appropriate arrangement of its various 


83 


Christian Belief in God 


parts. It is just this peculiar arrangement, due 
to human intelligence, which is primarily char- 
acteristic for the machine. It is made, indeed, of 
the same materials which are ordinarily found in 
nature, and it works with the same forces, and 
according to the same laws, that we are accustomed 
to see in nature. But in spite of this fact, the 
machine differs fundamentally from all other man- 
ifestations of nature, and leads to results which 
do not occur anywhere else in nature. This is 
due to the fact that human beings, acting with 
rational and systematic understanding and de- 
sign, have given the machine a definite form 
which makes possible its new and specific achieve- 
ments. 

Now it is very similar with living organisms. 
Chemical processes and physical properties alone 
do not explain their peculiar and unique functions. 
On the contrary, it is necessary to presuppose an 
organization of elements peculiar to living organ- 
isms—a machine-like arrangement or structure, 
which is prerequisite to the phenomena of life, 
just as the design evolved by rational thinking is 
prerequisite to the machine. 

Let us now briefly call to mind the most im- 
portant of these specific functions of organisms. 
It will then also become clear to what extent the 
machine analogy characterizes their nature. How- 
ever, this will only be by way of suggestion, and is 
not intended to be exhaustive. 

Nutrition, regeneration and propagation are the 


84 


Chapter [V—Biology 


three concepts which express the most essential 
specific traits of the organic world. 

Haeckel, among others, looks upon nutrition as 
a purely chemico-physical process like the forma- 
tion of crystals, for instance. Just as in the forma- 
tion of crystals new particles are, according to 
definite laws, continually deposited by accretion 
on the already solid nucleus, so in nutrition, it is 
claimed, similar conditions hold. But this analogy 
is misleading, indeed it is absolutely false. For in 
the nutritive process of organisms we have to do 
not merely with a process of accretion, but with 
internal and organic assimilation. And what is 
more important, this consumption and assimilation 
of food always takes place, from the lowest stages 
of life up, according to a real selective choice. Even 
those most primitive forms of life consisting of 
simple cells or not even having the full value of a 
complete cell, have the capacity of selecting nour- 
ishment suitable for themselves and of sucking it 
in for the purposes of assimilation. And what is 
true of these primitive forms of life is true also of 
those cell structures in the digestive organs of 
higher forms of life whose function is the assimila- 
tion of food. We know today that the reabsorption 
of the walls of the intestines is due to the fact that 
special cells here exercise the specific function of 
absorbing suitable matter, and of passing it on for 
further assimilation in the body. 

Moreover, as regards the popular reference to 
the formation of crystals, the fact must not be 


85 


Christian Belief in God 


overlooked that this already presents a difficult 
problem in itself. Driesch has advocated the legiti- 
mate and important distinction between ‘‘static”’ 
and ‘‘dynamic” teleology. Thus the formation of 
crystals falls within the domain of static teleology 
and is, therefore, itself already teleological in 
character.*4 

How great the natural capacity of regeneration 
is in plants, animals and human beings is, at least 
in general, familiar to all. I shall illustrate this 
by an example which will at the same time clear 
up still another problem of importance for our 
whole investigation. The question is as to whether 
relations and phenomena of a teleological nature, 
that is to say, in any way purposive in character, 
can be proved to hold in the realm of organic life. 
However, for the present I avoid intentionally, for 
a reason that will appear later, the expression 
“purposive.” It is obvious that the capacity of 
regeneration can be profitably used as a positive 
element of proof by the advocate of teleology. 
Consequently the opponents of teleology have 
made a systematic attempt to invalidate every line 
of argument of this kind by referring to so-called 
non-purposive or dysteleological facts and proc- 
esses, contrasting them with such teleological phe- 
nomena. Again Haeckel, more than anyone else, 
has taken pains to collect all such dysteleological 
facts that he could find, in order to found upon 
them a special doctrine of dystelology.* 

* Natiirliche Schépfungsgeschichte, roth ed., 1902, p. 288. 

86 


Chapter 1V—Biology 


It has often been observed that in craw-fish, 
when an eye is destroyed, an antenna or feeler 
similar to those of insects is produced instead of 
another eye. Now in this production of a less 
perfect to take the place of a more perfect sense 
organ a non-purposiveness has been seen. Is it 
purposive, it has been asked, for this entirely dif- 
ferent and less perfect sense-organ to be innervated 
by the optic nerve? And it has been answered: 
“‘Here the teleological point of view breaks down, 
for we are confronted with an aberration in the 
teleological sense.” ** This case, which has been 
much discussed in print as well as in meetings of 
natural scientists, shows with all the clearness that 
could be desired the logical absurdity of this, and 
all similar objections raised against organic teleol- 
ogy. The teleological character of regeneration is 
not disproved by the fact that the latter has its 
limitations. It would be entirely in line with this 
line of argument, if one were to seek to establish 
the absolute dysteleology, non-purposiveness and 
miscarriage of organic nature as a whole, by point- 
ing out that, with very few exceptions, living 
creatures do not grow a new head after it has once 
been severed. Logically such manifest nonsense 
differs only in degree from Haeckel’s assertion that - 
in very many cases the purposiveness of organiza- 
tion is only apparent, and that more exact anatom- 
ical and physiological investigation often shows 
that ‘‘even very highly developed organs of seem- 
ingly well designed construction exhibit great me- 


87 


Christian Belief in God 


chanical defects.” ** The general point of view 
under which all such objections must be considered 
is obviously this: we may not definitely decide the 
question of teleological relations and phenomena 
according to our desires and the state of our 
knowledge, we may not demand a subjective an- 
- thropopathic teleology, but we must acknowledge 
the objective empirical teleology. This makes 
it incumbent upon us to go still deeper into the 
whole problem and we shall now attempt so to do. 

The so-called teleological proof for the existence 
of God consists in concluding the existence of a 
designing creator from the purposive order of 
nature. But a peculiar difficulty presents itself 
against such an attempt. The concept of purpose 
is rooted in inner experience. Whatever arises 
from a decision for a purpose is purposeful and 
purposive. Consequently, in order to be quite sure 
that any result is purposive, we must know that 
it arises from a decision for a purpose, from an 
act of will of an intelligent being. From purposive- 
ness we seek to draw the conclusion that there is 
an intelligent will, and yet we can only recognize 
a result as purposive on the supposition of an in- 
telligent act of will. In the last analysis we cannot 
avoid this circle. However, we cannot for this 
reason simply drop the question, or we should for 
similar reasons actually have to abandon scientific 
_ investigation altogether. 

On the contrary, we shall have to find the best 
criterion we can to characterize results as pur- 


88 


Chapter I1V—Biology 


posive, disregarding the fact that we know their 
origin to lie in the will of consciously purposive 
intelligences. If we want to treat the matter sys- 
tematically, we shall take up the highest products 
of the purposive activity of human intelligence, 
and inquire what is characteristic of them. These 
highest purposive human products are such systems 
as are complete within themselves, and whose com- 
ponent parts serve the purpose of realizing a con- 
sistent end. Here we have a criterion which is far- 
reaching in enabling us to investigate and to judge 
objectively. To be sure, the objectivity of judg- 
ment does not extend directly to the characteristic 
of purposiveness, but only to that of being directed 
toward an end. For the present the possibility 
must be left open that these ends may be random 
and accidental. Von Baer deserves the chief credit 
for having introduced the concept of directedness 
.toward an end into natural science and natural 
philosophy, and for having insisted that phenomena 
of this kind must be recognized as real.®” How- 
ever, he makes a clear distinction between purpose 
and end. Now, since this distinction seems to me 
to be both real and important, I consider the 
polemic which Reinke has recently started on this 
point against Baer to be a step backward.* 

The truth of the matter really is that directedness 
of nature toward an end can be made an object of 
purely empirical scientific investigation while this 
cannot be done with the purposiveness of nature. 

* See Anm, 38, Reinke’s Dominanten. 


89 


Christian Belief in God 


It is a further question, lying beyond the domain 
of the exact sciences and capable of being dealt 
with only by philosophical reflection, whether the 
facts falling under the head of directedness toward 
an end must be interpreted as purposive results. 
Since the Greek terms teleology and teleological 
have the more general meaning, comprising both 
the concept of directedness toward an end and that 
of purposiveness, we can properly speak of an 
empirical teleology, as has recently been done. 
The question formulated above may then be re- 
stated: Does an empirical teleology lead necessarily 
to a metaphysical teleology? — 

Of course the answer to this question must de- 
pend upon the scope and nature of empirical 
teleology. This brings us back to our discussion 
above. 


B. PROPAGATION AND EVOLUTION AS THE CULMIN- 
ATION OF ORGANIC TELEOLOGY 


It still remains for us to consider propagation 
as the third specific characteristic of living organ- 
isms. For it is in this that their teleological char- 
acter finds its strongest expression. 

Natural philosophy as well as philosophy in 
general formerly sought to explain the great enigma 
presenting itself in the fact of reproduction, by the 
so-called theory of preformation. This theory as- 
sumed that the germ or beginning of every living 
creature already, only on an infinitely reduced 


go 


Chapter 1V—Biology 


scale, represents the developed individual in ques- 
tion. The germ must be looked upon, it was 
claimed, as an extremely small image of the com- 
pletely developed individual, the imperfections of 
our sense-organs alone preventing our recognizing 
this miniature image as an exact copy. The whole 
ontogenetic course of development, even in the 
early embryonic stages, was accordingly taken to 
be a simple process of growth by nutrition. In 
order to preserve the real continuity of the develop- 
ment, which is the real enigma, it was further held 
that all the germs of any particular species were 
from the very beginning contained in the first germ 
of that species. Accordingly, it was calculated that 
Eve, for example, was created with an endowment 
of two hundred billion germs of human beings. 
This theory of preformation is today untenable, 
not primarily, as most people will think to begin 
with, on account of the absurd numbers involved, 
for no limit can be set, after all, either as a maxi- 
mum or as a minimum. But it is untenable be- 
cause we know today that the germ of every living 
creature is originally a single cell * like all those of 
which the completely formed creature consists, and 
consequently, that cell segmentation and cell divi- 

* More exactly, the ovum as well as the sperm cell, on whose 
union propagation depends (in so far as this does not take place 
by simple division or parthenogenesis) have in form and function 
the value of elementary organisms. In particular, the cell nuclei 
are, as recent investigations have made at least highly probable, 


the real vehicles of reproduction, just as in the union of ovum 
and sperm a union of their nuclei is primarily involved. 


gr 


Christian Belief in God 


sion represent the first stages of embryonic develop- 
ment. Hence the germ, the simple cell cannot be 
an image of the complete creature and cannot be 
organized like the latter. 

The problem confronting us in reproduction is 
then really this: How does it happen that organ- 
isms are developed from simple cells that are al- 
ways like, in kind and constitution, those from 
which these cells have been detached? Since all 
germs of all living creatures are uniformly simple 
cells, how can such a cell invariably develop in such 
a way as to conform to the species in question? 
Never does a blade of grass or an apple tree grow 
from the germ of a lemon seed, never does a turtle 
or an elephant develop from the egg of an ant, never 
does a sea-eagle or a humming-bird arise from the 
blastocyst of a pigeon egg! 

Nevertheless, people have tried to comprehend 
this fact, whose wonder only seems to increase the 
more it is reflected upon, by purely causal mechan- 
ical considerations, and with a rigid exclusion of 
all teleological reflection. The so-called idioplasm 
theory of the late botanist, Nageli of Munich, and 
the germ-plasm theory of the biologist, Weismann, 
are especially deserving of mention among the the- 
ories advanced to serve this purpose. As is recog- 
nized by natural scientists and philosophers, they 
are by far the most important of these attempts. 
These theories are of interest and importance for 
us by reason of the fact that they bring out the full 
significance of the problem before us. In fact, both 


Q2 


Chapter [V—Biology 

theories do this in essentially the same way. Their 
differences appear only in their finer details. For 
our purpose it is sufficient to discuss the fundamen- 
tal idea common to both theories. 

Since all organisms, despite their extreme diver- 
sity, are developed from simple cells of microscopic 
size, it follows that these germ cells themselves— 
this is the fundamental idea common to both the- 
ories—cannot really be-the ultimate and the most 
elemental units of life, but must themselves be 
highly complex in structure or highly composite in 
their organization. Every germ cell must be a ver- 
itable microcosm. For only thus is the infinite va- 
riety of development possible. Né&ageli calls the 
hypothetical component elements of the cell mi- 
cells,* and, as a result of certain calculations, he 
finds that a mass of protoplasm equal to one-thou- 
sandth of a cubic millimeter contains about four 
millions of them. 

Now, to be sure, this calculation is really of con- 
sequence only from the view-point of epistemology 
or from that of the infinitesimal calculus. These 
two fields here have a common interest. 

The same reflection must of course be repeated 
for the individual mi-cells. It follows, then, as I 
have already stated, that every cell is really a mi- 
crocosm, a true universe. While, on the other 
hand, if we start a little farther on in the series con- 
stituting the system of infinitesimal equations 
which we can and must look upon as constituting 


* From the Latin word mica, meaning a small grain. 


93 


Christian Belief in God 


the world, then even the solar system to which our 
earth belongs and which, in spite of Galileo, New- 
ton and Laplace, indeed, in spite of the undulatory 
theory and spectrum analysis, we still like so much 
to regard as the universe pure and simple, then, I 
say, even this solar system appears as a mere grain 
of dust in the universe. 

On the other hand, every individual cell is after 
all a real universe! And hence the result of our 
whole discussion of reproduction is exactly this: 
we must regard the very component elements of 
livings things—-the individual cells—as entities of 
a most highly complicated organization. Even 
these individual cells have a machine-like struc- 
ture, but, as we know by experience, the end which 
this machine-like structure serves, and to which 
it leads, lies infinitely beyond all achievements 
which human intelligence and energy can attain. 
For it serves the end of securing the continuity of 
life. A superb teleology, a most comprehensive 
directedness toward an end, is discernible in or- 
ganic nature, even when we consider individual 
living creatures as such. If philosophers like Spen- 
cer, Hartmann and Wundt interpret these teleo- 
logical facts, which they accept, in the sense of a 
pantheism, however it may be defined in detail, 
we shall still have to grant them the possibility of 
such an interpretation. But it is certainly not the 
only possible interpretation, nor indeed the one 
most naturally suggesting itself, nor the one best 
founded. By every analogy of experience the in- 


94 


Chapter [V—Biology 


terpretation meeting these requirements is un- 
doubtedly that which the Christian religion con- 
tains in its belief in a personal God. 

After all perhaps it is not a mere accident that 
a natural scientist like Reinke,® having once come 
to accept the justice and demonstrability of the 
teleological view of the organic word, is ready even 
before professional philosophers (to whom the de- 
tails of the teleological order are not as clear and 
familiar as to himself) to declare faith in a personal 
creator to be the only key with which we can, at 
least, attempt to solve the riddle presented by those 
facts. He writes: “‘Reasoning by the methods of 
induction and analogy, the natural scientist will 
find that reducing the nature and the existence of 
organisms to a creating deity is not only the most 
plausible but the only conceivable explanation— 
for him this follows with convincing logic from the 
facts.” * This statement we must certainly limit 
and set right from an epistemological point of view, 
but with such limitation it seems to me to be en- 
tirely warranted. And within this limitation, 
Reinke’s argument directed especially against pan- 
theism is relevant, namely: ‘‘The machine-like 
structure of plants and animals is incompatible 
with pantheism, for the inventor and master work- 
man are inseparably bound up with the concept. 
machine”’ (p. 464). 

With all this, however, we have thus far merely 
crossed the threshold of the teleological order of 

* Die Welt als Tat, 1899, p. 457. 


95 


Christian Belief in God 


nature. In terms of the illustration already sev- 
eral times used, we have considered the various 
parts of the machine and grasped their teleological 
character. Let us now turn our attention to the 
whole range of living organisms, as it constitutes 
a gradually ascending line of ever higher and higher 
forms of life. For the world of living things con- 
stitutes a connected whole, and when we consider 
it above all, as it seems to me we must, from the 
point of view of evolution, it represents a great 
work of art, which is self-perfecting in the sense 
that the lower forms of life lead to higher and higher 
forms. | 

Hence I am certainly of the opinion that the 
doctrine of evolution and the Christian belief in 
God not only do not conflict but, on the contrary, 
that they are mutually complementary—I might 
almost say that each is necessary to the other. 
The Christian belief in God alone comprehends 
the riddle propounded by the theory of evolution— 
it does not solve but it comprehends this riddle.*® 
For it is most especially under the conception of 
evolution that the world of living things seems like 
a work of art, in comparison with which even the 
most elaborate human works of art are but very 
imperfect imitations. It appears as a work of art 
in which innumerable distinct elements serve the 
single purpose of developing ever more perfect 
forms of life, from the lowest stages of unicellular 
organisms or such, indeed, that do not even have 
the value of a complete cell in form, and with only 


96 


Chapter [V—Biology 


an extremely vague sensibility, up to the highest 
stage where rational and religious moral life be- 
comes possible, and with it conscious and respon- 
sible personal beings. Only in this sense and to 
this extent is the theory of evolution in the domain 
of organic life a well-founded hypothesis. Even 
then it is no more than an hypothesis. Compared 
with the unscientific exaggerations which we find 
in this respect in Haeckel’s publications, and all 
the more in those of the popular authors of his 
school, it is at all events of value that strictly pro- 
fessional natural scientists have recently empha- 
sized most vigorously the hypothetical character 
of the whole theory of the origin of the species, of 
the theory of evolution in the domain of organic 
life, and have reverted to a complete repudiation 
of it.* But considered from a higher philosophical 
point of view this must be adjudged a hasty 
narrowness. 

For in the sense explained the doctrine of evolu- 
tion is really a well-founded hypothesis, one of the 
best founded hypotheses, in fact, of all science, and 
there are certainly much stronger arguments in 
favor of it than there are in favor of the opposing 
hypothesis of the independent creation of all the 
various genera or species of organic life. For it 
must be conceded by everyone who is not willing 


* The chief representative of this line of thought is the zo- 
ologist Alb. Fleischmann of Erlangen. Concerning him and his 
lectures ‘“‘Uber den Auf- und Niedergang einer wissenschaftlichen 
Hypothese,” see Anm. 9. 


97 


Christian Belief in God 


to defend to the utmost the verbal inspiration 
theory of the Scriptures of the seventeenth century 
that the theory of independent creation is, from 
our point of view, nothing more than an hypothesis. 

Proof that the doctrine of evolution or the theory 
of descent is one of the best established hypotheses 
of science is derived especially from three branches 
of knowledge: comparative biology or comparative 
botany and zodlogy, paleontology or the science of 
organisms living in earlier periods of the earth’s 
development, and ontogeny or the inquiry into the 
life-history of individual organisms. 

Comparative biology teaches that the demarca- 
tions of the various species of living organisms 
are frequently not fixed but uncertain and fluc- 
tuating. Natural science, as well as philosophy, 
had. formerly considered the distinctive differences 
of the various species to be absolutely fixed and 
immutable. But this position has become un- 
tenable with the broadening of our knowledge of 
the plant and animal world. Varieties and sub- 
species often represent connecting intermediary 
forms, and hence a systematic demarcation and 
classification becomes a mere makeshift, useful 
only for practical purposes. Similar conditions 
obtain for genera and higher groups. However, 
we must keep in mind that there are, in the veg- 
etable as well as in the animal kingdom, a certain 
number of distinctively organized groups or types 
which are not, at least immediately, reducible to 
one another. On the contrary, as compared with 


98 


Chapter I1V—Biology 


the older view, recent investigation has proved the 
necessity of increasing the number of such distinct 
groups.” 

Paleontology has established three facts which 
tend to support the theory of evolution. It has 
shown, first, that in the different periods of the 
history of the earth correspondingly different forms 
of life have been developed, and that these forms 
did not remain the same throughout all these 
periods. Secondly, it points out that the successive 
forms of life found in the various strata of the 
earth and representing the different periods of its 
history, constitute a progressive line of develop- 
ment, inasmuch as the simpler forms predominate 
in earlier while higher forms always occur in the 
later periods. Finally, paleontology teaches that 
among extinct species there are some which may, 
with a certain degree of justice, be regarded as 
intermediary and transitional forms.* 

So far, however, the efforts to establish a con- 
tinuous progressive line of development have met 
with so little success as to make it highly improba- 
ble that any material advance will ever be made 
in this direction. It should be specifically men- 
tioned that no form has yet been discovered which 
might with certainty be regarded as an inter- 
mediary form which really fills the gap between 
the highest orders of quadrupeds living today and 
man.*” 

Ontogeny teaches that every higher organism 
must, in the process of its development, pass 


99 


Christian Belief in God 


through forms which characterize lower organisms. 
A particularly striking example is the branchial 
stage in the development of the embryo of higher 
vertebrates. On the basis of this fact Haeckel has 
formulated what he calls the fundamental bioge- 
netic law, namely, that the process of development 
of the individual is a rapid and contracted reca- 
pitulation of the history of the species. In this form 
and broad generality, to be sure, the ‘fundamental 
biogenetic law”’ is open to very serious objection. 
But the careful formulation just given does express 
a real state of facts, such facts, indeed, as in them- 
selves lead to the theory of evolution, or better, to 
a theory of evolution.** 

Thus we have three groups of facts supporting 
the theory of evolution. By reason of the agree- 
ment and mutual corroborative character of these 
facts this theory becomes one of the best estab- 
lished hypotheses of all science. Of course the 
possibility must be left open that this development 
cannot, after all, be looked upon as taking place, 
without break and unalterably, in an absolutely 
continuous line. On account of the restrictions and 
provisos which we had to make with respect to 
each of these groups of facts, we are forced to recog- 
nize this possibility. Moreover, various empirical 
data tend directly to substantiate such a position. 
It is always a matter of method for us to take into 
account every supposition which is unfavorable to 
us as a representative of the Christian belief in 
God. Every modification and every point yielded 


IOO 





ee a ee eee ee 


Chapter [V—Biology 


in the direction mentioned is a concession to our 
own position. It is just for this reason that we 
deem it sufficient to have established the fact that 
the necessity of such modifications does not by any 
means lie outside the realm of real scientific reflec- 
tion about the doctrine of evolution. However, 
we shall not, at present, make any direct use of 
this restriction, but on the contrary we shall accept 
precisely the other possibility, namely, that there | 
is really a continuous unbroken development: irom, 
a first beginning up to an ultimate final stage. 
For as a possibility this must certainly. be held 
valid. 

Now would the fact of such a development 
jeopardize the Christian belief in God? I have 
already emphatically answered this question in 
the negative. But since we now know more about 
the facts supporting this theory, I can treat this 
question more fully. It certainly cannot be denied 
that, considered and interpreted from the point of 
view of evolution, we have before us in organic 
life a system of facts of empirical teleology. But, 
more than this it is a system of empirical teleolog- 
ical facts for the understanding of which a met- 
aphysical teleology is absolutely required. For in 
the face of these facts the strictly mechanical and 
causal position is pure nonsense. Perhaps it might 
be conceivable that a watch, an organ or a micro- 
scope could, in the course of millions of years, and 
as the result of a fortuitous concurrence of circum- 
stances and of the bringing together by chance 


IOI 


Christian Belief in God 


of the various component parts, be produced by 
a purely causal mechanical process, although I 
think this highly improbable. But that cells could 
originate spontaneously and accidentally, cells 
which are capable of segmenting and dividing, of 
developing into a morula and blastula, of expand- 
ing into endodermic, ectodermic and mesodermic 
tissues,“ and thus finally of producing most com- 
_ plex organisms up to man himself, who subjects the 
very ‘universe to his questions and investigations, 
_or, te use Gpce more the words of Dubois Reymond, 
cells capatle of bringing about a development of a 
primordial bacillus into a palm grove, of a prim- 
itive micrococcus into Suleima’s graceful mien and 
Newton’s philosophical brain—to maintain that 
such cells could have originated accidentally by 
a purely causal mechanical process is madness, 
even though there be method in it. It would be 
much more plausible to hold that the facts adduced 
and which represent such a complicated work of 
art, point unmistakably to a master-builder who 
sets and realizes definite purposes and to whose 
conscious and purposive intention the origin and 
development of life owes its beginning. 


C. INTERPRETATION AND DELIMITATION OF THE 
CONCEPT OF EVOLUTION 


A posteriori this conclusion is, of course, by no 
means imperative, since the pantheistic explanation 
remains open as a possibility. Nevertheless, this 


I02 


ES ee eee ee ee 





ee ee er 


Chapter [V—Biology 

interpretation of the Christian belief in God is un- 
doubtedly reasonable, and, viewed from a purely 
scientific standpoint, it has the great advantage 
over the pantheistic interpretation that the analogy 
of experience is in its favor, and that it avoids the 
difficulties to which the latter inevitably leads. 
For the simple fact, which is all that is given us 
as a matter of experience, the fact of the realization 
of purposes by self-conscious and purposive intelli- 
gences, brings to naught every attempt to give this 
pantheistic interpretation a more intelligible form. 
When, in spite of this, the attempt is made, the 
result is altogether arbitrary and fantastic construc- 
tions. That Hartmann’s “unconscious absolute”’ 
is such a construction is almost the unanimous 
opinion of all philosophers today. But even Wundt, 
who has frequently expressed this opinion most 
forcibly, nevertheless finally comes, in his own at- 
tempt to give this pantheistic interpretation a more 
intelligible form, to a conception closely related to 
that of Hartmann, and for this very reason it falls 
under his own criticism of unconscious mind as a 
self-contradictory concept. For, in spite of all the 
efforts of Hartmann and his followers, to maintain 
a speculative concept, set up @ priori, by subse- 
quent epistemological and psychological argu- 
ment, Wundt is manifestly right when he empha- 
sizes the fact that the concept of mind springs 
from our own inner experience, that it is, therefore, 
bound to our consciousness, that consequently 
everything pertaining to mind is conscious mental 


103 


Christian Belief in God 


activity, and that, as a result, “unconscious mind” 
is a self-contradictory concept.” 

But is not the concept to which the problem un- 
der consideration reduces with Wundt, the concept, 
namely, of the ‘‘spontaneous generation of the or- 
ganic world,” similarly self-contradictory? And 
after all, would not such a ‘‘spontaneous generation 
of the organic world” presuppose “unconscious 
mental activity” as the ultimate and primary force 
of the universe? 

Nor does the law of heterogony of purposes, ad- 
duced by Wundt to make this spontaneous genera- 
tion intelligible, eliminate the difficulty mentioned. 
This law does, indeed, express.a real fact, namely: 
that in the organic world definite acts, originally 
controlled by the will, bring about permanent 
changes which facilitate and perfect such acts, and ~ 
thus gradually lead to a steady increase in effec- 
tiveness beyond the end first sought. However, 
this heterogony of purposes, and the correspond- 
ing gradual self-perfecting of the organic world, 
applies only to the way in which the ascending 
process of development takes place, but not to 
the sum total of the facts of organic development 
on their own merits. Because, as Wundt himself 

* In his “System der Philosophie,” 2d ed., p. 559, Wundt says 
explicitly: ‘‘The assumption, by reason of any objective indica- 
tions, that there is a mental content, is justified only where the 
latter must be interpreted as acts of a consciousness similar to 
our own, however different its stage of development may be.” 


Consistently maintained, this insight leads to a result beyond 
Wundt’s own pantheism. 


104 


} 
4 
: 
4 
< 
7 





Chapter 1V—Biology 


admits,* the creative energy which is at work in 
organic nature, never consists in an absolutely new 
creation, but always in an unending and continual 
differentiation and intensification of acts accom- 
plished, which are given originally in their simplest 
form. When the matter is taken as a whole the 
argument based upon this ‘“‘creative energy” is 
inadequate. What must be thought of the final 
result of Wundt’s discussion follows from the pre- 
ceding. He writes: ‘Even if the contemplation of 
organic nature makes it probable that the purpos- 
siveness displayed in the organization of living 
forms has sprung from a purposive will, there is no 
reason whatever for assuming that this purposive 
will lies outside the organisms themselves, since 
experience teaches us, in fact, to recognize the 
volitional acts of animals as important and funda- 
mental factors in the adaptation of their organs.” T 
This statement is not positively erroneous. But 
in this form, the assertion that there is no reason 
whatever for assuming the purposive will, which, 
even according to Wundt, must be posited, to lie 
outside of organisms themselves, must be chal- 
lenged. Really it can only be said that for a purely 
theoretical and scientific consideration there is no 
reason absolutely compelling us to make this as- 
sumption. But it is the assumption easiest to 
understand and best founded. 

Still less than that of Wundt can the view of 
Ostwald serve as a valid objection to our position. 
* Cf. op. cit., p. 332 f. t Op. cit., p. 432 f. 
105 


Christian Belief in God 


In the world-view derived from energetics, which 
Ostwald promulgates, he seeks to establish the 
concept of energy not only as the fundamental 
concept of theoretical physics, but beyond this as 
the fundamental philosophical or metaphysical 
concept. Hence -he undertakes to reduce both in- 
organic and organic processes to laws of energy, 
and therefore finally to explain the organic as the 
product of inorganic laws of nature. Indeed he 
claims that organic life with all its functions and 
manifestations is derivable from such laws of en- 
ergy. In all of these, that is to say, we have to do 
at most with special kinds or forms of energy which 
may and actually do change into one another. 
Consciousness and mental activity, too, are, ac- 
cording to this view, only a special form of energy, 
or at least depend upon such a form. Now it is 
neither necessary nor possible for us to enter here 
into a criticism of the whole of this fundamental 
conception built up on “energetics.” The un- 
certainty implied in the preceding and which Ost- 
wald is unable to overcome constitutes the real 
weak point in the conception. All that is of interest 
to us here is the way in which Ostwald, in order to 
find further support for his position as an advocate 
of energetics, deals with the problem of teleology. 
His aim is nothing more nor less than pointing out 
a way in which “the problem of the purposiveness 
of organisms seemingly so extremely intricate” 
may be made, at least in principle, to lose its enig- 
matical character. ‘To accomplish this end he 


106 


Chapter [V—Biology 
would let the concept of purposiveness apply only 
to the term of life of organisms. Whatever in- 
creases this term of life he calls purposive and what- 
ever diminishes it he calls non-purposive. How- 
ever, this term of life must not be understood to 
refer to the individual organism, but, in accordance 
with the law of heredity, to the species. And here 
he holds that Darwin’s idea of the survival of the 
fittest furnishes a sufficient explanation. So this 
explanation is held to follow from recognition of 
the fact that those forms remain which happen to 
be most virile, and this just because the other less 
virile forms are swept away by the current of time. 
But this amounts to an arbitrary limitation and 
restriction of the problem, and to giving then a 
solution which is truly only too ‘‘trivial.” * The 
teleological problem does not begin to reach its full 
depth when it is considered only with reference to 
duration in time. To get at its full depth we must 
expressly keep in mind the ascending line of devel- 
opment leading always to higher forms of life, and 
we must take into consideration also the highest 
form of life as exhibited in the religious and moral 
consciousness of man. But it is just at this point 
that Ostwald’s conception, based as it is purely on 
“‘energetics,” breaks down completely. 

After this discussion of this newest form of nat- 


* On page 434 of his ‘‘ Vorlesungen tiber Naturphilosophie,” 
Ostwald himself says: ‘‘We arrive at the absolutely trivial prop- . 
osition: Of the forms of organisms, those last longest which are 
most lasting.” 


107 


Christian Belief in God 


ural philosophy it still devolves upon us to define 
our position toward Darwinism. For this is neces- 
sary in order to complete the argument. 

I have been using the concepts evolution and 
doctrine or theory of evolution in the broader 
sense, taking them to mean quite generally the 
philosophical attitude which takes account of a 
gradual development of organic nature. Only this 
can be upheld as a well-grounded hypothesis. 
Darwin’s special theory of selection, even though 
it is still sometimes treated as identical with the 
doctrine of evolution in general, is not a well- 
grounded hypothesis. Basing its argument upon 
the doctrine of natural selection especially, this 
theory of Darwin has the definite aim of establish- - 
ing the process of evolution as altogether natural 
and causal mechanical. But at least when it claims 
to make the process of evolution completely in- 
telligible, that is to say, when it claims to be the 
sufficient and complete explanation of the pro- 
gressive development of organization, this theory 
of selection cannot be accepted as a legitimate 
hypothesis. For as soon as we go into the logical 
consequences of the theory of selection as thus 
understood, we find ourselves everywhere con- 
fronted with logical absurdities and contradictions. 
Over and over again we are forced to conclude that 
natural selection must in some way have played a 
part in the process of evolution of organic nature, 
*but at the same time, also, that it does not by any 
means furnish the sole and sufficient explanation 


108 


' Chapter [V—Biology 


for the progressive development. It may be stated 
as a fact that today all professional philosophers 
without exception hold the view of Darwinism just 
presented, and that among natural scientists, too, 
those having a certain measure of philosophical 
insight take a view which at least approaches this 
conception. 

I shall make it clear that this position (the re- 
jection of the theory of natural selection) is justi- 
fied and necessary, by discussing briefly a few of 
the most salient points. 

The theory of natural selection operates with 
three concepts: variability, heredity and selection 
through the struggle for existence. Variability or 
capacity of modification—adaptability in partic- 
ular—undoubtedly exists in the world of living 
things. But whether it is present to the extent that 
the application of the doctrine of natural selection 
would require is another question. But I shall ad- 
mit even this. But an insurmountable difficulty 
is presented by the additional assumption which 
then becomes necessary, the assumption, namely: 
that variability uniformly, or certainly in an over- 
whelming majority of cases, acts in the direction 
of greater perfection, or, in other words, that va- 
riability is progressive. Have the purely accidental 
conditions of life always been suitable to the pro- 
motion of higher forms and higher degrees of de- 
velopment? If we are to judge by a purely 
empirical study of variability, this is by no’ 
means the case. For we find fluctuations that 

109 


Christian Belief in God 


hinder as well as those that further the develop- 
ment of the organism and as many of one as of 
the other. 

The general theory of heredity does not need to 
be considered in dealing with the doctrine of nat- 
ural selection. Only so-called progressive hered- 
ity—the transmission of newly acquired charac- 
teristics—comes into consideration. For in fact, 
heredity tends exactly to maintain specific differ- 
ences and is conservative in character. Now I 
shall disregard the fact that the whole matter of 
such a progressive heredity has recently been the 
subject of much controversy.* Let us proceed on 
the ground that such progressive heredity actually 
exists, for if we do not have in mind isolated indi- 
vidual variations but such as often recur when 
definite and uniform conditions obtain, this pro- 
gressive heredity must, in my opinion, be held to 
exist. However, it must be admitted that this 
general kind of progressive heredity is rather ex- 
ceptional, whereas, according to the theory of nat- 
ural selection, it ought to be the rule if not a uni- | 
versal law. For the progressive development could 
only be explained by progressive heredity if the 
latter predominated. 

The assumption of discrimination in the struggle 
for existence is justified by the analogy of artificial 
discrimination in scientific breeding. But although 
scientific breeding has the advantage in many re- 
spects over natural selection, since it is here pos- 

* Compare Anm. 11. 


IIo 


Chapter [V—Biology 


sible to restrict propagation absolutely to the fit- 
test representatives of the species, all that has ever 
been achieved by means of it is the production of 
a definite range of new forms closely related to the 
parent form. Every process of artificial selection 
has a limit beyond which every attempt at fur- 
ther development fails. Since this is true in arti- 
ficial selection, it is by all odds most probable that 
natural selection, or selection through the struggle 
for existence, is also limited in its capacity of pro- 
ducing deviations, and consequently, that it is not, 
in the last analysis, the decisive cause of, but 
merely contributory to, the evolutionary process. 
The same conclusion is reached by a closer study 
of those cases of the operation of natural selection 
which Darwin and his successors are so fond of 
citing, namely: the cases of so-called mimicry— 
of mimicking or masquerading for the purposes of 
protection. In all kinds of mimicry—protective 
coloration, assuming the aspect of certain natural 
objects, or that of related but better protected spe- 
cies—the result is that better chances in the strug- 
gle for existence are gained. But does natural 
selection offer a sufficient explanation of the devel- 
opment of such mimicry? It is assumed to have 
developed gradually from the most meager begin- 
nings. But natural selection could become effective 
only after a point is reached where the deviation 
is so decided as to be of advantage, where the imi- 
tation is so good as to mislead the enemy. Hence 
another principle or another cause must have been 


Se & § 


Christian Belief in God 


operative to bring about the development up to 
that point. 

We have now considered each of the three most 
salient factors upon which the theory of natural 
selection relies. In conclusion let us look briefly 
at the theory as a whole. It would explain the 
variation and perfection of species by pointing out 
that those individuals having such characteristics as 
are best adapted to the prevailing conditions of life, 
regularly have the best chance of surviving and of 
transmitting their characteristics to their offspring. 
But this leaves completely unanswered the ques- 
tion as to how such characteristics which later 
prove useful in the struggle for existence originally 
came into being. This question is not answered 
because it is really not taken into account. An- 
other question also remains unanswered, the ques- 
tion, namely: as to how the continued and pro- 
gressive perfecting of species is to be brought about 
by this process, since it is difficult to see why even 
very low forms should not satisfy the principle of 
utility with which natural selection alone operates. 
It has very properly been asked, what good would 
it do an amoeba, a worm or an insect to be more 
highly organized, what advantage could a higher 
stage of development bring to it? And on the other 
hand, if it was really nothing but the mechanically 
necessary effect of natural selection which occa- 
sioned the perfection of organization, and in the 
course of millions of years led up to the highest 
stage of development, the question may and must 


II2 


Chapter [V—Biology 


be raised as to why organisms of the simplest form 
still exist. Did no change ever take place in them 
which might have furnished an opportunity for 
natural selection to set in? Yet unrestricted vari- 
ability is a basic tenet of the theory of selection! 
Or were such changes, if they did occur in isolated 
individuals, never in the course of millions of years 
transmitted to their offspring? Yet heredity is the 
second fundamental tenet of the theory of selection! 
Or, finally, did these organisms always find such 
conditions of life that such a selection was never 
called for? Yet existing conditions of such a nature 
as to lead to selection constitute the third basic 
tenet of the doctrine of selection! 

As soon, therefore, as the logical consequences 
of the fundamental ideas of this theory of selection 
are developed, incongruities are everywhere met 
with, and we are invariably led to feel that, while 
natural selection probably played a réle in the 
evolution of organic nature, it can by no means 
serve as an adequate and sufficient explanation of 
the progressive development of organization. For 
such an explanation we shall always find it neces- 
sary to fall back upon a developmental principle 
operating from within and having the character of 
being directed toward an end, a principle which 
does not depend exclusively upon purely accidental 
conditions, and which in its turn is best and most 
intelligibly explained in the world-view of the 
Christian belief in God.’ 

To be sure, Haeckel, in the last edition of his 


113 


Christian Belief in God 


“History of Creation,’ continues to hold to the 
theory of selection. ‘‘The struggle for existence is 
just as effective in natural breeding, as far as mod- 
ification and selection are concerned, as is the will 
of man in scientific breeding. Only the latter 
proceeds systematically and consciously, while the 
former proceeds unsystematically and unconsciously. 
This enables us to understand why results which 
are adequate to meet the conditions can be pro- 
duced by mechanical causes operating without 
purpose, just as well as by ultimate aims which 
are purposive in character. The products of nat- 
ural breeding are just as purposive in character 
as the scientific results achieved by man, and even 
more so. Yet they do not owe their origin to a 
purposive creative power, but to a mechanical 
condition operating unconsciously and without 
purpose.” * And again he writes: ‘‘When we con- 
sider the whole course of the evolutionary develop- 
ment of related forms from a comparative point 
of view, we see clearly how natural breeding, 
though operating aimlessly in all directions, slowly 
brings about a gradual perfecting, finally attaining, 
after many futile attempts, results like those which 
are purposive in character, and this by chance.” fT 
Such statements must forthwith be condemned 
by all who are capable of thinking correctly and 
logically. Among natural scientists, too, such a 
condemnation is steadily gaining ground. Follow- 


* “ Nattirliche Schépfungsgeschichte,” roth ed., p. 247. 
} Idem, p. 775. 


114 


Chapter [V—Biology 

ing the precedent of men like Wigand, Gustav 
Wolff and Driesch they are coming more and more 
generally to acknowledge that a rigorous main- 
tenance of Darwin’s theory would mean a mon- 
strous distortion of the facts given in organic 
nature.* Thus, for instance, the zodlogist, Pauli, 
writes: “It runs counter to the logical faculty 
with which all of us are endowed, to refer to chance 
the building up of bodies consisting of a complicated 
system of parts, representing various sorts of mate- 
rial, standing in a relationship of dependence upon 
one another, joined together as a unit, comprising 
regulative processes, thinking and acting... . 
To succeeding generations, it will appear as a 
paradox in the thinking of our time that science 
dared to ignore this logical compulsion from which 
man can never be freed, and Darwin could not have 
fallen into a contrary mode of thinking, if this 
serious error of judgment, with which his unfor- 
tunate principle was connected, had not been 
obscured in his mind by genuine teleology.* 

In conclusion I must add the following remark 
with regard to the doctrine of evolution as it has 
been interpreted above. If we subordinate this 
doctrine to the Christian belief in God, a conception 
follows forthwith which, although it adheres to a 
real development in the true sense of the word— 
to a gradual unfolding of life in accordance with 
the powers and possibilities put into the organic 
world to begin with by God, nevertheless at the 

* “ Darwinismus und Lamarckismus” (Munich, 1905), p. 41- 


II5 


Christian Belief in God 


same time holds the unceasing providential super- 
vision of this development by God to be self- 
evident, and deems the latter to be excluded by 
the former just as little as it deems the former to 
be imperiled by the latter. 


116 


Chapter Five 


Psychology and the Christian Belief in 
God 


N the foregoing we have discussed the relation 
of religious faith to certain fields of knowl- 
edge, and to certain judgments and problems with 
which it is not itself directly and immediately 
concerned. As yet we have either not taken up 
religious faith in its uniqueness—its peculiar mo- 
tives, interests and tendencies—at all, or else we 
have only incidentally and occasionally referred 
to them. For religious belief does not spring from 
knowledge of the outer world, but from those inner 
experiences and convictions which, welling up from 
the depth of our souls, force themselves upon us. 
The subject we are now to discuss, however, 
allows us to gain an insight into faith in its own 
province and in its own language. If we would 
begin again with the traditional attempts of the 
ecclesiastic-theological argumentation, it is the so- 
called ontological proof for the existence of God— 
in various forms and nuances, of course,—with 
which we now have to deal. 
I shall discuss briefly only the most familiar and 
the most characteristic of these various forms of 
the argument. It originated with the scholastic 


117 


Christian Belief in God 


philosopher Anselm (died 1109), and is to be found 
in his work entitled ‘‘ Proslogium.” 

Anselm begins with prayerful meditation: ‘‘ Lord 
God, Thou who givest understanding to faith, 
grant to me, so far as Thou deemest it beneficial 
for me, that I may understand that Thou art, 
as we believe, and that Thou art what we believe 
Thee to be.” 

‘But we believe,” he continues, ‘that Thou art 
the absolutely supreme being (aliquid quo maius 
cogitari nequit).”’ 

With this as a basis he attempts to establish his 
proof. He argues that the concept of the absolutely 
supreme being, which he urges to be indispensable 
for human thinking, cannot be a mere mental 
image, that is to say, a mere illusion (cannot exist 
merely in the mind). For if it were a mere mental 
image it could not be the idea of an absolutely su- 
preme being at all, since a being still higher would 
then be conceivable, namely, any actually existing 
being. Therefore the concept of the absolutely 
supreme being must either be left altogether un- 
thought, or else it must be held to designate an 
actually existing absolutely supreme being. ‘The 
former, he asserts, is impossible, and therefore only 
the latter alternative remains. 

The valid criticism of this ontological proof was 
very precisely formulated by Kant as follows: 
existence being not simply one of various attributes 
of a concept but a matter or problem to itself, the 
existence of a thing, in the broadest sense of the 


118 


| Chapter V 


word, can never be deduced from its concept. This 
is quite right and it disposes of the ontological proof 
as proof. But it does not dispose of Anselm’s line 
- of thought or of the psychological problem which 
he set up. For obviously that problem is this: 
How does mankind happen to have the concept 
of an absolutely supreme, an <anyeveebaekh infinite 
being at all? 

Man knows himself to be only a finite being, 
and likewise, he knows the world in which he is 
placed to be only a world of finite phenomena. In 
spite of this, how does he get the idea of an 
absolutely infinite, an absolutely supreme being, 
exalted above the whole mass of phenomena, indeed 
exalted above absolutely all phenomena, whether 
he knows them or merely conceives them to be 
possible? For although the Christian belief in God 
is by no means exhausted thereby, it certainly con- 
tains this idea most explicitly and forcibly. And 
every form of belief in God manifestly contains a 
more or less distinct feeling of this idea. How, 
then, does man happen to have this idea? For him 
it means, in truth, an entirely different world— 
another world beside the world of sense and phe- 
nomena which is known to him, and of which he is 
himself a part. For this world of sense and phe- 
nomena the idea of God is altogether useless and 
entirely devoid of meaning. This world is every- 
where finite, limited and relative. Should we not, 
therefore, suppose that no ideas but those of finite 
and relative entities could ever arise in the human 


11g 


Christian Belief in God 


mind, or at least that this absolutely different idea, 
if it should at any time arise, would at once and 
forever be recognized as empty? 

It cannot be said as a rejoinder that the history 
of human mental life presents more than enough 
conceptions and ideas which correspond to no 
reality: dragons and sea-serpents, pigmies and 
giants, witches and afrites, and other things of this 
kind. For all of these are within the possible limits 
of the world of sense and phenomena, and generally 
even have definite analogies or foundations in it. 
Genuine spooks and ghosts are always in some way 
connected with religious faith. They are creations 
of a naive and childish or of a pathological religious 
imagination, or at least of an imagination influenced 
by religion. Psychologically considered, therefore, 
they are in the last analysis only imperfect reflec- 
tions of the idea of another absolutely different 
world—a world of the ‘‘beyond”’ parallel to the 
world we know here below. From whence, then, 
comes this idea, or indeed, even the possibility of 
it? Not only does its wide existence present a 
serious psychological problem. For such a prob- 
lem is even presented by its mere possibility. All 
the other ideas and creations of the imagination 
representing unreal objects, some of which were 
just mentioned, are easy to comprehend in their 
psychological possibility, and are even fairly ob- 
vious. But on the basis of the world of sense and 
phenomena, the possibility of this idea is and re- 
mains simply incomprehensible—an absolute riddle. 


I20 


Chapter V 

Does this idea perhaps point, then, to a hidden 
connection in the depth of the human spirit be- 
tween it and the world of the beyond? Does it 
perhaps indicate that man is not merely a link in 
the world of sense and phenomena, but that he is 
at the same time a link in the world beyond? that 
he is, at all events, destined and appointed to be 
such a link and that he ought to become such? Has 
premonition for the world of the beyond perhaps 
been put into his soul, that from a vague feeling 
it may become more and more clearly and certainly 
conscious? In the sense of the exact sciences it is, 
of course, here impossible to furnish ‘‘proofs.”’ 
Wherever matters concerning the higher psychic 
life are involved, personal convictions cannot be 
completely eliminated in forming a view. It de- 
volves upon us, then, to set into clearer relief the 
meaning and the practical value of this idea, as 
well as its réle in human psychic life as a whole. 

In doing this we shall depart from a point touched 
briefly in the chapter on epistemology, presuppos- 
ing, however, what was said above about the inde- 
pendence of the psychic life and its own inherent 
laws.* : 

As we saw, our very acceptance of anything as 
truth is based upon reasoning in a circle. The 
hypothesis that human beings are capable of 
knowing ‘‘truth” underlies all knowledge as an 
unproved and unprovable petitio principit. But it 
carries with it also the further assumption that 

* See pages 75 ff. 
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Christian Belief in God 


man’s life in the world and, indeed, the world itself 
as a whole has some sort of meaning for him. For 
otherwise the whole course of the world becomes 
for him a mere empty farce—nothing but the de- 
ceptive veil of Maya. But only the individual for 
himself can arrive at this assumption or conviction. 
Considered strictly on its own merits it is absolutely 
undemonstrable. _ 

Now religious faith is by far the best and surest 
means of giving the individual this conviction. 
Religious faith alone is capable of meeting pro- 
found doubt as to the meaning of the world and of 
life. Only religious faith can erect an insurmount- 
able barrier against the fundamentally and con- 
sistently pessimistic view that the world and all 
human life in it are meaningless. 

In our day no one has felt this more strongly or 
described it more graphically than Leo Tolstoi.“ 
He combined an astonishing gift for psychological 
introspection with the ability of masterful pre- 
sentation. In his ‘‘My Confessions” he gives us a 
deep insight into the terrible struggles of his com- 
pletely distracted soul, and then describes his final 
liberation from this agonizing state of mind. 

It was just after the completion of his great 
novels. He was at the height of his literary fame, 
and besides, his circumstances were in every way 
comfortable, indeed, happy. Health, a happy 
family life and wealth were all his. In spite of this 
life began to seem flat and empty to him just at this 
time. For at this height of success the question of 


I22 


Chapter V 


the meaning and purpose of life had to arise in his 
mind, and to it he found no answer. He had cast 
religious faith aside in his sixteenth year. Even 
earlier he did not, as he judged later, have true 
faith, but he had trusted in the religious traditions 
of his church only under the influence of the au- 
thority of his elders. But the superficiality which 
he then saw everywhere about him, in the whole 
religious life of his environment and in the church, 
completely estranged him from religion. Hence, 
when later these questions as to the meaning and 
purpose of life arose in his mind, his thoughts did 
not immediately turn to religion. But the problems 
became increasingly insistent. When they began 
to dawn upon him he had believed that he would 
soon dispose of them, since the answer must be 
easy to find. But he began to realize more and 
more clearly how terribly mistaken he had been. 
Indeed, instead of the answer being easy to find, 
the longer and the more seriously he reflected upon 
them and the more seriously he studied them, all the 
more distressing did these questions become. Over 
and over again he tried to solve them by all the 
means which human life suggests. But all failed 
miserably. Working for his family with all its joys 
and cares, which had for years been his whole 
thought, failed to satisfy him, for the problem as 
to the meaning and the purpose of existence holds 
for the family just as much as it does for the in- 
dividual. Art, in which he had accomplished so 
much, became of no avail, for as a ‘‘mirror of life” 


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Christian Belief in God 


it only showed him “how desperate his plight was.” 
Science also failed him, for all that it could offer 
merely showed how inadequate it was to furnish a 
solution for these problems. 

One way of escape, however, still remained open 
to him. Just as so many people are not concerned 
over these problems, so he might ward them off 
by ignoring them. But, as a matter of fact, this 
course was no longer possible for him. Having 
come to realize the importance of these problems 
he could not fall back to an attitude of stupid 
indifference. ‘‘For what purpose do I live? Why 
should I work? Is there in life any purpose which 
the inevitable death which awaits me does not undo 
and destroy? These questions are the simplest in 
the world. Without an answer to them it is im- 
possible, as I experienced, for life to go on.” * So 
for a long time he harbored thoughts of suicide. 
But a certain vital instinct, coupled with the hope 
of being able to discover a meaning in life, always 
restrained him from putting these thoughts into 
execution. He took up hard agricultural labor 
and found occasion to observe the simple folk who 
find happiness and peace in their faith, however 
much it may be permeated with superstition. And 
then, he too finds a real remedy for his distressed 
soul. 

“Since mankind has existed, wherever life has 
been, there also has been the faith that gave the 

*T have taken this and the following quotations from Tolstoi 
from William James’ “ Varieties of Religious Experience.” Tr. 
124 


Chapter V 


possibility of living. Faith is the sense of life, 
that sense by virtue of which man does not destroy 
himself, but continues to live on. It is the force 
whereby we live. If man did not believe that he 
must live for something, he would not live at all. 
The idea of an infinite God, of the divinity of the 
soul, of the union of men’s actions with God— 
these are ideas elaborated in the infinite ‘secret 
depths of human thought. They are the ideas 
without which there would be no life, without 
which I myself would not exist. I began to see 
that I had no right to rely upon my own individual 
reasoning and neglect these answers given by 
faith, for they are the only answers to the question 
of the meaning of life. . . .” 

“And again there arose in me, with this thought, 
glad aspirations toward life. Everything in me 
awoke and received meaning. Why do I look fur- 
ther? a voice within me asked. He is there, he 
without whom one cannot live. To acknowledge 
God and live is one and the same thing. God is 
what life is. Well, then, live, seek God, for without 
him there is no life! . . .” 

“ After this things cleared up within me and about 
me better than ever, and the light has never wholly 
died away. I was saved from suicide. Just how 
or when the change took place I cannot tell. But 
as insensibly and gradually as the force of life had 
been annulled within me, and I had reached my 
moral death-bed, just as gradually and impercep- 

tibly did the energy of life come back.” 


125 


Christian Belief in God 


Tolstoi’s experience is extraordinarily valuable 
because it is based upon the most severe sincerity 
with himself. Tolstoi attacked the problems which 
life offers—every life and by no means simply his 
own—with a strength of purpose unusual for the 
general run of mankind. He allowed no subterfuge 
to swerve him from his path, and he was never 
satisfied with any partial solutions, which, after 
all, always leave the main point unanswered. His 
only concern was to find an answer to the final 
and decisive question—why and to what purpose 
is the whole of life? 

And is not Tolstoi really right when he suggests 
that as long as religious faith is left out of con- 
sideration only two possibilities remain, namely: 
dull animal existence and suicide? Dull animal 
existence may find expression either in a stupid 
resignation which gives up asking why or where- 
fore, or in a heedless enjoyment of life according to 
the principle ‘‘Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow 
we die.”” Sober-minded people find both alterna- 
tives intolerable in the long run, or are thrown 
back completely to the level of mere animal exist- 
ence. But suicide is simply a mockery of the whole 
of life! 

Yet this is the inevitable alternative which the 
enigma of life presents to man so long as he insists 
upon entirely disregarding religion and its belief 
in God. Here every one—at least every one who 
sees deeply and thinks seriously, must answer yes 
or no. There is no middle course. Least of all is 


126 


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any such middle course, or any kind of satisfactory 
solution to this problem, provided for in a mere 
reference to an actual’ progress in the history of 
mankind, the reference, that is to say, to any sort 
of higher development of life. For such talk of 
progress and higher development hangs completely 
in the air so long as no final aim and goal can be 
assigned. For without a goal all bearings are 
lacking, indeed, every possibility of their being 
such bearings is lacking. For how can progress be 
recognized as real progress when we simply do not 
know what line of development is in question? 
Tolstoi is quite right when he says that the vague 
belief in progress is just as foolish, as it would be 
for a man driven hither and thither in his skiff by 
wind and waves on the ocean to be satisfied with 
the answer ‘‘I am drifting somewhere” to the ques- 
tion, which is for him all-important, ‘Whither 
shall I steer?” 

Thus we cannot get away from the fact that only 
religious faith in God gives a really satisfactory 
answer, because it alone knows a fixed and immu- 
table goal, a goal which is not, indeed, inherently 
foreign to the human soul, but accords fully with 
its deepest and most important faculties and its 
most fundamental instincts—its impulse and yearn- 
ing for life, its eagerness for a richer and a more 
exhalted life. Only living union with God offers 
such a goal, only the growing into the perfect life 
of the transcendent God can give to these instincts 
a hope of enduring satisfaction. 


127 


Christian Belief in God 


However, with all these remarks we have gone 
far beyond the original statement of our investiga- 
tion. We began with the reflection that all human 
knowledge of truth must be based upon the assump- 
tion of a final and consistent truth being in some 
way or another attainable for man, and also upon 
the further assumption that the world and life in 
it are not without meaning and aim. But this 
assumption, again, only gets a meaning and a con- 
sistent form in religious faith. And this practical 
importance of faith is by no means restricted to the 
fundamental problem and to the domain of the 
understanding. It holds just as much for all other 
phases of the mental life of man and hence ul- 
timately for the whole of human civilization. 
Love, vocation, social activity, and, in fact, the 
whole of ethical life get their full meaning only 
under the point of view of religious faith, and only 
thus are they really established. When developed 
purely on its own merits ethics lacks the necessary 
grounding in the eternal and absolute. Hence the 
danger is that it may fall back into the relative, 
and therefore into utilitarianism and eudemonism. 
To be sure, moral obligation is absolute in itself 
and demands absolute obedience for its own sake. 
But, in the first place, this is only a purely formal 
characteristic which points as such—as a psycholog- 
ical symbol—to the very essence of what is ethical, 
but it does not of itself constitute the ethical. On 
the other hand, ethics, when brought into connec- 
tion with religion, that is to say, when the moral 


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good is made equivalent to the will of God, need 
not fear the charge that it thereby looses its au- 
tonomy in the sense of Kant. That is to say, such 
an ethic need not fear that it has become dependent 
upon an external authority, and that it is, therefore, 
ultimately founded upon such an external author- 
ity. For in the sense of religion—of the Christian 
religion at least—the will of God is not an external 
authority for man. It certainly is not intended to 
be an external authority, since according to its 
conviction man is called and fitted for living union 
with God, and that means just this: he is fitted and 
destined, and therefore also in duty bound, to 
grow more and more, and, in the end, to grow com- 
pletely into the will of God. For in its highest form 
living union is community of will—a unity of will. 

The testimony of many others besides Tolstoi 
could be cited to prove that the belief in God of 
religion can bring complete and enduring satisfac- 
tion to the human being, even when he has fallen 
into the direst spiritual distress and the most 
serious doubts. Only in passing shall I mention 
Augustine, who, at the very beginning of the 
“Confessions,” sums up the result of the expe- 
riences and conflicts of his whole life: ‘‘O Lord, 
thou hast made us for thyself, and our souls are 
restless until they find their rest in thee.” 

But to meet the objection that such testimony 
proves little for the modern man because it rests 
upon and is determined by the whole mental atti- 
tude of this remote period, I shall add the testimony 


129 


Christian Belief in God 


of several recent writers. They are taken from the 
collection entitled “‘The Varieties of Religious 
Experience,’ compiled by the American philos- 
opher and psychologist of religion, William James. 

I select as the first illustration pages 66 ff. 

“T remember the night, and almost the very 
spot on the hill-top, where my soul opened out, as 
it were, into the Infinite, and there was a rushing 
together of two worlds, the inner and the outer. 
It was deep calling unto deep—the deep that my 
own struggle had opened up within being answered 
by the unfathomable deep without, reaching out 
beyond the stars. I stood alone with him who had 
made me, and all the beauty of the world, and love, 
and sorrow, and even temptation. I did not seek 
him, but felt the perfect unison of my spirit with 
his. The ordinary sense of things around me faded. 
For the moment nothing but the ineffable joy and 
exaltation remained. It is impossible fully to de- 
scribe the experience. It was like the effect of 
some great orchestra when all the separate notes 
have melted into one swelling harmony that leaves 
the listener conscious of nothing save that his soul 
is being wafted upward, and almost bursting with 
its emotion. The perfect stillness of the night was 
thrilled by a more solemn silence. The darkness 
held a presence that was all the more felt because 
it was not seen. I could not anymore have doubted 
that he was there than that I was. Indeed I felt 
myself to be, if possible, the less real of the two. 

“My highest faith in God and truest idea of him 


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were then born in me. I have stood upon the 
Mount of Vision since, and felt the Eternal round 
about me. But never since has there come quite 
the same stirring of the heart. Then, if ever, I be- 
lieve, I stood face to face with God, and I was born 
anew of his spirit. There was, as I recall it, no 
sudden change of thought or of belief, except that 
my eatly crude conception had, as it were, burst 
into flower. There was no destruction of the old, 
but a rapid wonderful unfolding. Since that time 
no discussion that I have heard of the proofs of 
God’s existence has been able to shake my faith. 
Having once felt the presence of God’s spirit, I 
have never lost it again for long. My most assur- 
ing evidence of his existence is deeply rooted in 
that hour of vision, in the memory of that supreme 
experience and in the conviction, gained from read- 
ing and reflection, that something the same has 
come to all who have found God.” 

Compare with this the account of the crisis of 
his life given by the eminent French Protestant, 
Adolph Monod, taken by James from Monod’s 
book, ‘‘La Vie,” and one of his letters: 

““My sadness was without limit, and having 
gotten entire possession of me, it filled my life from 
the most indifferent external acts to the most se- 
cret thoughts, and corrupted at their source my 
feelings, my judgments and my happiness. It was 
then that I saw that to expect to put a stop to this 
disorder by my reason and my will, which were 
themselves diseased, would be to act like a blind 


131 


Christian Belief in God 


man who should pretend to correct one of his eyes 
by the aid of the other equally blind one. I had 
then no recourse save in some influence from with- 
out. I remembered the promise of the Holy Ghost; 
and what the positive declaration of the Gospel 
had never succeeded in bringing home to me, I 
learned at last from necessity, and believed, for 
the first time in my life, in this promise, in the only 
sense in which it answered the need of my soul, in 
that, namely: of a real external supernatural ac- 
tion, capable of giving me thoughts, and taking 
them away from me, and exerted on me by a God 
as truly master of my heart as he is of the rest of 
nature. Renouncing then all merit, all strength, 
abandoning all my personal resources, and ac- 
knowledging no other title to his mercy than my 
own utter misery, I went home and threw myself 
on my knees, and prayed as I never yet prayed in 
my life. From this day onward a new interior life 
began for me: not that my melancholy had disap- 
peared, but it had lost its sting. Hope had entered 
into my heart, and once entered on the path, the 
God of Jesus Christ, to whom I then had learned 
to give myself up, little by little did the rest.” 
Now the question arises as to whether, on the 
basis of our psychological considerations, it is pos- 
sible for us to reach a decision as to the zdea of God 
itself, or, to put it more precisely, concerning our 
specific interpretation of this idea. In the discus- 
sion of the cosmological and the teleological argu- 
ments we had to stop short of such a decision, or, 


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at least, we could only reach it conditionally and 
with many critical reservations. ‘There the pan- 
theistic form of belief in God which identifies God 
with the evolutionary tendency of the cosmos, and 
therefore seeks and knows God only in the ‘‘ All,” 
remained possible alongside of the properly the- 
istic form as it finds its most perfect expression in 
the Christian religion, where the essence of God 
is defined as spiritual and ethical. 

In taking up this question, now, on the basis of 
the psychological results adduced, I need hardly 
point out again that obviously here, too, we can- 
not speak of real ‘‘proof” in the sense of exact 
demonstration. Indeed, the question can only be: 
What concrete form of the idea of God best corre- 
sponds to the active religious motives of the belief 
in God. : 

But, as a matter of fact, the preceding discus- 
sion plainly contains certain hints and suggestions 
which are all in favor of the theistic and against 
the pantheistic conception of God. Only when 
the belief in God attains the theistic form can it 
really accomplish the task which forms its psycho- 
logical significance. The words of Augustine, “‘our 
souls are restless until they find their rest in thee,”’ 
bring the various elements discussed above into a 
single thought, and quite plainly demand a theistic 
conception of God. Only when the divine being 
is of a spiritual and personal nature can the human 
soul really ‘‘find rest” in him. 

The quotations from James show the same thing 


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Christian Belief in God 


by a variety of expressions. Even more charac- 
teristic and interesting in this respect is the fol- 
lowing account, which is also taken from James’ 
book: 

‘Between twenty and thirty years I gradually 
became more and more agnostic and irreligious, 
yet I cannot say that I ever lost that indefinite 
consciousness which Herbert Spencer describes so 
well, of an absolute reality behind phenomena. 
For me this Reality was not the pure Unknowable 
of Spencer’s philosophy, for although I had ceased 
my childish prayers to God, and never prayed to 
It in a formal manner, yet my more recent expe- 
rience shows me to have been in a relation to It 
which practically was the same thing as prayer. 
Whenever I had any trouble, especially when I had 
conflict with other people, either domestically or 
in the way of business, or when I was depressed in 
spirits or anxious about affairs, I now recognize 
that I used to fall back upon this curious relation 
I felt myself to be in to this fundamental cosmical 
It. It was on my side, or I was on Its side, how- 
ever you may please to term it, in the particular 
trouble, and It always strengthened me and seemed 
to give me endless vitality to feel Its underlying 
and supporting presence. In fact, It was an un- 
failing fountain of living justice, truth and strength, 
to which I instinctively turned at times of weak- 
ness, and It always brought me out. I know now 
that it was a personal relation I was in to It, 
because of late years the power of communicating 


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Chapter V 


with It has left me, and I am conscious of a per- 
fectly definite loss.” * 

In this connection Tolstoi’s experience is again 
very characteristic and instructive. For a long 
time he wavered between the theistic and the pan- 
theistic forms of faith, which is quite easy to under- 
stand when we remember that the concrete form 
which the theistic conception has been given in the 
tradition of the orthodox church could not, of 
course, satisfy him. Added to this was the fact 
that pantheism seemed to him more suitable for 
his purpose of striving for religious unity, that is, 
of bringing about a universal religion uniting all 
peoples. The devil so ensnared him (this is his 
own later opinion) that he thought it possible and 
especially important in the interests of unison 
with the Chinese, Confucianists and Buddhists, as 
well as with the philosophically interested atheists 
and agnostics, to avoid entirely the “idea of the 
Father” in the sense of the New Testament. But 
later on, and precisely because of his own religious 
experience, he came to realize that such an under- 
taking would jeopardize religious purity and depth. 
As he himself puts it, he felt that he was suddenly 
falling into spiritual decline, that he became inca- 
pable of every intellectual joy and energy, without 
clearly understanding at first the reason for this. 
“Only then did I bethink myself that this was due 
to the fact that I had departed from God. And I 
began to think, it is strange to say it, I even began 

* Od. cit., p. 64 f.) 


135 


Christian Belief in God 


to guess whether there is a God, and a feeling came 
over me as though I had found him anew. And I 
felt so joyful over this because my conviction in 
him was so firmly established, the conviction that 
I can and must commune with him and that he hears 
me.’’ * 

In fact, it is impossible to have a really personal 
religious relationship with an impersonal Absolute. 
It is true, of course, that one may gain a personal 
telationship even with impersonal objects—with 
things, or with abstract ideas and concepts. But 
the idea that this can be made the basis of an 
attack upon the theistic conception of God is due 
to a lack of appreciation of the specific character of 
the religious relationship itself. For it is always in 
some way a relationship of subordination. Indeed, 
according to religious faith, the “other” world or 
the world of the ‘“‘beyond”’ is absolutely supreme 
over the world of sense and phenomena, and the 
latter has value only because of its relation to the 
former. Therefore, the devout not only desire to 
but must subordinate themselves unconditionally 
to the “other” world. On the other hand, how- 
ever, they are as ethical personalities superior to 
everything material and impersonal. Hence there 
cannot be a profound and enduring relationship 
with an impersonal Absolute, at least not on the 
plane of spiritual and ethical religion. But fun- 
damentally only religion on this plane, however 
often religious practices even within the evangelical 

* “ Gedanken tiber Gott,’? XX. 
136 


Chapter V 


church may continue to fall below this high level, 
can seriously concern us. 

At the same time these reflections lead us to a 
wider view, that is, to a view which takes into 
consideration also the realm of nature and its 
development. 

Not to think of the divine being as personal and 
spiritual is to subordinate it to the highest level 
of the development and unfolding of life already 
attained in the world of sense. But this not only 
contradicts the fundamental motive of the religious 
consciousness but also the teleological conception 
of nature. The original reason and the final pur- 
pose of the world as a whole would then lie in a 
form of existence which could be, and already has 
been surpassed in this world! And thus, in the 
end, we would be pushed back to pure atheism. 

As I have already frequently emphasized, theis- 
tic belief in God has found its purest expression in 
the Christian religion. It is, therefore, absolutely 
necessary to turn our attention more explicitly to 
the characteristic features of this Christian belief 
in God, or, more exactly, to the idea of God which 
it involves. That will at the same time furnish 
the best refutation of the familiar objections, 
which, even in present-day philosophy, are often 
raised against it. 

The Christian religion is that form or stage of 
religious life which, based upon the piety of the 
Old Testament, arose under the influence of the 
personality of Jesus Christ. If we wanted to 


137 


Christian Belief in God 


consider the historical process of development for 
itself and to describe it in detail, we should, above 
all, have to keep in mind the fact that the Jewish 
piety of the Old Testament had, even at that time, 
been exposed for a considerable period to the in- 
fluences of other religions and civilizations, espe- 
cially those of Persia and Babylonia, but also those 
of Greece, and that these influences continued 
during the time. in which Christianity itself was 
developed. Assuming this to be generally known 
and admitted, I shall not go into the particulars of 
those influences. For to know what the special 
historical factors which concurred to bring about 
the establishment of Christianity were does not 
matter so much to us as it does to know what the 
distinctive fundamental character of Christianity 
and of its belief in God is, whatever its historical 
origin may have been. 

For this purpose we must here call attention to 
that element in the history of the development of 
Christianity which we have already emphasized: 
the Christian religion is that stage of religious — 
development attained under the influence exerted 
by the personality of Jesus Christ. This element 
is unquestionably the really decisive factor in the 
whole matter. All other elements that may have 
come into play, whatever their number, have re- 
ceived their characteristic form only through it, 
since it has become the fixed point of reference for 
all of them, and has served as the foundation upon 
which their own trend and purpose have been 


138 


Chapter V 


shaped. At the same time, it was not merely 
effective during the period of development, but it 
is the element which has remained effective through- 
out the whole history of the Christian religion, and 
that, too, as the absolutely decisive factor. 

For the Christian religion is not simply that stage 
of development which arose under the influence of 
the personality of Jesus Christ, but it is that stage 
which has always continued to be, and is even to- 
day, determined by just this influence of the per- 
sonality of Jesus Christ. Just as this influence of 
the personality of Jesus Christ created the decisive 
psychological motive which moved the first Chris- 
tians to establish a new religious community, so also 
it has continued, and even to the present day still 
continues to affect all deeply religious natures, 
acting as the decisive psychological motive im- 
pelling them to turn to the Christian religion, or 
to remain consciously faithful to it. 

Indeed, the New Testament is, on the whole, 
only the reflection of the impression made by the 
personality of Jesus Christ—with various refrac- 
tions and radiations of the light to be sure, but, 
nevertheless, in the last analysis, a reflection con- 
sistent in all its parts and producing a single effect. 

In this picture of Jesus as it is drawn in the New 
Testament, two traits stand out plainly as the most 
characteristic features—and they are the traits 
which have always proven to be the strongest 
throughout the history of Christianity—the close 
personal relationship of Jesus to God, his “‘ Father,” 


139 


Christian Belief in God 


and the thorough-going ethical character of his 
conduct and conception of life. 

This enables us to understand the fact that the 
ethical and personal character of the divine being 
constitute the decisive element in that belief in 
God conceived under the influence of Jesus Christ. 
The God of Christian faith is a spiritual and per- 
sonal, more exactly, an ethical and personal God. 
Spiritual ethical personal life characterizes the fun- 
damental nature of his being. 

This serves to give two other essential attributes 
of God a more definite form, as well as to establish 
their intimate connection in Christian faith, 
namely: the transcendence and the immanence of 
God in his relation to the world. 

For although in almost all other religions, as 
well as in most systems of philosophical world- 
views, transcendence and immanence are regarded 
as mutually exclusive attributes of the being of 
God, one of them always being maintained in con- 
trast to the other, it constitutes one of the unique 
features of the Cheistiain religion that it asserts 
equally both the transcendence and the immanence 
of God, and that it only admits one of these two 
characteristics of the essence of God when it is 
limited by the other. 

For Christian faith God is, indeed, the absolute 
Lord of all reality, and as such an absolutely 
transcendent God, exalted above the finiteness, 
the transitoriness and the relativity of the whole 
sense-world. In this regard the Christian religion 


140 


Chapter V 


consciously and purposely follows what is man- 
ifestly the tendency of faith in God even in the Old 
Testament. The Lord of the “Kingdom of 
Heaven,” or of the ‘‘Kingdom of God,” as the first 
Gospel expresses it, must, of course, be an ab- 
solutely transcendent God because this “King- 
dom of Heaven” is itself absolutely supramun- 
dane—completely beyond the world. ‘‘My King- 
dom is not of this world” says Jesus in the fourth 
Gospel, describing his “Father’s” kingdom as his 
own. Yet, on the other hand, this absolutely 
transcendent God has, according to Christian be- 
lief, a most vital connection with the world. He 
it is who “‘maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on 
the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the un- 
just” (Matthew V, 45). He feedeth the birds of 
the air and careth for the lilies of the field (Mat- 
thew VI, 26 ff.). Apart from his will not a sparrow 
falls to earth or a hair from our head (Matthew X, 
29). Hence, too, when Paul says that all things are 
of God he forthwith adds that this God is for us the 
goal of the destiny of our life (I Cor. VIII, 6). 
And he gives expression to the thought which con- 
nects these two ideas when he says that the whole 
creation groaneth and hence yearneth after God 
(Romans VIII, 22). 

Thus, despite his altogether transcendent nature 
the God of the Christian religion still pervades the 
world as a living God. And this especially holds 
with respect to man—collectively, that is to say, 
in his whole historical development, as well as in- 


I4I 


Christian Belief in God 


dividually. ‘‘He made of one every nation of men 
to dwell on all the face of the earth, having deter- 
mined their appointed seasons, and the bounds of 
their habitation; that they should seek God, if 
haply they might feel after him, and find him, 
though he is not far from each one of us: for in him 
we live and move and have our being,”’ (Acts XVII, 
26 ff.). Hence the real mission of the Christian reli- 
gion is, as is:stressed and set forth in detail espe- 
cially in the fourth Gospel, to bring mankind, ap- 
pointed for God, toward and into life communion 
with God. 

Consequently there are in all three factors which 
together, and only through their intimate connec- 
tion,. determine the nature of God as conceived 
by the Christian religion: the absolute and ethical 
personality of God, the absolute transcendence 
or sublimity of God and the absolute immanence 
or pervasiveness of God. These three factors are 
indissolubly connected together. If the purity and 
the completeness of the Christian conception of 
God are not to be jeopardized, each of these factors 
must be fully taken into account. 

But in thus reducing the Christian belief in God 
to its final elements have we not, at the same time, 
criticised and condemned it? Does not this belief 
in God necessarily lead to a self-contradictory con- 
ception of God? To begin with, are not transcend- 
ence and immanence incompatible attributes, and 
does not their association show that a conception 
of God which seeks to unite them must therefore 


142 


Chapter V 


be logically untenable? In meeting such an ob- 
jection it must, above all, be emphasized that faith 
as faith can certainly not be disturbed by doubts 
of this kind. For faith does not arise from logical 
considerations and conceptual determinations, but 
from its own consciousness of God. And if in this 
consciousness of God elements are found which ap- 
pear mutually contradictory to the rational reflec- 
tion, it must be remembered that, for the purely 
rational conception of the finite and earthly intel- 
lect, this consciousness of God is itself simply an 
irrational thing. But just as man can, in spite of 
this, attain the conviction that a superior reason 
is displayed precisely in this irrationality, so he 
will also be able, though he cannot completely 
solve this apparent self-contradiction on an in- 
tellectual basis, to grasp, nevertheless, its cru- 
cial import, and thus to find a deeper meaning 
in it. 

To accomplish this we must realize at the outset 
that the three factors characterizing the nature of 
God as conceived by Christian faith are really not 
of equal importance, but that the first factor, the 
ethical personality of God, is predominant over the 
other two. 

Now what does this characteristic of the ethical 
personality of God mean for Christian faith? Again 
this must be determined more exactly from Chris- 
tian religious conviction and experience. In its 
specifically Christian form, religious conviction is 
“the believing”’ as exhibited in the New Testament, 


143 


Christian Belief in God 


that is to say, “the believing’’ as absolute confi- 
dence in the holy and loving will of God. 

Now we use the concept “‘personality” in two 
essentially different senses. One of these is purely 
or at least predominantly formal. When the con- 
cept is applied to God in this sense God is charac- 
terized as nothing more nor less than an independ- 
ent individual, who is, so to speak, self-existing. 
But from the point of view of the Christian belief 
in God the factor of the personality of God is barely 
touched upon, much less exhausted, in this mean- 
ing of the concept “‘personality.” For the chief 
concern of the Christian belief in God is not with 
any purely formal characteristic, but altogether 
with the content of the idea. From the point of 
view of faith the conviction that God is a personal 
God means that his innermost essence lies in the 
line of our own spiritual and ethical personality, 
and that faith can vaguely grasp the meaning of 
God as personality only through this analogy. 
However, we must emphasize the fact that the in- 
nermost essence of God lies in the line of our own 
spiritual and ethical personal life—in the extension 
of this line, of course, but really only in the exten- 
sion of just this line. It is, therefore, just in our 
ethical life as personalities that we experience God 
most surely, most strongly and most immediately— 
in the depth of our own soul when we become con- 
scious of its ethical nature. But all spiritual per- 
sonal life depends upon the definiteness of the will 
by which it is regulated. The more unified and 


144 


Chapter V 


constant is this will, the more perfect can the life 
as a personality become. Perfect personal life 
would be or is attained when the will directing it 
can be judged to be absolutely unswerving and, at 
the same time, absolutely ethically determined. 
Faith in God as living and personal, then, means 
being convinced of the absolute continuity and 
consistency of his ethical will. Only in a God who 
is such a uniform ethical will can we really ‘“‘be- 
lieve,” only in such a God can we have real and im- 
plicit confidence. For apart from the continuity 
of will this confidence would be groundless. And 
‘it would also be groundless if his will did not pos- 
sess ethical definiteness, since only the ethical will 
can guarantee complete continuity. For every 
will is continuous, and therefore worthy of confi- 
dence, to the degree in which it is ethical. Thus 
the faith of the Christian religion, as implicit con- 
fidence in the holy and loving will of God, presup- 
poses the unity and the absolute ethical definite- 
ness of this will. 

Only on the basis of what has just been said can 
we get a complete understanding of the other two 
factors which, according to Christian faith, are also 
decisive in characterizing the nature of God, 
namely: the absolute transcendence and the abso- 
lute immanence of God in his relations to the 
world. 

The purport of the idea of immanence for the 
Christian belief in God is that the consistent and 
ethical fundamental will of God pervades the world 


145 


Christian Belief in God 


as a living force, and that it determines and guar- 
antees a meaning and purpose for the development 
of the world. 

And the idea of transcendence emphasizes for 
the Christian belief in God, above all, that in its 
nature and essence God’s absolute and ethical lov- 
ing will, which rules and pervades the whole world, 
lies infinitely beyond all the bustle and stir of the 
world of sense and phenomena, so that this phe- 
nomenal world cannot have any sort of real or ab- 
solute value, except through its relation to this 
ethical and loving will of God. 

Thus formulated transcendence and immanence 
cease to be contradictory attributes of the divine 
being, but reveal themselves, on the contrary, as 
the mutually supplementary factors for the more 
precise conception of the character of God as eth- 
ical and living personality. Hence, when these 
attributes are given such a meaning in other reli- 
gions, and in the systems of philosophical specu- 
lation, as to make them mutually exclusive, this 
is due to the fact that the ethical and personal char- 
acter of the nature of God is not sufficiently em- 
phasized, or that its real meaning is not grasped 
in these religions and philosophical systems. 

But that transcendence and immanence are 
really mutually supplementary as elements of 
Christian faith is confirmed, indeed, by the fact 
that both are already to a certain degree active in 
the human soul. For in his own spiritual and eth- 
ical personal life man begins to feel the reality and 


146 


Chapter V 


the significance of an ‘‘Absolute,” of a world of 
absolute values which lies completely beyond the 
world of phenomena. Hence, too, the religious and 
metaphysical consciousness of man arises most 
strongly from his own spiritual and ethical person- 
ality. And it is this religious and metaphysical 
consciousness which lifts man above the whole 
sense-world, and brings him into the world of ab- 
solute reality—the world of God and his holy lov- 
ing will. 


* * * * * * * * 


If, now, we undertake to consider as a whole 
what we have just discussed severally and specif- 
ically, and to bring it into a precise form in accord- 
ance with thinking reflection, we can say that the 
conception of God corresponding to the Christian 
belief in God is that of the unified totality (einheit- 
liche Altheit) of spiritual ethical personal life. 

To be sure, this concept of unified totality also 
seems to involve a self-contradiction. But it does 
so in no greater degree for the sphere of the ab- 
solute than does the concept of unified diversity 
for the domain of the finite. And such unified 
diversity is an actual fact. 

Modern biology rests absolutely upon the recog- 
nition of the fact that all life is ultimately reducible 
to the simple cell, and that all higher organisms 
are built up from and are composed of aggregates of 
such simple cells. Every higher organic being, 
including man himself, represents an aggregate 


147 


Christian Belief in God 


composed of an infinite number of most primitive 
organisms. Yet the human being is not merely 
an aggregate of atoms. No human being can be 
identified forthwith with the sum of the individual 
cells constituting him a human being. On the con- 
trary, the human being, the personality, differs in- 
finitely in its nature and importance from the in- 
dividual cells. For the personality dominates over 
them, often disposes of them at will and remains 
unaffected by the fate and by the continual chang- 
ing of large quantities of them. There are other 
analogous conceptions in biology. I shall only 
call attention to one more, which has already been 
mentioned incidentally. Not very long ago the 
cell was thought to be an absolute unit, that is to 
say, an entity not composed of further constituent 
elements and simply indivisible. In recent years 
biologists have abandoned this view. It has been 
found that the individual cell is in its turn a highly 
complex phenomenon, and that it is made up of a 
countless number of still simpler elements of life. 
Thus we have here before us in various nuances, 
and others still might be cited, the phenomenon, 
or rather the fact that a unity of life exists by virtue 
of a multiplicity or community of life, but is by no 
means identical with it either in nature or in import 
or in meaning. If we pass now, in accordance 
with this analogy, from the sphere of sense and 
appearance and its relativity to that of absolute 
reality, and if, accordingly, we conceive God as 
the unified totality of spiritual and ethical personal 


148 


Chapter V 


life, we shall avoid the difficulties of the naive 
anthropomorphic conception of God, and shall 
still avoid, on the other hand, the ultimate results 
of pantheism, however sublime and highly phil- 
osophical this may be, which sees the deity simply 
in the spiritual life as a whole and completely 
identifies God with this spiritual life as a whole. 
For when interpreted in accordance with the 
analogy referred to, this conception of God is 
proof against every pantheistic corruption. It 
neither requires the complete merging of every in- 
dividual mortal personality into the universal 
All, nor does it lead necessarily to an ‘“‘eternal 
restitution,” a final and equal salvation for all. 
Indeed the contrary seems rather to be suggested 
even by the analogy itself, and all the more if we 
take into consideration, with reference to the first 
point, that the diversity of the various develop- 
mental stages of life naturally carries with it 
diversity in their relationships among one another. 
The most primitive living entities—the cells, may 
lose their autonomous character until they appear 
only as component parts of a whole, dependent 
upon it in the discharge of their functions. Hence, 
in higher organisms they no longer truly represent 
individual entities as they often really do in lower 
organisms. Spiritual personalities, however, can- 
not pass over into one another at all, and so they 
invariably and necessarily remain real individual 
entities. 

The final objection might be raised that this 


149 


Christian Belief in God 


analogy must lead us to hold that the conception 
of the deity as the all-embracing unification of per- 
sonal life could only have arisen from the mul- 
tiplicity of creatural life and through its mediation. 
But this objection would be entirely unwarranted. 
It would only be warranted if the biological con- 
ception of development on which it is based were 
taken in the special Darwinian sense, that is to say, 
in the sense that the development of creatural 
life was regarded as taking place naturally and of 
itself. But this would not only be a complete 
begging of the question, but on purely scientific 
grounds this is, as we have seen, a most dubious 
hypothesis. There is, then, every reason to believe 
that there must be a living power behind the devel- 
opment of creatural life, or, differently expressed, 
prior to it, determining its purpose and directing 
it; and that this power receives into union with 
itself those creatural forms of life which attain 
spiritual life as personalities, without destroying 
their individuality: primordial and all-embracing 
unity of spiritual ethical personal life. 

If the attempt here made to analyze the Christian 
conception of God on the basis of modern thought 
be deemed acceptable, it would then follow that 
the Christian religion must be considered the truly 
absolute religion, not merely in the sense that it 
represents the highest form of religious develop- 
ment among people upon this earth yet known to 
us, nor merely in the sense that this development 
will probably never lead to a more perfect form of 


150 


Chapter V 


religion, but more than this, the Christian religion 
would then be the highest plane of religious life in an 
absolute sense, because it would be the highest plane 
of all creatural life. And this would hold no matter 
when or where life has originated and developed or 
shall originate and develop, no matter on what 
other distant heavenly body, whether belonging to 
the system of fixed stars bounded by the milky-way, 
or to another system beyond. 

For accepting the theory of the universe set up 
by Copernicus and Newton, we must, it seems to 
me, necessarily leave open, theoretically at least, 
the possibility that life may not be restricted to the 
earth. The taking of this possibility into account 
has an appreciable bearing on our final conception 
of the absoluteness of the Christian religion. 
Against this hypothesis it will not do to insist upon 
the limitations of human experience. For it is 
precisely when the standpoint of experience is 
really seriously maintained that it must be con- 
sidered more than probable that life is not confined 
to this little world of ours. If this were not true, 
how could such a view have seemed so natural and 
obvious to a scientist so matter of fact and empirical 
as Helmholz,* to say nothing of the philosophers, 
all of whom, since the days of Kant, have taken it 
into consideration? Hence it is inadmissible to 
urge experience against this view. At best, it could 
only be put forth as a postulate of religion or of the 
Christian belief in God that life must be restricted 
to the earth. But it seems to me that there is little 


151 


Christian Belief in God 


occasion for such a postulate and that the opposite 
hypothesis is the most natural one to make under 
the conception of the Christian religion as the 
absolute religion. 

For then the Christian religion must certainly 
be accepted as the absolute religion in the sense 
that it represents the highest plane of all religious 
life pure and simple, because it represents the 
highest conceivable plane of all creatural life. 

It is precisely for this reason that the Christian 
religion can give a satisfactory answer to the prob- 
lem of the meaning of the world and of human life: 
the final aim and real purpose of the world is to 
develop ethical and spiritual personalities and to 
bring them into living communion with God! 


152 


Notes and References 


TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: I have shortened considera- 
bly this part of the book by omitting lengthy quotations 
and comments, as well as some references to German 
books. English translations of some of the books 
mentioned by Dr. Wobbermin are indicated at the 
close of the note in which they are mentioned. 

1 Alois Riehl gives an important discussion of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy in Frommann’s Sammlung der 
Klassiker der Philosophie (5th ed., Stuttgart, 1909). 
Riehl discusses Nietzsche first as a man, then as an 
artist and finally as a thinker. 

H. Vaihinger: Fr. Nietzsche als Philosoph (3rd ed., 
1905), shows instructively how far the peculiar ideas 
of Nietzsche are capable of being brought into a unified 
relation. 

Of the additional very extensive Nietzsche literature 
I would mention, as especially important from the point 
of view of religion and theology, the following: 

Ritschl, Otto: Nietzsche’s Welt- und Lebens-an- 
schauung in ihrer Entstehung und Entwicklung (2nd 
ed., 1899). 

Rittelmeyer, Fr.: Fr. Nietzsche und die Religion 
(2nd ed., 1911). 5 

Kaftan, Jul.: Aus der Werkstatt des Ubermenschen, 
1906. 

Gritzmacher, R. H.: Nietzsche, 1910. 

Richter, R.: Fr. Nietzsche, sein Leben und sein Werk 
(2nd ed., 1909). 


153 


Christian Belief in God 


Schwarz, A.: Zum Verstindnis von WNietzsches 
Zarathustralehre, etc., 1901. 

I want expressly to emphasize, once more, that my 
discussion of Nietzsche’s Mitternachtslied is not in- 
tended as an “interpretation.” I merely aimed to 
bring out the psychological point at which the under- 
lying motive of this poem and that of religion are con- 
nected. Compare in general Nietzsche’s own works. 
I have quoted from the complete edition (Naumann, 
1899 ff.). 

See Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche’s complete works, 
first complete and authorized English translation, 
edited by Dr. Oscar Levy (18 Vols., Macmillan, 
IgI0). 

2 Avenarius, R.: Der Kritik der reinen Erfahrung 
appeared first in two volumes in 1888-90. It has re- 
cently been republished in a second edition by J. 
Petzoldt (1907). Avenarius’ smaller work: Der men- 
schliche Weltbegriff, (1881, new ed., 1905) should also 
be mentioned. For writings by his disciples consult 
the Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 
and also Petzoldt: Einfihrung in die Philosophie der 
reinen Erfahrung (Vol. I, 1900, Vol. II, 1904). 

Of the writings against Avenarius and his school I 
would give first place to the work of W. Wundt, pub- 
lished as the second part of his voluminous discussion of 
naive and critical realism. (See Vol. XIII of his Phil- 
osophischen Studien, pp. 1-105 and 323-434.) It has 
been republished in his Kleinen Schriften (I, 1910, pp. 
2509 ff.). 

E. Mach, of Vienna, originally a physicist, but now a 
philosopher, is in many respects similar to Avenarius, 
as well in his general philosophical position as in his 
position to belief in God. See especially his: Die Analyse 


154 


Notes and References 


der Empfindungen und Das Verhidltnis des Physischen 
zum Psychischen (5th ed., 1906). 

I have myself, and especially from the point of view 
of theology, given a critical discussion of the philosophy 
of pure experience, regarding it as similar to the position 
of Mach. See Part II of my Theologie und Metaphysik: 
Das Verhiltnis der Theologie zur modernen Erkennt- 
nistheorie und Psychologie, rgor. 

° The interesting discussion of evolution by Kant in 
paragraph eighty of the Critique of Judgment (see 
J. H. Bernard’s translation) has recently been brought 
to notice by Haeckel (Natiirliche Schépfungsgeschichte, 
toth ed., pp. 92 f.), and by Liebmann (Zur Analysis der 
Wirklichkeit, 3rd ed., pp. 344 f.). 

*In this connection see especially Troelisch, E.: Das 
Historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie (in Kant- 
studien, 1904). Cf. also Menzer, O.: Kants Lehre 
von der Entwicklung in Natur und Geschichte, 
IQII. 

° Cohen, H.: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (2nd ed., 
1885). System der Philosophie (Vol. I, 1902, Vol. II, 
1904). Religion und Sittlichkeit (1907). 

Natorp, P.: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen 
der Humanitiat (2nd ed., 1908). Philosophie, ihr Prob- 
lem und ihre Probleme (1911). 

Cf. also Cassirer, E.: Sunstanzbegriff und Funktions- 
begriff, 1910. 

6 Cf. Anm. 2. 

™The name Immanence Philosophy is intended to 
mean that its advocates do not depart from the pure 
immanence of consciousness, that is to say, they limit 
themselves strictly to analyzing and synthesizing the 
facts given in consciousness. 

Schuppe, Wilh.: Erkenntnistheoretische Logik (1878). 


155 


Christian Belief in God 


Grundriss der Erkenntnistheorie und Logik (2nd ed., 
IQIO). 

Rehmke, Joh.: Die Seele des Menschen (2nd ed., 
1905). Zur Lehre vom Gemiit (2nd ed., 1911). 

8 Liebmann, O.: Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit (4th 
ed., 1910). Gedanken und Tatsachen (1899-1905). Cf. 
also Kantstudien, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1910 (published in 
honor of Liebmann’s seventieth birthday). It contains 
valuable essays by E. Adickes, R. Hénigswald, B. 
Bauch, F. Medicus, e¢ alia. 

Riehl, Al.: Der Philosophische Kritizismus (2 Vols., 
1876-77). A new edition is now appearing (Vol. I, 
1909). Zur Einfihrung in die Philosophie der Gegen- 
wart (3rd ed., 1908). Of the followers of Riehl, Bruno 
Bauch and Richard Hénigswald should be mentioned 
as being discreet and sagacious epistemologists. 

* Of the writings in opposition to Haeckel’s “ Riddle of 
the Universe” that of the church historian Loofs— 
Anti-Haeckel (5th ed., Halle, 1906) should be men- 
tioned first. Loofs shows the “presumptuous igno- 
rance” of Haeckel’s discussions of church history. 
Other important works in opposition to Haeckel are 
the following: 

Paulsen, Fr.: Ernst Haeckel als Philosoph, published 
in Preussische Jahrbicher (Vol. CI, pp. 29-72), and 
also in Philosophia Militans (Berlin, 1901). 

Adickes, E.: Kant contra Haeckel (2nd ed., 1906). 

Honigswald, R.: Ernst Haeckel, der monistische 
Philosoph (1900). 

Haeckel’s essay: Der Monismus als Band zwischen 
Religion und Wissenschaft, and the book mentioned 
so often in the text—Die Lebenswunder, are similar to 
the Weltritsel. His Naturliche Schépfungsgeschichte 
(2nd ed., Berlin, 1908), deserves to be taken more 


156 


Notes and References 


seriously. Of the special technical works which form 
the basis of his philosophy, the following should be 
mentioned: 

Generelle Morphologie der Organismen; Anthro- 
pogenie oder Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschen, 
and Systematische Phylogenie. In these works Haeckel 
is incomparably more cautious and reserved in what he 
writes than in his popular works just mentioned. For 
example, in the Preface to his Systematische Phylogenie 
(p. 6), he writes: “It goes without saying that the his- 
tory of our origin is and will remain a building of hy- 
potheses, as well as its sister, historical geology. For 
it seeks to gain consistent knowledge about the cause 
and the march of events which have long since occurred, 
the immediate examination of which is therefore an 
impossibility. Neither observation nor experiment can 
give us direct information about the innumerable 
processes of transformation through which the animal 
and plant forms known today have issued from their 
long line of ancestors. Only a small number of those 
changes, which the phylogenetical transformations 
have produced, lie before us in a tangible form. By 
far the greater number will forever remain hidden from 
us.” 

In general see Georg Wobbermin’s booklet: Ernst 
Haeckel im Kampf gegen die christliche Weltan- 
schauung (Leipzig, 1906). Reprinted in Monismus and 
Monotheismus. 

The following of the works of Haeckel referred to 
by Dr. Wobbermin are in English: Riddle of the 
Universe (Harper, 1905). Monism as connecting Reli- 
gion and Science (Macmillan). The Wonders of Life 
(Harper, 1905). History of Creation (2 Vols., Apple- 
ton, 1906). Evolution of Man (2 Vols., Appleton, 1905). 


157 


Christian Belief in God 


The chief representative of the most recent reaction 
in natural science caused by the ultraism of Haeckel is 
the zodlogist, Fleischmann. He has given expression 
to this especially in his voluminous Die Deszendenz- 
theorie (Leipzig, 1901). Fleischmann says that the 
present general supremacy of the concept of evolution 
is due solely to man’s inclination for fairy stories 
(p. 109). The theory of evolution is defective and ob- 
jectionable, and anyone who is really working with 
good intentions should take no account of it, because 
it leads only to nonsense (p. 253). Apart from many 
special passages which are worthy of attention, and 
which are not void of significance to the general posi- 
tion of philosophy, Fleischmann’s position is unques- 
tionably untenable. The most important and decisive 
criticisms of his view are the following: (1) He pays no 
attention to the relation in which the theory of descent 
stands to the doctrine of evolution as a whole (cosmic 
evolution). (2) He misconstrues the fact that the 
concept of evolution is a (natural) philosophical idea 
by taking it for granted that we are dealing with a 
special scientific result. (3) For these reasons the 
special arguments which he uses to establish his posi- 
tion are insufficient because logically falsely orientated. 
The justification of the concept of evolution in itself 
(that is, apart from its detailed development) is not 
dependent upon whether every single problem will be 
solved by its use, but upon whether it makes possible 
a complete understanding which would otherwise be 
lacking, and upon whether the special problems win 
intelligibility by being classified together. Cf. also, 
Fleischmann’s Die Darwinische Theorie (1903). 

10 Roux is the editor of the Archiv fir Entwicklungs- 
mechanik der Organismen. In 1895 he published 


158 


Notes and References 


his Gesammelte Abhandlungen tiber Entwicklungs- 
mechanik der Organismen. Of his other writings the 
book especially significant from our point of view is 
Der Kampf der Teile im Organismus (Leipzig 1881). 

11 Of the numerous works of Weismann the following 
are especially worthy of our attention: Uber Leben 
und Tod; Zur Frage nach der Unsterblichkeit der 
Einzelligen; Das Keimplasma; Die Allmacht der Na- 
turzuchtung; Neue Gedanken zur Vererbungsfrage; 
Uber Germinalselektion; Vortrige zur Deszendenz- 
theorie (2 Vols. 2nd ed. 1904). The latter is a sketch of 
the Darwinian theory of selection. _Weismann’s con- 
troversy with Herbert Spencer over whether function- 
ally acquired variations of structure are hereditary 
is well known. Spencer was right in affirming with 
certain restrictions what Weismann denied. 

The following works of Weismann are in English: 
Germplasm (2 Vols., Scribners). Germinal Selection as 
the source of definite Variation (Open Court, Chicago). 
Essays upon Heredity (2 Vols., Oxford, edited by E. 
Poulton). 

12 Nageli: Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der 
Abstammungslehre (Munich and Leipzig). 

18 De Vries, H.: Die Mutationslehre (Leipzig, 1901- 
03). Arten und Varietiten und ihre Entstehung durch 
Mutation. According to De Vries the important devel- 
opment from species to species is not accomplished by 
variation, that is to say, not by a gradual progressive 
development of the smallest variations, but by muta- 
tion, that is, by a sudden leap. 

The following of the writings of De Vries are in 
English: Mutation Theory (2 Vols., Open Court, 
Chicago): Species and Varieties, their origin by muta- 
tion (Open Court). 


159 


Christian Belief in God 


14 Of Ostwald’s numerous publications his Vorlesungen 
uber Naturphilosophie (3rd ed., 1905) is the most im- 
portant. If we would be exact, it should be noted 
that Ostwald’s whole undertaking can be considered 
natural philosophy only in a very restricted sense, for 
he intentionally rejects all apriorism. 

Ostwald’s Natural Philosophy has been translated 
(Holt, 1910). 

15 Driesch has passed gradually from a mechanical 
naturalistic world-view to a most emphatic insistence 
upon the uniqueness of the processes of life. He is the 
leader of the neo-vitalists. At the same time, he nat- 
urally leans toward Aristotelianism. Cf. especially 
the following of his works: Die Biologie als selbst- 
stindige Grundwissenschaft: Die organischen Regula- 
tionen: Naturbegriffe und Natururteile: Der Vitalismus 
als Geschichte und als Lehre: Philosophie des Or- 
ganischen (2 Vols., 1909). 

Driesch’s Science and Philosophy of the Organism 
is in English (Macmillan). His lectures on Vitalism 
are also in English (Macmillan). 

16 Reinke: Die Welt als Tat (Berlin, 4th ed., 1905). 
Reinke gives a more technical exposition of his view 
in his Einleitung in die theoretische Biologie (Berlin, 
tg01). See also the article: Die Dominantenlehre in 
Natur und Schule (2nd ed., 1903). Reinke’s general 
philosophical position must be carefully weighed. 
Taken as a whole his epistemological position is really 
not that of “critical philosophy,” and that weakness 
often mars his judgment of particular problems. To 
this weakness, for example, is due his exceedingly un- 
fortunate position toward the account of creation in 
Genesis. 

1” Hartmann’s basic work is Die Philosophie des 


160 


Notes and References 


Unbewussten (2nd ed., 3 Vols., 1904). From our own 
point of view the second part of his Religionsphilosophie 
is also especially important. It bears the special title: 
Die Religion des Geistes (1882). Of his more recent 
works the following should be mentioned: Kategorien- 
lehre (1896): Geschichte der Metaphysik (2 Vols., 
1899-1900). 

Drews, Arthur: has published a good exposition of the 
Hartmannian philosophy: E. von Hartmanns philo- 
sophisches System im Grundriss (1902). Of Drews’ 
other works the following deserve special mention: 
Die deutsche Spekulation seit Kant, mit besonderer 
Rucksicht auf das Wesen des Absoluten and die Per- 
sénlichkeit Gottes (1893): Die Religion als Selbst- 
bewusstsein Gottes (1906). Drews also wrote the in- 
troductory article in the book on monism which he 
edited: Der Monismus in Beitrigen seiner Vertreter 
(1908). He has recently undertaken, with less success, 
to discuss historical subjects. So far as the special 
historical discussions are concerned his book entitled: 
Die Christusmythe (Jena, 1909, Part II, 1911) is 
highly contestible. For a discussion of the chief ques- 
tions bearing on the significance of the historicity of 
Jesus Christ for the Christian religion, see my Ge- 
schichte und Historie in der Religionswissenschaft 
(Tubingen, 1911). 

The following of the above mentioned works are 
in English: Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious 
(Paul, Kegan, French, Trubner & Co., London): Drews’ 
Christ Myth (Open Court, Chicago). 

18 Baumann, Jul.: Die Grundfrage der Religion 
(1895): Realwissenschaftliche Begriindung der Moral; 
des Rechts und der Gotteslehre (1898): Neuchristentum 
und reale Religion (1901). 


161 


Christian Belief in God 

19 Hofiding: Philosophy of Religion (Macmillan). 

*0In my opinion, Wundt’s chief significance as a 
philosopher lies in his comprehensive knowledge which 
extends into the most varied spheres, and which he is 
able to utilize in the discussion of special philosophical 
problems. The result is that such problems are dealt 
with by him upon the basis of all present-day exper- 
imental knowledge. As evidence of this see especially 
the methodological part of his Logik (1894-95). Of 
course, on the other hand, it is just this characteristic 
which constitutes the basis for the limitations that are 
contained in his methodology, and which are very 
evident, so far as his Logik is concerned, when it is com- 
pared with the Logik of Christ. Sigwarts, for example 
(2nd ed., 1889-93, Vol. II, Die Methodenlehre. This 
book is in English). The same criticism is valid of 
Wundt’s most recent comprehensive work: Vélker- 
psychologie. (See especially Vols. 3, 4 and 5 of the 2nd 
ed.) For Wundt’s metaphysical position see his Sys- 
tem der Philosophie (3rd ed., 1903). 

The most important of Wundt’s disciples is Oswald 
Kulpe—see especially his Einleitung in die Philosophie 
(3rd ed., 1907). A good résumé of the philosophy of 
Wundt is that by Edm. Konig in Fromann’s Sammlung 
philosophischer Klassiker (1901). Cf. also Rudolph 
Eisler: W. Wundts Philosophie und Psychologie (1902). 

Kilpe’s Study of Philosophy is published in English 
by Allen, George & Co., London. 

1 Fr, Paulsen (died 1908): Kant, der Philosoph des 
Protestantismus (1899). Cf. also his exposition of 
Kant’s philosophy in Frommann’s Sammlung philos- 
ophischer Klassiker (4th ed., 1903). His Einleitung in 
die Philosophie (16th ed., 1906) is especially noteworthy 
from our point of view. Cf. also Anm. 9. 


162 


Notes and References 


Paulsen’s Introduction to Philosophy (Holt, and also 
Paul, Kegan, Trench, Trubner & Co.), and his Kant 
(Scribners) are in English. 

22 William James (died 1910) is known primarily by 
his Principles of Psychology, Varieties of Religious 
Experience and Pragmatism. He wasa strong advocate 
of pragmatism in his last years. Indeed this is fore- 
shadowed in his interesting essays: The Will to Believe. 

°3 Fechner’s chief philosophical work is entitled Zend 
Avesta (1851, new ed. by Lasswitz, r90r). The best 
exposition of Fechner’s philosophy is that by Kurd. 
Lasswiiz in Fromann’s Sammlung, 3rd ed., 1910. The 
following works of Fechner are important as develop- 
ments of the doctrine set forth in Zend Avesta: Das 
Bucklein vom Leben nach dem Tode (4th ed., 1900): 
Nanna, oder uber das Seelenleben der Pflanzen (edited 
by Lasswitz, 1899). Cf. also Wundt’s Gustav Theodor 
Fechner, Rede zur Feier seines hundertjahrigen Geburt- 
stages (1901). Also R. Liebe: Fechners Metaphysik 
(1903). 

Fechner’s Little Book of Life after Death has been 
twice translated into English (Little, Brown & Co., 
Boston, with an introduction by William James, and 
Open Court, Chicago). 

4 Eucken has himself published a philosophy of 
religion: Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion (2nd ed., 
1905). Chief among his other works are the following: 
Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt (2nd ed., 
1907): Geistige Strémungen der Gegenwart (4th ed., 
Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart, 1909). His Lebensan- 
schauungen der grossen Denker (6th ed., 1905) should 
also be mentioned. 

The following of the works of Eucken are in English: 
Truth of Religion (Putnam, r9r1): Problems of Human 


163 


Christian Belief in God 


Life, as viewed by the great thinkers from Plato to 
the present time (Macmillan, 1909): Main Currents of 
Modern Thought (1912). 

> Wilhelm Dilthey: (died 1911) unfortunately never 
completed his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 
the main tendency of which I outlined in the text. 
The first volume appeared in 1883. Along with it we 
should mention his voluminous discussion: Ideen iiber 
eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie (in 
the Sitzungsberichten der Berliner Akademie der Wis- 
senschaften, 1894). The exceedingly noteworthy 
sketch, referred to in the text, about the world-views 
that are possible today is to be found in the Archiv 
fur Geschichte der Philosophie (Neue Folge, Vol. IV, 
1898, pp. 551 ff.). Cf. also Dilthey’s Wesen der Philos- 
ophie in Hinneberg’s Kultur der Gegenwart (Vol. I, 
Pt. IV), and his: Die Typen der Weltanschauung und 
ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen, in 
the collective work Weltanschauung (Berlin, 1910). 

In a somewhat different way Heinrich Rickert en- 
deavors to reach the same goal as Dilthey. His great 
epoch-making work bears the title: Die Grenzen der 
naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (2nd ed., 1913). 
The smaller work: Kulturwissenschaft und Natur- 
wissenschaft (2nd ed., 1910), gives a brief and helpful 
discussion of the basic thoughts. Cf. also Rickert’s 
article Geschichtsphilosophie, in the volume published 
in memory of Kuno Fischer: Die Philosophie im Beginn 
des 20 Jahrhunderts (2nd ed., 1907). Since 1910 Georg 
Mehlis has been publishing in Tubingen an interna- 
tional magazine for the philosophy of culture under the 
title ‘Logos,’ in which some valuable articles by 
Rickert have appeared. For the significance of the 
position of Rickert to theological and religio-philosoph- 


164 


Notes and References 


ical work, see my discussion in Geschichte und Historie 
in der Religionswissenschaft (Tiibingen, 1911). Cf. also 
Fr. Traub, Theologie und Philosophie, pp. 93 ff. 

Windelband, Praludien (3rd ed., 1907). 

6 Herbert Spencer’s System of Synthetic Philosophy 
(1862 ff.) contains in volume I, First Principles, the 
fundamental principles of the whole system, and in the 
other nine volumes the application of these prinicples 
to the disciplines Biology (new revised and enlarged 
edition 1898-99), Psychology, Sociology and Ethics. 
Spencer makes the theory of evolution into a philos- 
ophy, and develops the concept of evolution in every 
sphere of human knowledge. (See Gaup: Herbert 
Spencer Fromann’s, 2nd ed., 1900.) That Spencer is 
thereby led into arbitrariness and dilettantism cannot 
be denied. 

*7 See Kant’s formulation of this thought in Religion 
innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 2nd ed., 
p. 16. 

*8See Kant’s posthumous writings, published by 
Rudolph Reicke (Altpreussischen Monatsschrift, Vols. 
XIX and XX). Cf. also Heman in Kantstudien (1904, 
pp. 155 ff.). 

9 The history of the discovery of Neptune, that is to 
say, the history of the prognostication of its existence, 
and of the approximated precomputation of its course 
(the course of a planet hypothetically disclosed!) on 
the basis of the variations in the course of Uranus, 
along with the discovery of the planet later by Galle, is 
not only highly interesting in itself, but is also of su- 
preme importance to every complete epistemological 
and metaphysical view. A purely positivistic epistemol- 
ogy, that is, an epistemology which claims that expe- 
rience is the only source of knowledge, is contradicted 


165 


Christian Belief in God 


by such a fact as the discovery of Neptune. W. Meyer 
has given a detailed account of the discovery (Viertel- 
jahrsschrift der Zuricher naturforschenden Gesellschaft, 
1874, pp. 226 ff.). i 

3° Du Bois Reymond: Uber die Grenzen des Natur- 
erkennens (8th ed., 1898, p. 17). The further develop- 
ment following the statement given in the text shows 
that the criticism there given is not unjust. Moreover 
a further epistemological error, worse than the one 
pointed out, is to be seen. For he makes the supposi- 
tion that the “‘Laplacian Spirit” is not limited to nat- 
ural occurrence in its ability to foretell events, but is 
able to foretell what will happen in the future of the 
race. Thus the human will is treated as if it were a — 
physical atom. 

31'To supplement the very brief sketch of the posi- 
tions of Hartmann, Drews, Spencer and Wundt which 
was given in the text, the following references to espe- 
cially instructive résumés of their philosophy by each 
of these writers should be given: Hartmann, Die Reli- 
gion des Geistes, pp. 155 ff. Cf. Anm.17. Drews, Die 
deutsche Spekulation seit Kant, Vol. I, pp. 65 f., cf. also, 
Das Ich als Grundproblem der Metaphysik, pp. 279 ff., 
and Die Religion als Selbstbewusstsein Gottes, pp. 
282 ff.: Spencer, First Principles, concluding section of 
the book, reprinted as especially characterizing his 
position by Spencer himself in Principles of Biology 
(concluding section): Wundt, System der Philosophie, 
and ed., pp. 666 ff. 

82 H. Lotze’s well known article: Leben und Lebens- 
kraft in Wagner’s Handwoérterbuch der Physiologie 
(Braumschweig, 1842). 

33 Oscar Hertwig’s Zeit- und Streitfragen der Biol- 
ogie, having been written for the general public, is 


166 


Notes and References 


especially deserving of recommendation. For the ques- 
tion dealt with in the text the work entitled Mechanik 
und Biologie (1897) is important. See also his address: 
Die Lehre vom Organismus und ihre Beziehung zur 
Sozialwissenschaft (1899). The text-book: Die Zelle 
und die Gewebe (1893-98) is strictly technical. In 
Vol. II, Ch. V, he gives a thorough discussion of the 
difference between the mechanical and the organic. 
This book is in English (Allen, George & Co., London). 

34H. Driesch: Philosophie des Organischen, Vol. II, 
pp. 135 f. 

35 Kupffer gives the criticism of the text in his address 
at the opening of the tenth convocation of the An- 
atomische Gesellschaft (Ergainzungsheft zum XII 
Band des Anatomischen Anzeigers, 1896). The inves- 
tigations in question were conducted by Herbst, to 
whom we also owe the discovery that the eyes of crabs 
can only be regenerated when the ganglia opticum re- 
-mains unimpaired. Similar investigations were made 
by H. Przibram in 1900 at the zodlogical station in 
Naples. Among the results of these the following is 
especially interesting from our point of view, not only 
because it warns us against what was mentioned in the 
text, but also because, by reason of its greater com- 
plexity, it warns us against a premature acceptance 
of “dysteleology.” In species of alpheus which lose 
the large “snapping claw,” a small “pinching claw” 
afterwards grows in its place, while the pinching claw 
which has not been destroyed develops, by means of 
various changes in size and form of the skin, into a 
snapping claw. See Przibram’s proof in Vol. XX,p. 526, 
of the Biologischen Zentralblatt. Further testimony 
is to be found in the works of Driesch (see Anm. 15, 
but more especially Die Organischen Regulationen, 


167 


Christian Belief in God 


tgo1, and Philosophie des Organischen, Vol. I, 
1909). 

36 Natirliche Schépfungsgeschichte, roth ed., p. 775. 
When Haeckel here refers to Helmholz—“as this, 
for example, has been proven, so far as the human eye 
is concerned, by Helmholz, one of the most careful in- 
vestigators of the eye’”—he is thinking of Helmholz’ 
discussion in the Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik, 
where he refers, despite his admiration of the wonderful 
arrangement of the human eye, to the fact that im- 
perfections are to be found in it. However, so far as 
the bearing of this fact upon our own and Haeckel’s 
philosophical formulation of the question is concerned, 
the following sentence from Helmholz, which is the 
most significant one of all, shows with the utmost de- 
sirable clearness. “The apparent monochromatical 
divergencies in the eye are not, as the spherical aberra- 
tions of glass lenses, symmetrical around an axis, but, 
on the contrary, they are unsymmetrical and of such 
a kind as are not to be found in well made optical in- 
struments” (2nd ed., p. 170). The words I have ital- 
icised show very plainly the point of view which, in a 
subjective and sub-conscious way, dominates Helm- 
holz’ whole conception. 

37 K. E. von Baer (died 1876), excepting Darwin, did 
more than anyone else to give a scientific establishment 
to the doctrine of evolution—a doctrine which he even 
advocated before 1859, that is to say, before the appear- 
ance of Darwin’s Origin of the Species. Von Baer was 
foremost among the natural scientists and philosophers 
exercising a great influence upon Herbert Spencer. 
For the Baerian thesis, that the evolution of every 
living being consists in an advance from a similarity 
of structure to a dissimilarity of structure, was extended 


168 


Notes and References 


and enlarged by Spencer into a general law of evolution, 
namely, that all evolution consists of a process of grad- 
ual dissipation and concomitant integration (see First 
Principles, p. 470). The work of von Baer which is of 
general philosophical interest bears the title Reden und 
kleinere Aufsitze and is in two volumes. For his con- 
ception of a directedness toward an end, see his treatise: 
Uber Zweckmissigkeit oder Zielstrebigkeit tiberhaupt, 
and also, Uber Zielstrebigkeit in den organischen 
Korpern insbesondere (of. cit., Vol. II, pp. 51 ff. and 
173 ff.). The catholic philosopher, R. Stélzle, has given 
a complete and useful exposition of the Baerian world- 
view: K, E, v. Baer und seine Weltanschauung (1897). 

P. N. Cossmann’s book: Elemente der empirischen 
Teleologie (1899) has the merit of pointing out the ex- 
tent to which recent science, even though often un- 
willingly and contrary to its desire in the matter, works 
with teleological principles. 

38 Reinke expresses this view under the concept 
“dominanten.” Dominanten are for him the funda- 
mental forces which guide evolution. They are to be 
presupposed for the most varied spheres of organic life. 
It should not be overlooked that this theory of Reinke 
assists in the obliteration of the boundaries between 
natural scientific investigation and philosophical re- 
flection, It can claim no further credit than that of 
having brought to expression the need of an enlarge- 
ment of the causal and mechanistic by a teleological 
view. 

3°In his address before the Akademie der Wissen- 
schaften, of Berlin, entitled ‘‘The Epistle of Ptolmey to 
Flora,” Harnack has brought out the fact that, even 
in early Christianity, attempts were not lacking at 
bringing the basic thoughts of the Christian religion 


169 


Christian Belief in God 


under a kind of evolutionary idea. (Sitzungsberichte 
der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902, pp. 
522 ff.). 

“0 Whereas, for example, so far as the animal king- 
dom is concerned, the standard classification of the 
first half of the 19th century was that of George Cuvier, 
in which four great branches (vertebrates, articulates, 
mollusks and radiates) were differentiated, the clas- 
sifications of zodlogists today vary from seven (R. 
Hertwig) to seventeen (Fleischmann) divisions. 

41 The famous archaeopteryx lithographica, found in 
the slates of Solenhofen, certainly cannot be considered 
a special intermediary form between birds and reptiles. 
But it does show the hypothetical character and the 
insufficiency of our idea of classes. See Fleischmann 
(op. cit, Ch. VI). 

*2 A discovery made in 1891 in Java by a Dutch army 
surgeon, Eugene Dubois, has been put forth with de- 
cided positiveness by Haeckel and his friends as a 
fossil of a “true monkey-man” (Pithecantropus 
erectus). From Haeckel’s account in the Natiirliche 
Schépfungsgeschichte the laity would scarcely under- 
stand that this discovery consisted only of a skull, two 
molar teeth and a thigh bone! And it should be added 
that it has never been proven that these pieces all be- 
long to a single individual, Haeckel’s concluding ver- 
dict is so characteristic of his way of dealing. with such 
matters that I cannot refrain from quoting it here. 
“This genuine monkey-man stands so nearly between 
the known man-like apes and the lower races of man 
that in 1895, at the International Zodlogical Congress, 
at Leyden, a very spirited debate as to its meaning took 
place. About a dozen leading authorities expressed 
their opinion on the subject. Three declared that the 


170 


Notes and References 

thigh-bone and the skull of this great anthropcid be- 
longed to a monkey, three others held that they be- 
longed to a human being, and six or more other zodl- 
ogists declared the animal to be what 1t really is according 
to the laws of logic(!) namely: a true transitional form be- 
tween man and monkey—the much sought “missing 
link”? of the line of our ancestors. (Op. cit. 1902, 
pp. 715 f.). Today prominent zodélogists, for example, 
Hermann Klaatsch, declare that Dubois’ discovery 
is not justly entitled to the name Pithecantropus erectus. 
They say that erectus is a misnomer because, in all 
probability, the animal did not have an erect posture. 
For the same reason, and also upon other grounds, 
the name Pithecantropus is also false. In all probability, 
so these authorities hold, this animal is a species of 
Anthropopithecus, and is a man-like ape. 

On the other hand, the meaning of the so-called 
Neanderthal skull and the other fossils found with it, 
has recently been more strongly emphasized and more 
highly valued than hitherto. These bones were found 
in 1859 in the valley of Neander near Duesseldorf. 
The skull is of a man, is very flat on top and has a very 
thick bone-friz above the eye-holes. Virchow regards 
this as a pathological skull formation. But this is not 
the only other important discovery. Many others have 
been made. For example, to mention only the most 
significant, that made in Belgium in the cave of Spy, 
and especially the one made in Croatia, near Crapina, 
where a whole mound of bones, with pieces of no less 
than ten individuals representing different periods, 
has been discovered. The more recent discoveries of 
Moustier and La Chapelle-aux-Saints (both made in 
1908) belong to the Neanderthal type. All of these. 
discoveries show a type of man which really varies from 


171 


Christian Belief in God 


the average type of today. Yet they remain within 
the general type “man,” and more than likely, they 
simply are evidence of an older race of men having 
existed. 

It appears to be somewhat different with the third 
most recent discovery, that by the Heidelberg wall. 
Here, in October, 1907, there was unearthed a lower 
jaw-bone with some teeth intact, the characteristics of 
which, according to specialists, refer to a type that is 
older than the Neanderthal type. Indeed some in- 
vestigators (especially Otto Schoetensack and Herr- 
mann Klaatsch) think that they can see in this “homo 
Heidelbergensis”’ the universal root form from which, 
on the one hand, man, and on the other hand, the 
man-like apes, have developed. Cf. O. Schoeten- 
sack: Der Unterkiefer des ‘Homo-Heidelbergensis,” 
(1909). 

In conclusion, and this is the important point for us 
here, the Christian belief in God has absolutely no 
interest in the question of the direct origin of the 
human race, and the answering of this question in the 
strictest sense of the Darwinian theory would not in 
the least affect this belief. 

‘8 For a criticism of ‘‘biogenetic basic laws’ see Ch. 
XIV of Fleischmann’s Die Ausnahmen des biogen- 
etischen Grundgesetzes. But Fleischmann’s criticism 
is very unfortunate in this connection because it is so 
exaggerated. Prudent and sober-minded specialists 
take the position given in the text. For example, see 
Oscar Hertwig: Die Zelle und die Gewebe (1898, 
Bk. II, pp. 273 ff., translated). 

“4'The technical expressions of the text refer to the 
most important elements and stages of embryonic 
development, according to the view considered valid 


172 


Notes and References 


today. Concerning this see the text-books of physiol- 
ogy, or H. Driesch: Philosophie des Organischen, Vol. I, 
eat | 

4° The chief critics of Darwinism among natural 
scientists are: Wigand, Der Darwinismus und die 
Naturforschung Newtons und Cuviers (3 Vols. 1874- 
77); Gustav Wolff, in Biologischen Zentralblatt, Vols. X 
and XIV. More exact information concerning the 
history of recent natural science in its relation to Dar- 
winism is to be found in Rudolph Otto’s admirable book: 
Naturalistische und religidse Weltansicht (2nd ed., 
1909). I should also mention especially Gust. Portig’s 
large two volume work: Das Weltgesetz des kleinsten 
Kraftaufwandes in den Reichen der Natur (1903-04). 
Beneath his fantastic speculations there lies buried a 
genuine bit of knowledge and a kernel of profound 
truth. See also K. Beth: Die Entwicklungsgedanke und 
das Christentum. 

‘6 For the development of the religious life of Tolstoi 
the following works are of special importance: My Con- 
fession (1879), My Belief (1884), What, then shall we 
do? (1885). His “Life” is more systematic (1880). 
The illustrated cabinet edition is the best English 
edition of the works of Tolstoi (Estes). Of the liter- 
ature about Tolstoi the work by Fr. Rittelmeyer: Tol- 
stois religidse Botschaft (1905) should be mentioned. 

“7 Helmholz has put forth the idea that the origin of 
life on the earth is perhaps to be explained by a trans- 
ference of germs of life to the earth from other heavenly 
bodies. He has not failed to recognize the purely 
hypothetical character of this supposition, and he has 
advanced it with extreme reserve. On the other hand, 
he simply implicitly presupposes the existence of crea- 
tural life on other planets. The discussion in question 


173 


Christian Belief in God 


is as interesting as it is noteworthy. (See his Vortriage 
und Reden, Vol. II, pp. 346 ff. 

Translator’s note: I append a list of the writings of 
Dr. Wobbermin published by the J. C. Hinrichs Com- 
pany, of Leipzig, publishers of the German edition of 
this work. 


Die religionspsychologische Methode in Religion und 
Theologie. (XIII, 475 S.) 8°. 1913. 


Buch I: Die Voraussetzungen der religionspsychol- 

ogischen Methode. 

1. Die Stellung der Theologie im Gesamtsystem 
der Wissenschaften. 

2. Aufgabe und Gliederung der Theologie im 
allgemeinen und der systematischen Theologie 
im besonderen. 

3. Die Forderung methodischer Einheitlichkeit 
fiir das Gesamtgebiet der systematischen 
Theologie. 


Buch II: Die religionspsychologische Methode. 

4. Die religionspsychologische Methode als Fort- 
fiihrung der Schleiermacher-James’schen 
Problemstellung. 

5. Die religionspsychologische Methode als ein- 
heitliche Methode der systematischen The- 
ologie. 


Theologie und Metaphysik. Das Verhalinis der Theo- 
logie zur modernen Erkenntnistheorie und Psychologie. 


(XII, 291 S.) gr. 8°. 1901. 


Ernst Haeckel im Kampf gegen die christliche Weltan- 
schauung. (308.) 8°. 1906. 


174 


Notes and References 
Grundprobleme der systematischen Theologie. Zwei 
akademische Vorlesungen. (43 S.) gr. 8°. 1899. 


1. Der Wahrheitsbeweis fiir die christliche Religion. 
2. Aufgabe und Methode der evangelischen Dogmatik. 


In deutscher Ausgabe bearbeitete Professor Wobbermin: 

William James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience. 
A Study in Human Nature. 

Die religiose Erfahrung in ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit. 
Materialien und Studien zu einer Psychologie und 
Pathologie des religidsen Lebens. (XXI, 472 S.) 8°. 

Zweite durchgesehene Auflage 1914. 


175 











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